989 resultados para Emergency operations centre
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Les crises sont omniprésentes dans le monde organisationnel. Pour faire face à ces situations, les organisations se fient à leurs équipes de gestion de crise, composées habituellement de membres provenant de différents domaines et possédant divers types d’expertise, pour bien gérer ces situations. Comment les membres de ces équipes réussissent-ils ou ne réussissent-il pas à s’entendre et à cadrer collectivement une situation de crise, étant donné leurs antécédents variés? La présente étude propose de répondre à cette question à partir d’une perspective interactionnelle en analysant une sélection d’extraits audio-visuels tirés de trois exercices de gestion de crise réalisés dans la province de l’Ontario. Cinq extraits pertinents ont été retenus pour l’analyse interactionnelle qui a permis de décrire le rôle important de certaines figures dans le cadrage d’une gestion de crise. Les figures correspondent à ce qui compte dans la situation, c’est-à-dire aux préoccupations, aux intérêts et aux attentes des représentants autour de la table. Ces figures sont placées au premier plan dans le cadrage des individus et sont ensuite animées ou non par les membres du groupe de coordination communautaire. C’est seulement lorsque ces différentes préoccupations sont articulées, prises en compte et négociées que le cadrage de la situation de crise peut évoluer collectivement.
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Cover title.
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"The Illinois Emergency Operations Plan, (IEOP), was developed in cooperation with the office of the Governor, constitutional officers, executive departments and agencies, and the American Red Cross ... This IEOP revision contains specific new language dealing with the threat of a catastrophic earthquake or a terrorism incident involving a weapon of mass destruction"--Foreword.
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Reproduced from type-written copy.
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Física
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"IEPA/PWS/83-011."
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Natural and man-made disasters have gained attention at all levels of policy-making in recent years. Emergency management tasks are inherently complex and unpredictable, and often require coordination among multiple organizations across different levels and locations. Effectively managing various knowledge areas and the organizations involved has become a critical emergency management success factor. However, there is a general lack of understanding about how to describe and assess the complex nature of emergency management tasks and how knowledge integration can help managers improve emergency management task performance. ^ The purpose of this exploratory research was first, to understand how emergency management operations are impacted by tasks that are complex and inter-organizational and second, to investigate how knowledge integration as a particular knowledge management strategy can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the emergency tasks. Three types of specific knowledge were considered: context-specific, technology-specific, and context-and-technology-specific. ^ The research setting was the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the study was based on the survey responses from the participants in past EOC activations related to their emergency tasks and knowledge areas. The data included task attributes related to complexity, knowledge area, knowledge integration, specificity of knowledge, and task performance. The data was analyzed using multiple linear regressions and path analyses, to (1) examine the relationships between task complexity, knowledge integration, and performance, (2) the moderating effects of each type of specific knowledge on the relationship between task complexity and performance, and (3) the mediating role of knowledge integration. ^ As per theory-based propositions, the results indicated that overall component complexity and interactive complexity tend to have a negative effect on task performance. But surprisingly, procedural rigidity tended to have a positive effect on performance in emergency management tasks. Also as per our expectation, knowledge integration had a positive relationship with task performance. Interestingly, the moderating effects of each type of specific knowledge on the relationship between task complexity and performance were varied and the extent of mediation of knowledge integration depended on the dimension of task complexity. ^
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Background: Outbreaks of infectious diseases such as Ebola have dramatic economic impacts on affected nations due to significant direct costs and indirect costs, as well as increased expenditure by the government to meet the health and security crisis. Despite its dense population, Nigeria was able to contain the outbreak swiftly and was declared Ebola free on 13th October 2014. Although Nigeria’s Ebola containment success was multifaceted, the private sector played a key role in Nigeria’s fight against Ebola. An epidemic of a disease like Ebola, not only consumes health resources but also detrimentally disrupts trade and travel to impact both public and private sector resulting in the ‘fearonomic’ effect of the contagion. In this thesis, I have defined ‘fearonomics’ or the ‘fearonomic effects’ of a disease as the intangible and intangible economic effects of both informed and misinformed aversion behavior exhibited by individuals, organizations, or countries during an outbreak. During an infectious disease outbreak, there is a significant potential for public-private sector collaborations that can help offset some of the government’s cost of controlling the epidemic.
Objective: The main objective of this study is to understand the ‘fearonomics’ of Ebola in Nigeria and to evaluate the role of the key private sector stakeholders in Nigeria’s Ebola response.
