Early years teachers’ epistemic beliefs and beliefs about children’s moral learning

There is strong political and social interest in values education both internationally and across Australia. Investment in young children is recognised as important for the development of moral values for a cohesive society; however, little is known about early years teachers’ beliefs about moral values teaching and learning. The aim of the current study was to investigate the relationships between Australian early years teachers’ epistemic beliefs and their beliefs about children’s moral learning. Three hundred and seventy-nine teachers completed a survey about their personal epistemic beliefs and their beliefs about children’s moral learning. Results indicated that teachers with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs viewed children as capable of taking responsibility for their own moral learning. Conversely, teachers who held more naive or simplistic personal epistemic beliefs agreed that children need to learn morals through learning the rules for behaviour. Results are discussed in terms of the implications for moral pedagogy in the classroom and teacher professional development. It is suggested that in conjunction with explicitly reflecting on epistemic beliefs, professional development may need to assist teachers to ascertain how their beliefs might relate to their moral pedagogies in order to make any adjustments.

Epistemic beliefs and beliefs about teaching practices for moral learning in the early years of school : relationships and complexities

While investment in young children is recognised as important for the development of moral values for a cohesive society, little is known about early years teaching practices that promote learning of moral values. This paper reports on observations and interviews with 11 Australian teachers, focusing on their epistemic beliefs and beliefs about teaching practices for moral education with children aged 5 to 8 years. The analysis revealed three main patterns of thinking about moral education: following others, reflecting on points of view, and informing reflection for action. These patterns suggest a relationship between epistemic beliefs and beliefs about teaching practices for moral learning which have implications for teacher professional development concerning experiences in moral education.

Understanding children’s epistemic beliefs in elementary education

Research shows that the beliefs individuals hold about knowledge and knowing (epistemic beliefs) influence learning approaches and outcomes. However, little is known about the nature of children’s epistemic beliefs and how best to measure these. In this pilot study, 11 Australian children (in Grade 4 or Grade 6) were asked to ‘draw, write and tell’ about their epistemic beliefs using drawings, written responses and interviews respectively. Drawings were analysed, with the majority of children depicting external, one-way sources of knowledge. The written statements and interviews were analysed using inductive thematic analysis, showing that children predominantly described knowledge acquisition as processes of task-based learning. Interviews also enabled children to describe a wider range of views. These results indicate that the methodological combination of ‘draw, write and tell’ allowed for a deeper understanding of the children’s epistemic beliefs which holds implications for future research.

Pre-service teachers’ epistemic perspectives about philosophy in the classroom : it is not a bunch of ‘hippie stuff’

Using epistemic perspectives as a theoretical framework, this study investigated Australian pre-service teachers’ perspectives about knowing, knowledge and children’s learning, as they engaged in a semester-long unit on philosophy in the classroom. During the field experience component of the unit, pre-service teachers were required to teach at least one philosophy lesson. Pre-service teachers completed the Personal Epistemological Beliefs Survey at the beginning and end of the unit. They were also interviewed in focus groups at the end of the semester to investigate their views about children’s learning. Paired sample t-tests were used to explore changes in epistemic beliefs over time. Significant differences were found for only some individual items on the survey. However, when interviewed, pre-service teachers indicated that field experiences helped them consider children as competent ‘thinkers’ who were capable of engaging in philosophy in the classroom. They reported predominantly student-centred perspectives of children’s learning, although a process of adjudication (exploring disagreements and evidence for responses) was lacking in these responses.

Teachers’ and children’s personal epistemologies for moral education : Case studies in early years elementary education

While there is strong interest in teaching values in Australia and internationally there is little focus on young children’s moral values learning in the classroom. Research shows that personal epistemology influences teaching and learning in a range of education contexts, including moral education. This study examines relationships between personal epistemologies (children’s and teachers’), pedagogies, and school contexts for moral learning in two early years classrooms. Interviews with teachers and children and analysis of school policy revealed clear patterns of personal epistemologies and pedagogies within each school. A whole school approach to understanding personal epistemologies and practice for moral values learning is suggested.

