The impact of “empirical facts” on legal scholarship and legal research training

Lawyers have traditionally viewed law as a closed system, and doctrinal research has been the research methodology used most widely in the profession. This reflects traditional concepts of legal reasoning. There is a wealth of reliable and valid social science data available to lawyers and judges. Judges in fact often refer to general facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour (‘empirical facts’). Legal education needs to prepare our students for this broader legal context. This paper examines how ‘empirical facts’ are used in Australian and other common law courts. Specifically, the paper argues that there is a need for enhanced training in non-doctrinal research methodologies across the law school curriculum. This should encompass a broad introduction to social science methods, with more attention being paid to a cross-section of methodologies such as content analysis, comparative law and surveys that are best applied to law.

Empirical facts : a rationale for expanding lawyers' methodological expertise

This article examines the importance of the social evidence base in relation to the development of the law. It argues that there is a need for those lawyers who play a part in law reform (legislators and those involved in the law reform process) and for those who play a part in formulating policy-based common law rules (judges and practitioners) to know more about how facts are established in the social sciences. It argues that lawyers need sufficient knowledge and skills in order to be able to critically assess the facts and evidence base when examining new legislation and also when preparing, arguing and determining the outcomes of legal disputes. For this reason the article argues that lawyers need enhanced training in empirical methodologies in order to function effectively in modern legal contexts.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

PPs without Disguises: Reply to Bruening

[EN]Bresnan and Nikitina (2009) and Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2008) show that, contrary to standard assumptions, fixed-theme idioms may appear in to-constructions under certain pragmatic circumstances. Bruening (2010a) contends that the cases they present are in fact R(ightward)-dative shifts, double object constructions with the object projected to the right. In this article, we argue that Bruening’s proposed theoretical apparatus is unnecessarily complex and ad hoc and falls short of explaining the main facts it is supposed to deal with, massively overgenerating. A regular PP structure is argued to be empirically more adequate and conceptually simpler, avoiding the main problems of the R-dative shift analysis. New empirical evidence concerning pairlist readings and scope freezing also suggests that the empirical facts about idioms should be reconsidered in completely different terms.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Agreements with overlapping coalitions

Dans certaines circonstances, des actions de groupes sont plus performantes que des actions individuelles. Dans ces situations, il est préférable de former des coalitions. Ces coalitions peuvent être disjointes ou imbriquées. La littérature économique met un fort accent sur la modélisation des accords où les coalitions d’agents économiques sont des ensembles disjoints. Cependant on observe dans la vie de tous les jours que les coalitions politiques, environnementales, de libre-échange et d’assurance informelles sont la plupart du temps imbriquées. Aussi, devient-il impératif de comprendre le fonctionnement économique des coalitions imbriquées. Ma thèse développe un cadre d’analyse qui permet de comprendre la formation et la performance des coalitions même si elles sont imbriquées. Dans le premier chapitre je développe un jeu de négociation qui permet la formation de coalitions imbriquées. Je montre que ce jeu admet un équilibre et je développe un algorithme pour calculer les allocations d’équilibre pour les jeux symétriques. Je montre que toute structure de réseau peut se décomposer de manière unique en une structure de coalitions imbriquées. Sous certaines conditions, je montre que cette structure correspond à une structure d’équilibre d’un jeu sous-jacent. Dans le deuxième chapitre j’introduis une nouvelle notion de noyau dans le cas où les coalitions imbriquées sont permises. Je montre que cette notion de noyau est une généralisation naturelle de la notion de noyau de structure de coalitions. Je vais plus loin en introduisant des agents plus raffinés. J’obtiens alors le noyau de structure de coalitions imbriquées que je montre être un affinement de la première notion. Dans la suite de la thèse, j’applique les théories développées dans les deux premiers chapitres à des cas concrets. Le troisième chapitre est une application de la relation biunivoque établie dans le premier chapitre entre la formation des coalitions et la formation de réseaux. Je propose une modélisation réaliste et effective des assurances informelles. J’introduis ainsi dans la littérature économique sur les assurances informelles, quatre innovations majeures : une fusion entre l’approche par les groupes et l’approche par les réseaux sociaux, la possibilité d’avoir des organisations imbriquées d’assurance informelle, un schéma de punition endogène et enfin les externalités. Je caractérise les accords d’assurances informelles stables et j’isole les conditions qui poussent les agents à dévier. Il est admis dans la littérature que seuls les individus ayant un revenu élevé peuvent se permettre de violer les accords d’assurances informelles. Je donne ici les conditions dans lesquelles cette hypothèse tient. Cependant, je montre aussi qu’il est possible de violer cette hypothèse sous d’autres conditions réalistes. Finalement je dérive des résultats de statiques comparées sous deux normes de partage différents. Dans le quatrième et dernier chapitre, je propose un modèle d’assurance informelle où les groupes homogènes sont construits sur la base de relations de confiance préexistantes. Ces groupes sont imbriqués et représentent des ensembles de partage de risque. Cette approche est plus générale que les approches traditionnelles de groupe ou de réseau. Je caractérise les accords stables sans faire d’hypothèses sur le taux d’escompte. J’identifie les caractéristiques des réseaux stables qui correspondent aux taux d’escomptes les plus faibles. Bien que l’objectif des assurances informelles soit de lisser la consommation, je montre que des effets externes liés notamment à la valorisation des liens interpersonnels renforcent la stabilité. Je développe un algorithme à pas finis qui égalise la consommation pour tous les individus liés. Le fait que le nombre de pas soit fini (contrairement aux algorithmes à pas infinis existants) fait que mon algorithme peut inspirer de manière réaliste des politiques économiques. Enfin, je donne des résultats de statique comparée pour certaines valeurs exogènes du modèle.

