A Corrupção burocrática inibe o empreendedorismo? uma análise empírica dos estados brasileiros

This work aims to investigate the relationship between the entrepreneurship and the incidence of bureaucratic corruption in the states of Brazil and Federal District. The main hypothesis of this study is that the opening of a business in Brazilian states is negatively affected by the incidence of corruption. The theoretical reference is divided into Entrepreneurship and bureaucratic corruption, with an emphasis on materialistic perspective (objectivist) of entrepreneurship and the effects of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurial activity. By the regression method with panel data, we estimated the models with pooled data and fixed and random effects. To measure corruption, I used the General Index of Corruption for the Brazilian states (BOLL, 2010), and to represent entrepreneurship, firm entry per capita by state. Tests (Chow, Hausman and Breusch-Pagan) indicate that the random effects model is more appropriate, and the preliminary results indicate a positive impact of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurial activity, contradicting the hypothesis expected and found in previous articles to Brazil, and corroborating the proposition of Dreher and Gassebner (2011) that, in countries with high regulation, bureaucratic corruption can be grease in the wheels of entrepreneurship

A Corrupção burocrática inibe o empreendedorismo? uma análise empírica dos estados brasileiros

This work aims to investigate the relationship between the entrepreneurship and the incidence of bureaucratic corruption in the states of Brazil and Federal District. The main hypothesis of this study is that the opening of a business in Brazilian states is negatively affected by the incidence of corruption. The theoretical reference is divided into Entrepreneurship and bureaucratic corruption, with an emphasis on materialistic perspective (objectivist) of entrepreneurship and the effects of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurial activity. By the regression method with panel data, we estimated the models with pooled data and fixed and random effects. To measure corruption, I used the General Index of Corruption for the Brazilian states (BOLL, 2010), and to represent entrepreneurship, firm entry per capita by state. Tests (Chow, Hausman and Breusch-Pagan) indicate that the random effects model is more appropriate, and the preliminary results indicate a positive impact of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurial activity, contradicting the hypothesis expected and found in previous articles to Brazil, and corroborating the proposition of Dreher and Gassebner (2011) that, in countries with high regulation, bureaucratic corruption can be grease in the wheels of entrepreneurship

A Corrupção burocrática inibe o empreendedorismo? uma análise empírica dos estados brasileiros

This work aims to investigate the relationship between the entrepreneurship and the incidence of bureaucratic corruption in the states of Brazil and Federal District. The main hypothesis of this study is that the opening of a business in Brazilian states is negatively affected by the incidence of corruption. The theoretical reference is divided into Entrepreneurship and bureaucratic corruption, with an emphasis on materialistic perspective (objectivist) of entrepreneurship and the effects of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurial activity. By the regression method with panel data, we estimated the models with pooled data and fixed and random effects. To measure corruption, I used the General Index of Corruption for the Brazilian states (BOLL, 2010), and to represent entrepreneurship, firm entry per capita by state. Tests (Chow, Hausman and Breusch-Pagan) indicate that the random effects model is more appropriate, and the preliminary results indicate a positive impact of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurial activity, contradicting the hypothesis expected and found in previous articles to Brazil, and corroborating the proposition of Dreher and Gassebner (2011) that, in countries with high regulation, bureaucratic corruption can be grease in the wheels of entrepreneurship

Bureaucratic Corruption As a Constraint on Voter Choice

It Has Often Been Assumed That a Country's Tax Level, Tax Structure Progressivity and After-Tax Income Distribution Are Chosen by Voters Subject Only to Their Budget Constraints. This Paper Argues That At Certain Income Levels Voters' Decisions May Be Constrained by Bureaucratic Corruption. the Theoretical Arguments Are Developed in Asymmetry Limits the Capacity of the Fiscal System to Generate Revenues by Means of Direct Taxes. This Hypothesis Is Tested Witha Sample of International Data by Means of a Simultaneous Equation Model. the Distortions Resulting From Corruption Ar Captured Through Their Effects on a Latent Variable Defined As the Overall Fiscal Structure. Evidence Is Found of Causality Running From This Latent Variable to the Level of Taxes and the Degree of After Tax Inequality.

