The industrial equilibrium exchange rate in Brazil: an estimation

This paper presents a methodology for calculating the industrial equilibrium exchange rate, which is defined as the one enabling exporters of state-of-the-art manufactured goods to be competitive abroad. The first section highlights the causes and problems of overvalued exchange rates, particularly the Dutch disease issue, which is neutralized when the exchange rate strikes the industrial equilibrium level. This level is defined by the ratio between the unit labor cost in the country under consideration and in competing countries. Finally, the evolution of this exchange rate in the Brazilian economy is estimated.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Linking conflict to inequality and polarization

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray

Field optimisation of MosquiTRAP sampling for monitoring Aedes aegypti Linnaeus (Diptera: Culicidae)

A sticky trap designed to capture gravid Aedes (Stegomyia) aegypti mosquitoes, MosquiTRAP, has been evaluated for monitoring this species in Brazil. However, the effects of trap densities on the capture rate of Ae. aegypti females and the sensitivity of vector detection are still unknown. After a preliminary study has identified areas of high and low female mosquito abundance, a set of experiments was conducted in four neighbourhoods of Belo Horizonte (state of Minas Gerais, Brazil) using densities of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64 traps per block. Trap sensitivity (positive MosquiTRAP index) increased significantly when 1-8 MosquiTRAPs were installed per block in both high and low abundance areas. A strong fit was obtained for the total number of mosquitoes captured with increasing trap densities through a non-linear function (Box-Lucas) (r² = 0,994), which likely exhibits saturation towards an equilibrium level. The capacity of the Mean Female Aedes Index to distinguish between areas of high and low Ae. aegypti abundance was also investigated; the achieved differentiation was shown to be dependent on the MosquiTRAP density.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Endividamento público, crescimento, moeda e inflação: comentário a "matemática agradável", de Gerson Lima - a réplica

This paper aims at replying critical commentaries made by Leite, F. P., Aggio, G. O. e Angeli, E. (this Review, 2009) on two Author's theses. The first one states that, if public deficit is to be financed, then either interest rate applied is negative or government invests as if it where a profit-making business enterprise. Otherwise, public debt will mathematically follow an explosive trend. The second one says that if there is no debt and public deficit is paid with money issuing, then the monetary stock will tend to an equilibrium level.

The Quest for Hegemony Among Countries and Global Pollution

This paper builds on the assumption that countries behave in such a way as to improve, via their economic strength, the probability that they will attain the hegemonic position on the world stage. The quest for hegemony is modeled as a game, with countries being differentiated initially only by some endowment which yields a pollution free flow of income. A country's level of pollution is assumed directly related to its economic strength, as measured by its level of production. Two types of countries are distinguished: richly-endowed countries, for whom the return on their endowment is greater than the return they can expect from winning the hegemony race, and poorly-endowed countries, who can expect a greater return from winning the race than from their endowment. We show that in a symmetric world of poorly-endowed countries the equilibrium level of emissions is larger than in a symmetric world of richly-endowed countries: the former, being less well endowed to begin with, try harder to win the race. In the asymmetric world composed of both types of countries, the poorly-endowed countries will be polluting more than the richly endowed countries. Numerical simulations show that if the number of richly-endowed countries is increased keeping the total number of countries constant, the equilibrium level of global emissions will decrease; if the lot of the poorly-endowed countries is increased by increasing their initial endowment keeping that of the richly-endowed countries constant, global pollution will decrease; increasing the endowments of each type of countries in the same proportion, and hence increasing the average endowment in that proportion, will decrease global pollution; redistributing from the richly-endowed in favor of the poorly-endowed while keeping the average endowment constant will in general result in an increase in the equilibrium level of global pollution.

Essais sur des questions internationales en économie de l'environnement

Cette thèse est constituée de trois articles. Le premier étudie le problème de pollution globale dans un contexte environnemental incertain. Le deuxième article traite des accords internationaux sur l'environnement. Le troisième article montre comment la libéralisation du commerce peut affecter le bien-être et les taxes sur la pollution dans un monde où les pays sont hétérogènes et la pollution transfrontalière. Dans le premier article, je considère un monde dans lequel les pays souffrent uniformément de la pollution globale. Ils font face à une menace continuelle de voir les dommages causés par cette pollution globale s'accroître subitement de façon irréversible. Je caractérise le niveau des émissions, le stock de pollution, et le niveau de bien-être actualisé en équilibres coopératif et non-coopératif. L'objectif visé est d'analyser l'impact de ce type d'incertitude sur les équilibres issus des comportements stratégiques des pays. Je trouve que cette incertitude peut avoir un effet significatif sur ces équilibres. Les pays réduisent leurs émissions pour atténuer leur exposition à cette menace. Plus la menace est grande, plus les pays ajustent leurs émissions afin de réduire le stock de pollution globale. Cependant, en dépit du fait que cette incertitude diminue le bien-être net initial, elle peut à long terme avoir un effet net positif sur le bien-être. Le deuxième article étend la classe des modèles dynamiques standards traitant des accords internationaux sur l'environnement au cas où la durée de la période d'engagement à de tels accords est un paramètre que l'on peut varier de façon exogène. Nous y étudions les évolutions dans le temps de la taille des coalitions stables, du stock de pollution et du taux d'émissions en fonction de la durée d'engagement. Nous montrons que la longueur de la période d'engagement a un effet très significatif sur l'équilibre. Trois intervalles de durée d'engagement sont identifiés pour lesquels l'équilibre et sa dynamique diffèrent considérablement. Alors que pour des durées de la période d'engagement très longues on observe des coalitions stables constituées d'un petit nombre de pays, si ces durées sont suffisamment courtes on peut observer un niveau de coopération élevé. Les durées d'engagement entre ces deux extrêmes sont caractérisées par une relation inverse entre la durée de la période d'engagement et la taille des coalitions stables. Ces faits portent à croire qu'il faudrait accorder une attention toute particulière au choix de la durée d'engagement lors de l'élaboration de tels accords internationaux. Le troisième article s'inscrit dans un contexte où les activités de production des pays potentiellement hétérogènes génèrent de la pollution qui peut traverser les frontières et nuire au bien-être des pays impliqués. Dans chacun de ces pays, l'état impose des taxes sur la pollution aux firmes polluantes et des tarifs à l'importation afin de corriger cette distorsion. Ce papier a pour but d'évaluer les effets que pourrait avoir une diminution des tarifs douaniers sur la production, les taxes sur la pollution et le bien-être de ces pays. La littérature existante a étudié ce problème, mais seulement dans le cadre d'un commerce bilatéral entre pays identiques. Cet article fournit un cadre d'analyse plus réaliste dans lequel les pays ne seront pas nécessairement identiques et où le commerce pourra être multilatéral. Il devient alors possible de mettre en évidence le biais introduit en négligeant ces deux facteurs. Dans ce nouveau contexte, je montre qu'une réduction des tarifs d'importation n'augmente pas nécessairement la production; elle peut aussi nuire au bien-être, même si la pollution est purement locale.