Personal Epistemologies and Teaching

Over the last three decades, a growing body of research related to epistemic beliefs has been identified as a crucial for understanding teaching and learning (Yadav, Herron, & Samarapungavan, 2011). In particular, research related to beliefs about teaching, learning and knowledge has been considered important for understanding why teachers engage in certain approaches to pedagogy, curriculum and assessment in classrooms (Stromlo & Bråten, 2011). The beliefs held by teachers about knowledge and knowing, otherwise known as personal epistemology (Hofer, 2010), have been shown to influence other knowledge and beliefs (Schommer-Aikens, 2004). Five and Buehl (2012) indicated that because an individual’s understanding of reality is always seen through the lens of existing beliefs, the role of beliefs as a filter is particularly relevant in the context of teacher education. That is, if beliefs influence how individuals interpret new information and experiences, preservice and practicing teachers’ beliefs shape what and how they learn about teaching.” (p. 470-480). It is likely that such beliefs have an important relationship with teacher knowledge and practices...

Do the Messages Matter? An Investigation of Classroom Messages and College Students’ Personal Theories about Education

Students hold a number of personal theories about education that influence motivation and achievement in the classroom: theories about their own abilities, knowledge, and the learning process. Therefore, college instructors have a great interest in helping to develop adaptive personal theories in their students. The current studies investigated whether specific messages that instructors send in college classroom might serve as a mechanism of personal theory development. Across 2 studies, 17 college instructors and 401 students completed surveys assessing their personal theories about education at the beginning and end of college courses. Students and instructors reported hearing and sending many messages in the classroom, including instructor help messages, conciliatory messages, uncertainty in the field messages, differential ability messages and generalized positive and negative feedback. Between-class and within-class differences in message reports were associated with students’ personal theories at the end of their courses, controlling for initial personal theories. Students’ initial personal theories were also related to the messages students reported hearing. The findings demonstrate the utility of assessing non-content messages in college classrooms as potential mechanisms for changing students’ personal theories in college. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Remembering beliefs

Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pinpoint the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the experience of remembering from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. Lewis’ coherence argument for memorial knowledge.

Representing the epistemic nature of teachers’ practical knowledge : The case of class teachers’ general pedagogy

The present study addressed the epistemology of teachers’ practical knowledge. Drawing from the literature, teachers’ practical knowledge is defined as all teachers’ cognitions (e.g., beliefs, values, motives, procedural knowing, and declarative knowledge) that guide their practice of teaching. The teachers’ reasoning that lies behind their practical knowledge is addressed to gain insight into its epistemic nature. I studied six class teachers’ practical knowledge; they teach in the metropolitan region of Helsinki. Relying on the assumptions of the phenomenographic inquiry, I collected and analyzed the data. I analyzed the data in two stages where the first stage involved an abductive procedure, and the second stage an inductive procedure for interpretation, and thus developed the system of categories. In the end, a quantitative analysis nested into the qualitative findings to study the patterns of the teachers’’ reasoning. The results indicated that teachers justified their practical knowledge based on morality and efficiency of action; efficiency of action was found to be presented in two different ways: authentic efficiency and naïve efficiency. The epistemic weight of morality was embedded in what I call “moral care”. The core intention of teachers in the moral care was the commitment that they felt about the “whole character” of students. From this perspective the “dignity” and the moral character of the students should not replaced for any other “instrumental price”. “Caring pedagogy” was the epistemic value of teachers’ reasoning in the authentic efficiency. The central idea in the caring pedagogy was teachers’ intentions to improve the “intellectual properties” of “all or most” of the students using “flexible” and “diverse” pedagogies. However, “regulating pedagogy” was the epistemic condition of practice in the cases corresponding to naïve efficiency. Teachers argued that an effective practical knowledge should regulate and manage the classroom activities, but the targets of the practical knowledge were mainly other “issues “or a certain percentage of the students. In these cases, the teachers’ arguments were mainly based on the notion of “what worked” regardless of reflecting on “what did not work”. Drawing from the theoretical background and the data, teachers’ practical knowledge calls for “praxial knowledge” when they used the epistemic conditions of “caring pedagogy” and “moral care”. It however calls for “practicable” epistemic status when teachers use the epistemic condition of regulating pedagogy. As such, praxial knowledge with the dimensions of caring pedagogy and moral care represents the “normative” perspective on teachers’ practical knowledge, and thus reflects a higher epistemic status in comparison to “practicable” knowledge, which represents a “descriptive” perception toward teachers’ practical knowledge and teaching.