Essays on numerically efficient inference in nonlinear and non-Gaussian state space models, and commodity market analysis.

The first two articles build procedures to simulate vector of univariate states and estimate parameters in nonlinear and non Gaussian state space models. We propose state space speci fications that offer more flexibility in modeling dynamic relationship with latent variables. Our procedures are extension of the HESSIAN method of McCausland[2012]. Thus, they use approximation of the posterior density of the vector of states that allow to : simulate directly from the state vector posterior distribution, to simulate the states vector in one bloc and jointly with the vector of parameters, and to not allow data augmentation. These properties allow to build posterior simulators with very high relative numerical efficiency. Generic, they open a new path in nonlinear and non Gaussian state space analysis with limited contribution of the modeler. The third article is an essay in commodity market analysis. Private firms coexist with farmers' cooperatives in commodity markets in subsaharan african countries. The private firms have the biggest market share while some theoretical models predict they disappearance once confronted to farmers cooperatives. Elsewhere, some empirical studies and observations link cooperative incidence in a region with interpersonal trust, and thus to farmers trust toward cooperatives. We propose a model that sustain these empirical facts. A model where the cooperative reputation is a leading factor determining the market equilibrium of a price competition between a cooperative and a private firm

Computational Structure of Human Language

The central thesis of this report is that human language is NP-complete. That is, the process of comprehending and producing utterances is bounded above by the class NP, and below by NP-hardness. This constructive complexity thesis has two empirical consequences. The first is to predict that a linguistic theory outside NP is unnaturally powerful. The second is to predict that a linguistic theory easier than NP-hard is descriptively inadequate. To prove the lower bound, I show that the following three subproblems of language comprehension are all NP-hard: decide whether a given sound is possible sound of a given language; disambiguate a sequence of words; and compute the antecedents of pronouns. The proofs are based directly on the empirical facts of the language user's knowledge, under an appropriate idealization. Therefore, they are invariant across linguistic theories. (For this reason, no knowledge of linguistic theory is needed to understand the proofs, only knowledge of English.) To illustrate the usefulness of the upper bound, I show that two widely-accepted analyses of the language user's knowledge (of syntactic ellipsis and phonological dependencies) lead to complexity outside of NP (PSPACE-hard and Undecidable, respectively). Next, guided by the complexity proofs, I construct alternate linguisitic analyses that are strictly superior on descriptive grounds, as well as being less complex computationally (in NP). The report also presents a new framework for linguistic theorizing, that resolves important puzzles in generative linguistics, and guides the mathematical investigation of human language.

