The house that the Court built. The retained powers case law of the European Court of Justice and the constitutional structure of the Union

Euroopan unionin perustamissopimusten katsotaan muodostavan EU:n valtiosäännön, jonka rajat ovat kuitenkin perustamissopimusten määräysten väljän muotoilun sekä Euroopan unionin tuomioistuimen tulkintakäytännön valossa epätarkat. Etenkin kysymys unionin ja sen jäsenvaltioiden välisestä toimivallanjaosta on EU-oikeudellisen tutkimuksen klassikoita. Tarkastelen pro gradu -tutkielmassani unionin valtiosääntörakennetta ja unionioikeuden kokonaisvaikutusta jäsenvaltioiden toimivaltojen käyttöön erityisesti EU-tuomioistuimen ratkaisukäytännössään kehittämän niin kutsutun retained powers -doktriinin valossa. Kyseisen opin mukaan EU-oikeus asettaa vaatimuksia jäsenvaltioiden toimivaltojen käytölle myös niillä aloilla, joilla sääntelytoimivalta on jäänyt jäsenvaltioille eikä sitä ole jaettu unionin kanssa. Aiheen teoreettisen tarkastelun pohjalta analysoin Euroopaun unionin tuomioistuimen ratkaisukäytäntöä erityisesti yhtä säilytetyn toimivallan alaa, koulutusta, koskevissa tapauksissa pyrkien havaitsemaan typologioita tuomioistuimen ratkaisutoiminnassa. Tutkimus noudattaa EU-valtiosääntöoikeuden metodologiaa. Keskeisenä lähdemateriaalina on siten käytetty unionituomioistuimen ratkaisukäytäntöä, joka heijastaa perustamissopimuksia tarkemmin unionin valtiosääntörakennetta. Oikeuskäytännön analyysi ja tulkinta on suoritettu peilaten sitä vasten unionin kehitystä markkinaorientoituneesta organisaatiosta yleismaailmalliseksi poliittiseksi unioniksi. Tutkielmani loppupäätelmä on, että jäsenvaltiot ovat tietyissä rajoissa hyväksyneet unionituomioistuimen kehittämän doktriinin, ja unionituomioistuin on siten saanut aikaan tosiasiallisen muutoksen EU:n valtiosääntörakenteessa. Retained powers -doktriini on omiaan syventämään eurooppalaista integraatiota ja nostaa kysymyksiä toimivallanjaon merkityksestä unionioikeudessa, perustamissopimusten kyvystä heijastaa unionin valtiosääntörakennetta sekä unionituomioistuimen toiminnan poliittisesta luonteesta.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

In-house lawyers of NRAs may not represent their clients before the European Court of Justice: A case note on UKE (2011). Research Papers in Law, 3/2011

From the Introduction. It is not frequent for a National Regulation Authority (NRA) to bring an action against the Commission decision and, cynically speaking, case Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej2 v Commission3 shows that the avoidance of a sweeping retaliation may be one of the reasons for it. The General Court followed the Commission‟s argument that, notwithstanding the peculiarities of the employment conditions of the Polish Regulator‟s legal counsel giving it virtually full independence, as well as the fact that the Polish law itself does not differentiate between in-house counsel and third party attorneys, the claim should be rejected on the grounds of inadmissibility. The GC based its judgment on Art 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice4, which requires that, with the exception of the Member States' Governments and the EU Institutions, parties to the dispute must be represented by a lawyer. In so doing, the Court explicitly referred to the infamous Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission5 and EREF v Commission6. Most importantly, the Court stated that the lawyers representing Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej (UKE) are bound to enjoy a degree of independence inferior to that of lawyers who are not linked to their clients by an employment contract7.

The European Court of Justice blocks the EU’s accession to the ECHR. CEPS Commentary, 8 January 2015

The goal of accession to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) is to place the EU under the external oversight of the specialised court in Strasbourg. But in its Opinion of 18 December 2014 the Luxembourg-based European Court of Justice ruled that the draft accession agreement is not compatible with the EU treaties. In this commentary the authors argue that this would force EU member states to renegotiate the terms of accession to the ECHR. But meeting the demands made by the Court of Justice will prove to be very difficult.