Employment Protection, Flexibility and Firms’ Strategic Location Decisions under Uncertainty

We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide between locating in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments and in one without employment protection. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty, we demonstrate that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. The strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with employment protection while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand, provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

The political economy of employment protection

This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in agrowing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use toanalyze the political support for employment protection legislationssuch as the ones that are observed in most European countries.We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact thatworkers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and areduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the politicalsupport for employment protection (as defined by maximunjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the largerthe worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as negative impact of exogeneous turnover on employment protection.

Employment protection, international specialization and innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentivesfor R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firingcost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relativelysecure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle.Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where,roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country willspecialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existinggoods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primaryinnovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Employment Protection Legislation and Firm Growth : Evidence from a Natural Experiment

A natural experiment is used to identify the causal relationship between employment protection legislation and fi…rm growth. The natural experiment occurred in Sweden in 2001, when an exemption made it possible for fi…rms with less than eleven employees to exclude two workers from the last-in-fi…rst-out principle when dismissing personnel. The estimated average treatment effect of the reform show that the number of employees increased with 0.135 percent in fi…rms with 5-9 employees relative to fi…rms with 10-15 employees, which corresponds to over 5,000 additional jobs per year created by the reform. Firms with ten employees, just below the size threshold, became 3.4 percent less likely to increase their workforce to a level surpassing the threshold, indicating that the last-in-…first-out rule prevented these …firms from growing. Thus, employment protection legislation seems to act as a growth barrier for small fi…rms.

Railroad employment protection : hearing[s] before a subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, Seventy-fourth Congress, second session, on H.R. 11609, to foster and protect interstate commerce by authorizing the Interstate commerce commission to approve or disapprove of the consolidation or abandonment of carrier facilities of public service. March 30, 31, April 1 and 4, 1936.

Printed for the use of the Committee on interstate and foreign commerce.

Temporary contracts and non-protected employment in Argentina, Chile and Perú: incidence and determinants

The diverse kinds of legal temporary contracts and the employment forms that do not comply with legal requirements both facilitate employment adjustment to firms´ requirements and entail labour cost reductions. Their employment incidence depends not only on the economic and labour market evolutions but also on other factors, in particular the historical trajectories followed by labour legislation, state enforcement, and the degree of compliance. To contribute to the understanding of the determinants of the degree of utilization of different employment practices, the study reported in this article explores the use made of the various legal temporary contracts and of precarious employment relationships by private enterprises in three Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile and Peru) during 2003-2012, a period of economic growth, and the explanatory role of diverse factors.

On the labor share the long-run equilibrium and its adjustment process

This research computes an Equilibrium Labor Share using a VECM for a panel of 19 countries, analyzes what determines the speed at which the labor share adjusts towards that equilibrium and decomposes this adjustment in terms of real wages and employment. Results suggest that the speed at which a country adjusts decreases with employment protection legislation and labor taxes. Most countries’ labor shares adjustment is made through real wages changes instead of changing employment, suggesting that wage moderation policies may play an important role on the adjustment process without harming employment. Keywords: Equilibrium

On the labor share the long-run equilibrium and its adjustment process

This research computes an Equilibrium Labor Share using a VECM for a panel of 19 countries, analyzes what determines the speed at which the labor share adjusts towards that equilibrium and decomposes this adjustment in terms of real wages and employment. Results suggest that the speed at which a country adjusts decreases with employment protection legislation and labor taxes. Most countries’ labor shares adjustment is made through real wages changes instead of changing employment, suggesting that wage moderation policies may play an important role on the adjustment process without harming employment.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

The Part-time pay penalty in a segmented labor market

This paper is the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for women's subsequent earnings trajectories, distinguishing by their type of contract: permanent or fixedterm. Using a rich longitudinal Spanish data set from Social Security records of over 76,000 prime-aged women strongly attached to the Spanish labor market, we find that PT work aggravates the segmentation of the labor market insofar there is a PT pay penalty and this penalty is larger and more persistent in the case of women with fixed-term contracts. The paper discusses problems arising in empirical estimation (including a problem not discussed in the literature up to now: the differential measurement error of the LHS variable by PT status), and how to address them. It concludes with policy implications relevant for Continental Europe and its dual structure of employment protection.

Women's work histories in Italy: education as investment in reconciliation and legitimacy?

Within pre-enlargement Europe, Italy records one of the widest employment rate gaps between highly and poorly educated women, as well one of the largest differences in the share, among working women, of public sector employment. Building on these stylized facts and using the Longitudinal Survey of Italian Households (ILFI), we investigate the working trajectories of three cohorts of Italian women born between 1935 and 1964 and observed from their first job until they are in their forties. We use mainly, but not exclusively, event history analysis in order to identify the main factors that influence entry into and exit from paid work over the life course. Our results suggest that in the Italian context, where employment protection policies have also been used as surrogate measures to favour reconciliation between family and work, and where traditional gender norms still persist, education is so important for women's employment decisions because it represents an investment in 'reconciliation' and 'work legitimacy' over and above investment in human capital.