Inequality, intergenerational mobility and redistributive policies under endogenous information

This paper presents a dynamic model to study how different levels of information about the root determinants of wealth (luck versus effort) can impact inequality and intergenerational mobility through societal beliefs, individual choices and redistributive policies. To my knowledge, the model presented is the first dynamicmodel in which skills are stochastic and both beliefs and voted redistribution are determined endogenously. The model is able to explain a number of empirical facts. Large empirical evidence shows that the difference in the political support for redistribution appears to reflect differences in the social perceptions regarding the determinants of individual wealth and the underlying sources of income inequality. Moreover the beliefs about the determinants of wealth impact individual choices of effort and therefore the beliefs about the determinants of wealth impact inequality and mobility both through choices of effort and redistributive policies. The model generates multiple equilibria (US versus Europe-type) which may account for the observed features not only in terms of societal beliefs and redistribution but also in terms of perceived versus real mobility and inequality.

Stochastic growth and monetary policy: the impacts on the term structure of interest rates

This paper builds a simple, empirically-verifiable rational expectations model for term structure of nominal interest rates analysis. It solves an stochastic growth model with investment costs and sticky inflation, susceptible to the intervention of the monetary authority following a policy rule. The model predicts several patterns of the term structure which are in accordance to observed empirical facts: (i) pro-cyclical pattern of the level of nominal interest rates; (ii) countercyclical pattern of the term spread; (iii) pro-cyclical pattern of the curvature of the yield curve; (iv) lower predictability of the slope of the middle of the term structure; and (v) negative correlation of changes in real rates and expected inflation at short horizons.

Território usado e transporte coletivo : mobilidade e acessibilidade no Bairro Lagoa Azul Natal/RN

Transport systems involved the use of territory in different Brazilian cities with regard to the occupation of road systems in urban areas. The implementation of systems engineering and transport infrastructure such as roads (roads), signs, stops, stations and complex road (bridges, viaducts and tunnels) are not used in the same way in the area. The subway is not even use the bus and vice versa. The time spent in travel, the time to access and the number of trips made by passengers in each way of transport is not the same. The use of transport systems in the territory, therefore, takes place through a whole in the current period we are in the technicalscientific and informational. This work addresses, however, the area used as a synonym of geographical area, analyzed by two categories of analysis, systems of objects formed by the fixed and the systems formed by the action flows. The system analyzed is the public transport by bus and population displacement that makes using this medium with source destination from home to work and has as empirical cut the Lagoa Azul located in the district administrative area north of Natal / RN. The general objective of this research is to understand the extent to which public transport has contributed to the socio-spatial accessibility of the residents of Barrio Blue Lagoon, located in Natal-RN, emphasizing the way home and the workplace. To reach the general objective of this dissertation, a study was made in light of the line which the methodological empirical facts, statistical data and theoretical knowledge of the events that occur in the quarter related to the Lagoa Azul economic aspects. Use for this, the concepts of mobility and Accessibility

Sobre el Constructivismo : Construcción social de lo real y práctica investigativa

Las ciencias sociales en su versión clásica -adoptando como modelo a las ciencias naturales- se centraron en el estudio de los hechos empíricos con la pretensión de arribar a un conocimiento objetivo de la realidad. Desde este enfoque la ciencia deviene una representación teórica de la naturaleza, mientras lo real se constituye con independencia de la mente humana. Pero, durante el pasado siglo, los fundamentos mismos del conocimiento - el estatuto ontológico y epistemológico, tanto del objeto como el sujeto- serán cuestionados. En este nuevo enfoque, el lenguaje -y la comunicación- devienen los recursos a través de los cuales los individuos y los grupos construyen su vida cotidiana en tanto el interés se orienta a develar los procesos de construcción de sentido. Esta perspectiva modifica radicalmente el paradigma prevaleciente en las ciencias sociales; sin embargo, la discusión acerca de su validez no ha sido resuelta, en particular porque en ella se encuentran involucradas algunas de las principales cuestiones de la modernidad y la posmodernidad. Así, el artículo se propone considerar los principales elementos que configuran este enfoque, identificando las distintas corrientes que conviven en su interior, las principales críticas y específicamente, las consecuencias que se derivan tanto desde la perspectiva de la producción del conocimiento como en relación al estudio de la sociedad