Forecasting the spot prices of various coffee types using linear and non-linear error correction models

Este documento estima modelos lineales y no-lineales de corrección de errores para los precios spot de cuatro tipos de café. En concordancia con las leyes económicas, se encuentra evidencia que cuando los precios están por encima de su nivel de equilibrio, retornan a éste mas lentamente que cuando están por debajo. Esto puede reflejar el hecho que, en el corto plazo, para los países productores de café es mas fácil restringir la oferta para incrementar precios, que incrementarla para reducirlos. Además, se encuentra evidencia que el ajuste es más rápido cuando las desviaciones del equilibrio son mayores. Los pronósticos que se obtienen a partir de los modelos de corrección de errores no lineales y asimétricos considerados en el trabajo, ofrecen una leve mejoría cuando se comparan con los pronósticos que resultan de un modelo de paseo aleatorio.

Revenue-neutral tax policy under price uncertainty

The firm's response to revenue-neutral taxation is investigated under price uncertainty. Revenue-neutral policies adjust simultaneously the marginal tax rate and the level of exemptions while keeping expected tax receipts constant. Nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient to sign the firm's response: a reduction in the marginal rate causes the firm to contract output. Implications are established for the equilibrium level of treasury receipts.

A mathematical model for the dynamics of Banana Xanthomonas Wilt with vertical transmission and inflorescence infection

A mathematical model for Banana Xanthomonas Wilt (BXW) spread by insect is presented. The model incorporates inflorescence infection and vertical transmission from the mother corm to attached suckers, but not tool-based transmission by humans. Expressions for the basic reproduction number R0 are obtained and it is verified that disease persists, at a unique endemic level, when R0 > 1. From sensitivity analysis, inflorescence infection rate and roguing rate were the parameters with most influence on disease persistence and equilibrium level. Vertical transmission parameters had less effect on persistence threshold values. Parameters were approximately estimated from field data. The model indicates that single stem removal is a feasible approach to eradication if spread is mainly via inflorescence infection. This requires continuous surveillance and debudding such that a 50% reduction in inflorescence infection and 2–3 weeks interval of surveillance would eventually lead to full recovery of banana plantations and hence improved production.

Coordenação entre política fiscal monetária no regime de metas de inflação

Essa dissertação trata da coordenação entre política monetária e política fiscal. O trabalho visa testar a hipótese de que a demanda agregada é afetada pela política fiscal no Brasil entre 1995 e 2006. Com esse intuito, o trabalho estima uma curva IS para o Brasil nesse período, incluindo variáveis fiscais explicativas. O resultado é de que há evidência estatística de que o desvio do produto em relação ao produto potencial (de agora em diante gap do produto) seja dependente (positivamente) do nível de gastos do governo e (negativamente) da arrecadação do setor público. Além disso, conforme a teoria prevê, o gasto do governo tem um efeito (em módulo) mais intenso do que a arrecadação do governo, de modo que tanto o nível do superávit primário, quanto o tamanho do governo em proporção ao PIB têm impacto sobre a demanda agregada. Assim, assumindo que a convergência da taxa de câmbio real via paridade descoberta de taxa de juros tenha sido defasada no período sob análise, a política fiscal pode ter contribuído para manutenção da taxa de juros real acima do nível de equilíbrio no período em questão.

Stable isotopes for determining carbon turnover in sheep feces and blood

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Optimal pest control problem in population dynamics

One of the main goals of the pest control is to maintain the density of the pest population in the equilibrium level below economic damages. For reaching this goal, the optimal pest control problem was divided in two parts. In the first part, the two optimal control functions were considered. These functions move the ecosystem pest-natural enemy at an equilibrium state below the economic injury level. In the second part, the one optimal control function stabilizes the ecosystem in this level, minimizing the functional that characterizes quadratic deviations of this level. The first problem was resolved through the application of the Maximum Principle of Pontryagin. The Dynamic Programming was used for the resolution of the second optimal pest control problem.