Methods: This retrospective qualitative study was conducted in Nigeria and utilizes grounded theory to look across different economic sectors in Nigeria to understand the impact of Ebola on Nigeria’s private sector and how it dealt with the various challenges posed by the disease and its ‘fearonomic effects'.
Results: Due to swift containment of Ebola in Nigeria, the economic impact of the disease was limited especially in comparison to the other Ebola-infected countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. However, the 2014 Ebola outbreak had more than a just direct impact on the country’s economy and despite the swift containment, no economic sector was immune to the disease’s fearonomic impact. The potential scale of the fearonomic impact of a disease like Ebola was one of the key motivators for the private sector engagement in the Ebola response.
The private sector in Nigeria played an essential role in facilitating the country’s response to Ebola. The private sector not only provided in-cash donations but significant in-kind support to both the Federal and State governments during the outbreak. Swift establishment of an Ebola Emergency Operation Centre (EEOC) was essential to the country’s response and was greatly facilitated by the private sector, showcasing the crucial role of private sector in the initial phase of an outbreak. The private sector contributed to Nigeria’s fight against Ebola not only by donating material assets but by continuing operations and partaking in knowledge sharing and advocacy. Some sector such as the private health sector, telecom sector, financial sector, oil and gas sector played a unique role in orchestrating the Nigerian Ebola response and were among the first movers during the outbreak.
This paper utilizes the lessons from Nigeria’s containment of Ebola to highlight the potential of public-private partnerships in preparedness, response, and recovery during an outbreak.
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Natural and man-made disasters have gained attention at all levels of policy-making in recent years. Emergency management tasks are inherently complex and unpredictable, and often require coordination among multiple organizations across different levels and locations. Effectively managing various knowledge areas and the organizations involved has become a critical emergency management success factor. However, there is a general lack of understanding about how to describe and assess the complex nature of emergency management tasks and how knowledge integration can help managers improve emergency management task performance. The purpose of this exploratory research was first, to understand how emergency management operations are impacted by tasks that are complex and inter-organizational and second, to investigate how knowledge integration as a particular knowledge management strategy can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the emergency tasks. Three types of specific knowledge were considered: context-specific, technology-specific, and context-and-technology-specific. The research setting was the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the study was based on the survey responses from the participants in past EOC activations related to their emergency tasks and knowledge areas. The data included task attributes related to complexity, knowledge area, knowledge integration, specificity of knowledge, and task performance. The data was analyzed using multiple linear regressions and path analyses, to (1) examine the relationships between task complexity, knowledge integration, and performance, (2) the moderating effects of each type of specific knowledge on the relationship between task complexity and performance, and (3) the mediating role of knowledge integration. As per theory-based propositions, the results indicated that overall component complexity and interactive complexity tend to have a negative effect on task performance. But surprisingly, procedural rigidity tended to have a positive effect on performance in emergency management tasks. Also as per our expectation, knowledge integration had a positive relationship with task performance. Interestingly, the moderating effects of each type of specific knowledge on the relationship between task complexity and performance were varied and the extent of mediation of knowledge integration depended on the dimension of task complexity.
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Résumé Introduction: La plupart des études disponibles sur la chirurgie colorectale par laparoscopie concernent des patients hautement sélectionnés. Le but de cette étude est d'analyser les résultats à court et à long terme de l'ensemble des patients traités dans un service de chirurgie générale. Méthodes: Il s'agit d'une analyse rétrospective d'un registre prospectif interne au service, dans lequel tous les patients consécutifs opérés pour la première fois du colon et du rectum entre mars 1993 et décembre 1997 ont été enregistrés. Les informations concernant le suivi ont été collectées par questionnaire. Résultats: Un total de 187 patients ont été opérés par laparoscopie et 215 patients par chirurgie ouverte durant la période d'étude. Les informations concernant le suivi ont pu être collectées dans 95% des cas avec une évolution de 1-107 mois (médiane 59 mois), respectivement de 1-104 mois (médiane 53 mois). Une conversion fut nécessaire dans 28 cas (15%) mais ceux-ci restent inclus dans le groupe laparoscopie pour l'analyse par intention de traitement. Dans le groupe laparoscopie, les opérations ont duré plus longtemps (205 vs 150 min, p<0.001) mais l'hospitalisation a été plus courte (8 vs 13 