Determinants of government consumption expenditure in developing countries : a panel data analysis

The paper focuses on the recent pattern of government consumption expenditure in developing countries and estimates the determinants which have influenced government expenditure. Using a panel data set for 111 developing countries from 1984 to 2004, this study finds evidence that political and institutional variables as well as governance variables significantly influence government expenditure. Among other results, the paper finds new evidence of Wagner's law which states that peoples' demand for service and willingness to pay is income-elastic hence the expansion of public economy is influenced by the greater economic affluence of a nation (Cameron1978). Corruption is found to be influential in explaining the public expenditure of developing countries. On the contrary, size of the economy and fractionalization are found to have significant negative association with government expenditure. In addition, the study finds evidence that public expenditure significantly shrinks under military dictatorship compared with other form of governance.

Bureaucratic corruption and income : evidence from the land sector in Bangladesh

We examine, for the first time, the effects of corruption on income using household survey data from a developing country. Estimating the effects of corruption on income is challenging because of the simultaneous relationship between the two variables. We use a two-step instrumental variable approach to identify the effects of corruption on income. We find that after adjusting for simultaneity bias the act of bribery reduces income and that higher bribes have a negative effect on income. Taken together, our results provide a possible explanation why a vicious cycle between corruption and income inequality does not exist in the land sector in Bangladesh.

Effects of microfinance on poverty reduction in Vietnam : a pseudo-panel data analysis

The development of microfinance in Vietnam since 1990s has coincided with a remarkable progress in poverty reduction. Numerous descriptive studies have illustrated that microfinance is an effective tool to eradicate poverty in Vietnam but evidence from quantitative studies is mixed. This study contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on the impact of microfinance to poverty reduction in Vietnam using the repeated cross - sectional data from the Vietnam Living Standard s Survey (VLSS) during period 1992 - 2010. Our results show that micro - loans contribute significantly to household consumption.

Inequality for Wage Earners and Self-Employed: Evidence from Panel Data

Published as an article in: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 2009, vol. 71, issue 4, pages 491-518.

PANEL DATA UNIT ROOT TEST WITH FIXED TIME DIMENSION

The consideration of the limit theory in which T is fixed and N is allowed to go to infinity improves the finite-sample properties of the tests and avoids the imposition of the relative rates at which T and N go to infinity.

TESTING FOR STATIONARITY IN HETEROGENEOUS PANEL DATA IN THE CASE OF MODEL MISSPECIFICATION

This paper investigates the performance of the tests proposed by Hadri and by Hadri and Larsson for testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data under model misspecification. The panel tests are based on the well known KPSS test (cf. Kwiatkowski et al.) which considers two models: stationarity around a deterministic level and stationarity around a deterministic trend. There is no study, as far as we know, on the statistical properties of the test when the wrong model is used. We also consider the case of the simultaneous presence of the two types of models in a panel. We employ two asymptotics: joint asymptotic, T, N -> infinity simultaneously, and T fixed and N allowed to grow indefinitely. We use Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the effects of misspecification in sample sizes usually used in practice. The results indicate that the assumption that T is fixed rather than asymptotic leads to tests that have less size distortions, particularly for relatively small T with large N panels (micro-panels) than the tests derived under the joint asymptotics. We also find that choosing a deterministic trend when a deterministic level is true does not significantly affect the properties of the test. But, choosing a deterministic level when a deterministic trend is true leads to extreme over-rejections. Therefore, when unsure about which model has generated the data, it is suggested to use the model with a trend. We also propose a new statistic for testing for stationarity in mixed panel data where the mixture is known. The performance of this new test is very good for both cases of T asymptotic and T fixed. The statistic for T asymptotic is slightly undersized when T is very small (