Group Beliefs : Studies on the Nature and Logic of Collective Doxastic Attitudes

This thesis studies the nature and logic of collective doxastic attitudes, or what is referred to in ordinary language as "group beliefs". Beliefs and other intentional attitudes are attributed to groups and collections of people, and such attributions are used to explain and predict the actions of groups. The thesis develops an understanding of group beliefs as voluntarily adopted views or acceptances rather than as ordinary beliefs. Such an understanding can provide new answers to questions concerning collective knowledge and justification of group beliefs, and it allows developing modal logics with collective doxastic and epistemic notions. The thesis consists of six articles. The first three articles are philosophical studies concerned with the nature of group beliefs. The last three articles are logical studies that aim at developing proof-theoretical calculi for reasoning about collective doxastic attitudes.

Adaptation of a questionnaire to assess the epistemological beliefs of mathematics in secondary school teachers

The objective of the study is to determine the psychometric properties of the Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire on Mathematics. 171 Secondary School Mathematics Teachers of the Central Region of Cuba participated. The results show acceptable internal consistency. The factorial structure of the scale revealed three major factors, consistent with the Model of the Three Constructs: beliefs about knowledge, about learning and teaching. Irregular levels in the development of the epistemological belief system about mathematics of these teachers were shown, with a tendency among naivety and sophistication poles. In conclusion, the questionnaire is useful for evaluating teacher’s beliefs about mathematics.

A Syntactic Approach to Revising Epistemic States with Uncertain Inputs

Revising its beliefs when receiving new information is an important ability of any intelligent system. However, in realistic settings the new input is not always certain. A compelling way of dealing with uncertain input in an agent-based setting is to treat it as unreliable input, which may strengthen or weaken the beliefs of the agent. Recent work focused on the postulates associated with this form of belief change and on finding semantical operators that satisfy these postulates. In this paper we propose a new syntactic approach for this form of belief change and show that it agrees with the semantical definition. This makes it feasible to develop complex agent systems capable of efficiently dealing with unreliable input in a semantically meaningful way. Additionally, we show that imposing restrictions on the input and the beliefs that are entailed allows us to devise a tractable approach suitable for resource-bounded agents or agents where reactiveness is of paramount importance.

A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states

Belief revision performs belief change on an agent’s beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of interpretations) is received. Jeffrey’s rule is commonly used for revising probabilistic epistemic states when new information is probabilistically uncertain. In this paper, we propose a general epistemic revision framework where new evidence is of the form of a partial epistemic state. Our framework extends Jeffrey’s rule with uncertain inputs and covers well-known existing frameworks such as ordinal conditional function (OCF) or possibility theory. We then define a set of postulates that such revision operators shall satisfy and establish representation theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that these postulates reveal common characteristics of various existing revision strategies and are satisfied by OCF conditionalization, Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning and possibility conditionalization. Furthermore, when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates can induce Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates C1 and C2.

An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality

My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contextual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a specific set of beliefs ought to be. In certain exceptional contexts –where the seriousness of harm in case of mistake and the level of an agent’s responsibility for the outcome of his action are specially high– a very small probability of making a mistake should be recognized as a good reason to avoid to act based on beliefs that we nonetheless affirm with a high degree of confidence and that actually justify our action in other contexts. The further steps of the argument consist in probing 1) that the fundamental state’s policies are such a case of exceptional context, 2) that perfectionist policies are the type of actions we should avoid, and 3) that policies that satisfy neutral standards of justification are not affected by the reasons which lead to reject perfectionist policies.

Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy against doxastic involuntarism

According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. One possible strategy against this argument is to show that we do have voluntary control over some of our beliefs, and that we therefore have epistemic obligations. This is what I call the voluntarist strategy. I examine it and argue that it is not promising. I show how the voluntarist attempts of Carl Ginet and Brian Weatherson fail, and conclude that it would be more fruitful for deontologists to look for a different strategy.