jours, p<0.001). La reprise du transit a été plus rapide après laparoscopie, mais uniquement après intervention sur le colon gauche (3 vs 4 jours, p<0.01). Cependant, la sélection préopératoire (nombre plus élevé d'urgences et de patients avec un risque anesthésiologique élevé dans le groupe de la chirurgie ouverte) a été favorable à la laparoscopie. Le taux de complications (global ainsi que pour chaque complication chirurgicale) a été similaire dans les deux groupes, avec un taux global de 20% environ. Conclusions: Malgré une sélection favorable des cas, uniquement très peu d'avantages à la laparoscopie sur la chirurgie ouverte ont pu être observés. Abstract Background: Most studies available on laparoscopic colorectal surgery focus on highly selected patient groups. The aim of the present study was to review short- and long-term outcome of everyday patients treated in a general surgery department. Methods: Retrospective review was carried out of a prospective database of all consecutive patients having undergone primary laparoscopic (LAP) or open colorectal surgery between March 1993 and December 1997. Follow-up data were completed via questionnaire. Results: A total of 187 patients underwent LAP resection and 215 patients underwent open surgery. Follow up was complete in 95% with a median of 59 months (range, 1-107 months) and 53 months (range, 1-104 months), respectively. There were 28 conversions (15%) in the LAP group and these remained in the LAP group in an intention-to-treat analysis. The LAP operations lasted significantly longer for all types of resections (205 vs 150 min, P<0.001) and hospital stay was shorter (8 vs 13 days, P<0.001). Recovery of intestinal function was faster in the LAP group, but only after left-sided procedures (3 vs 4days, P<0.01). However, preoperative patient selection (more emergency operations and patients with higher American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) score in the open group) had a major influence on these elements and favours the LAP group. Surprisingly, the overall surgical complication rate (including long-term complications such as wound hernia) was 20% in both groups with rates of individual complications also being comparable in both groups. Conclusion: Despite a patient selection favourable to the laparoscopy group, only little advantage in postoperative outcome could be shown for the minimally invasive over the open approach in the everyday patient.
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BACKGROUND: Little is known about smoking, unhealthy use of alcohol, and risk behaviours for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) in immigrants from developed and developing countries. METHOD: We performed a cross-sectional study of 400 patients who consulted an academic emergency care centre at a Swiss university hospital. The odds ratios for having one or more risk behaviours were adjusted for age, gender, and education level. RESULTS: Immigrants from developing countries were less likely to use alcohol in an unhealthy manner (OR = 0.35, 95% CI 0.22-0.57) or practise risk behaviours for STDs (OR = 0.31, 95% CI 0.13-0.74). They were also less likely to have any of the three studied risk behaviours (OR = 2.5, 95% CI 1.5-4.3). DISCUSSION: In addition to the usual determinants, health behaviours are also associated with origin; distinguishing between immigrants from developing and developed countries is useful in clinical settings. Surprisingly, patients from developing countries tend to possess several protective characteristics.
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In the summer of 2008, the state of Iowa suffered from a series of severe storms that produced tornadoes and heavy rainfall, which resulted in widespread flooding. The Summer Storms1 lasted from late May through mid-August, with the most intense storms occurring over a month-long period from May 25 to June 25. The Summer Storms exacted a major human and economic toll on Iowa, resulting in 18 fatalities and 106 injuries, forcing the evacuation of approximately 38,000 Iowans, and impacting 21,000 housing units. Iowa’s public and private sectors suffered significant monetary damages. Eighty-six of the ninety-nine counties in the state were included in the Governor’s disaster declarations. Presidential disaster declarations made residents in 84 counties eligible for Public Assistance and 78 counties for Individual Assistance. The Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission estimated $798.3 million in damages to publicly owned buildings and infrastructure, including damages of $53 million to public transportation and $342 million to public utilities. The 2008 Summer Storms presented unique coordination challenges for the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division (HSEMD) and the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). These challenges arose from three interrelated factors: the large number of local jurisdictions and areas impacted, the prolonged period of time that response operations were conducted, and the increasing complexity of overall response operations. These events caused the SEOC to coordinate response, mitigation, recovery, and preparedness operations simultaneously. HSEMD and the SEOC implemented a variety of measures to enhance their ability to coordinate operations and assistance to localities. The SEOC expanded its organizational structure, implemented innovative techniques, and incorporated new partners into its activities. These steps enabled HSEMD and SEOC to coordinate operations more effectively, which undoubtedly helped save lives and property, while mitigating the effects of the 2008 Summer Storms.