Sobre el Constructivismo : Construcción social de lo real y práctica investigativa

Las ciencias sociales en su versión clásica -adoptando como modelo a las ciencias naturales- se centraron en el estudio de los hechos empíricos con la pretensión de arribar a un conocimiento objetivo de la realidad. Desde este enfoque la ciencia deviene una representación teórica de la naturaleza, mientras lo real se constituye con independencia de la mente humana. Pero, durante el pasado siglo, los fundamentos mismos del conocimiento - el estatuto ontológico y epistemológico, tanto del objeto como el sujeto- serán cuestionados. En este nuevo enfoque, el lenguaje -y la comunicación- devienen los recursos a través de los cuales los individuos y los grupos construyen su vida cotidiana en tanto el interés se orienta a develar los procesos de construcción de sentido. Esta perspectiva modifica radicalmente el paradigma prevaleciente en las ciencias sociales; sin embargo, la discusión acerca de su validez no ha sido resuelta, en particular porque en ella se encuentran involucradas algunas de las principales cuestiones de la modernidad y la posmodernidad. Así, el artículo se propone considerar los principales elementos que configuran este enfoque, identificando las distintas corrientes que conviven en su interior, las principales críticas y específicamente, las consecuencias que se derivan tanto desde la perspectiva de la producción del conocimiento como en relación al estudio de la sociedad

Sobre el Constructivismo : Construcción social de lo real y práctica investigativa

Las ciencias sociales en su versión clásica -adoptando como modelo a las ciencias naturales- se centraron en el estudio de los hechos empíricos con la pretensión de arribar a un conocimiento objetivo de la realidad. Desde este enfoque la ciencia deviene una representación teórica de la naturaleza, mientras lo real se constituye con independencia de la mente humana. Pero, durante el pasado siglo, los fundamentos mismos del conocimiento - el estatuto ontológico y epistemológico, tanto del objeto como el sujeto- serán cuestionados. En este nuevo enfoque, el lenguaje -y la comunicación- devienen los recursos a través de los cuales los individuos y los grupos construyen su vida cotidiana en tanto el interés se orienta a develar los procesos de construcción de sentido. Esta perspectiva modifica radicalmente el paradigma prevaleciente en las ciencias sociales; sin embargo, la discusión acerca de su validez no ha sido resuelta, en particular porque en ella se encuentran involucradas algunas de las principales cuestiones de la modernidad y la posmodernidad. Así, el artículo se propone considerar los principales elementos que configuran este enfoque, identificando las distintas corrientes que conviven en su interior, las principales críticas y específicamente, las consecuencias que se derivan tanto desde la perspectiva de la producción del conocimiento como en relación al estudio de la sociedad

Frontiers of finance: Evolution and efficient markets

In this review article, we explore several recent advances in the quantitative modeling of financial markets. We begin with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and describe how this controversial idea has stimulated a number of new directions of research, some focusing on more elaborate mathematical models that are capable of rationalizing the empirical facts, others taking a completely different tack in rejecting rationality altogether. One of the most promising directions is to view financial markets from a biological perspective and, specifically, within an evolutionary framework in which markets, instruments, institutions, and investors interact and evolve dynamically according to the “law” of economic selection. Under this view, financial agents compete and adapt, but they do not necessarily do so in an optimal fashion. Evolutionary and ecological models of financial markets is truly a new frontier whose exploration has just begun.