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The Missouri River floods of 2011 will go down in history as the longest duration flooding event this state has seen to date. The combination of above normal snowfall in the upper Missouri River basin followed by the equivalent of nearly one year’s worth of rainfall in May created an above normal runoff situation which filled the Missouri River and the six main reservoirs within the basin. Compounding this problem was colder than normal temperatures which kept much of the snowpack in the upper basin on the ground longer into the spring, setting the stage for this historic event. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) began increasing the outflow at Gavin’s Point, near Yankton, South Dakota in May. On June 14, 2011, the outflow reached a record rate of over 160,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), over twice the previous record outflow set in 1997. This increased output from Gavin’s Point caused the Missouri River to flow out of its banks covering over 283,000 acres of land in Iowa, forcing hundreds of evacuations, damaging 255,000 acres of cropland and significantly impacting the levee system on the Missouri River basin. Over the course of the summer, approximately 64 miles of primary roads closed due to Missouri River flooding, including 54 miles of Interstate Highway. Many county secondary roads were closed by high water or overburdened due to the numerous detours and road closures in this area. As the Missouri River levels began to increase, municipalities and counties aided by State and Federal agencies began preparing for a sustained flood event. Citizens, businesses, state agencies, local governments and non‐profits made substantial preparations, in some cases expending millions of dollars on emergency protective measures to protect their facilities from the impending flood. Levee monitors detected weak spots in the levee system in all affected counties, with several levees being identified as at risk levees that could potentially fail. Of particular concern was the 28 miles of levees protecting Council Bluffs. Based on this concern, Council Bluffs prepared an evacuation plan for the approximately 30,000 residents that resided in the protected area. On May 25, 2011, Governor Branstad directed the execution of the Iowa Emergency Response Plan in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. On May 31, 2011, HSEMD Administrator, Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, formally requested the USACE to provide technical assistance and advanced measures for the communities along the Missouri River basin. On June 2, 2011 Governor Branstad issued a State of Iowa Proclamation of Disaster Emergency for Fremont, Harrison, Mills, Monona, Pottawattamie, and Woodbury counties. The length of this flood event created a unique set of challenges for Federal, State and local entities. In many cases, these organizations were conducting response and recovery operations simultaneously. Due to the length of this entire event, the State Emergency Operations Center and the local Emergency Operations Centers remained open for an extended period of time, putting additional strain on many organizations and resources. In response to this disaster, Governor Branstad created the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force to oversee the State’s recovery efforts. The Governor announced the creation of this Task Force on October 17, 2011 and appointed Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, HSEMD Administrator as the chairman. This Task Force would be a temporary group of State agency representatives and interested stakeholders brought together to support the recovery efforts of the Iowa communities impacted by the Missouri River Flood. Collectively, this group would analyze and share damage assessment data, coordinate assistance across various stakeholders, monitor progress, capture best practices and identify lessons learned.
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In May 2011, very heavy rains combined with above average snowpack caused reservoirs throughout the Upper Missouri River basin to swell. The river carried more water in May and June than it does in an average year. The six Iowa counties bordering the river—Fremont, Harrison, Mills, Monona, Pottawattamie and Woodbury—suffered from major flooding which persisted throughout the spring and summer. On June 2, Governor Terry Branstad issued a Proclamation of Disaster Emergency for the six impacted counties. The Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division (HSEMD) activated the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) on June 10 to coordinate State, Federal, private sector, and voluntary agency preparedness and response activities in the affected area. The severity and duration of the flooding presented operational challenges for the SEOC and its partner agencies, which were further complicated by severe weather. The flooding forced the SEOC to conduct simultaneous response and recovery operations for an usually long period of time. The Missouri River floods caused major economic losses in Western Iowa. As a result of these economic losses, President Barack Obama issued a Major Disaster Declaration (FEMA-1998-DR) which made six counties eligible for Federal Public Assistance. The disaster declaration was subsequently amended on October 18, making five counties eligible for Federal Individual Assistance.
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Oil spills cause great damage to coastal habitats, especially when rapid and suitable response measures are not taken. Establishing high priority areas is fundamental for the operation of response teams. Under this context and considering the need for keeping all geographical information up-to-date for emergencial use, the present study proposes employing a decision tree coupled with a knowledge-based approach using GIS to assign oil sensitivity indices to Brazilian coastal habitats. The modelled system works based on rules set by the official standards of Brazilian Federal Environment Organ. We tested it on one of the littoral regions of Brazil where transportation of petroleum is most intense: the coast of the municipalities of Sao Sebastiao and Caraguatatuba in the northern littoral of São Paulo state, Brazil. The system automatically ranked the littoral sensitivity index of the study area habitats according to geographical conditions during summer and winter; since index ranks of some habitats varied between these seasons because of sediment alterations. The obtained results illustrate the great potential of the proposed system in generating ESI maps and in aiding response teams during emergency operations. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.