995 resultados para Emergency disposal plan
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This paper starts with the analysis of the unusual inherence mechanism, from two aspects: accumulating and human error. We put forward twelve factors affected the decision of the emergency treatment plan in practice and summarized the evaluation index system combining with literature data. Then we screened out eighteen representative indicators by used the FDM expert questionnaire in the first phase. Hereafter, we calculated the weight of evaluation index and sorted them by the FAHP expert questionnaire, and came up with the frame of the evaluation rule by combined with the experience. In the end, the evaluation principles are concluded.
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The State of Iowa has adopted a multi-hazard approach to managing the consequences of emergency/disaster response. Underlying this approach is the principle that a standard set of generic functional capabilities can be employed to effectively address a wide variety of hazardous conditions and categories of incidents, whether these have a known probability of occurring or are totally unforeseen. Therefore, to the greatest extent possible, the activities described and assigned in this plan are organized along functional lines first, rather than by agency, type of hazard, or type of incident. Contained in this section of the Plan, known as the ―Basic Plan,‖ are instructions, policies, and explanatory information related to many or all of the agencies/entities involved in emergency/ disaster response, as well as information about the legal and administrative foundations for the Plan, the state’s characteristics and significant hazards, lines of succession for the state’s chief executive, plan activation requirements, and the structure of the response organization.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"The Illinois Emergency Operations Plan, (IEOP), was developed in cooperation with the office of the Governor, constitutional officers, executive departments and agencies, and the American Red Cross ... This IEOP revision contains specific new language dealing with the threat of a catastrophic earthquake or a terrorism incident involving a weapon of mass destruction"--Foreword.
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"B-221801"--P. [1]
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The Missouri River floods of 2011 will go down in history as the longest duration flooding event this state has seen to date. The combination of above normal snowfall in the upper Missouri River basin followed by the equivalent of nearly one year’s worth of rainfall in May created an above normal runoff situation which filled the Missouri River and the six main reservoirs within the basin. Compounding this problem was colder than normal temperatures which kept much of the snowpack in the upper basin on the ground longer into the spring, setting the stage for this historic event. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) began increasing the outflow at Gavin’s Point, near Yankton, South Dakota in May. On June 14, 2011, the outflow reached a record rate of over 160,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), over twice the previous record outflow set in 1997. This increased output from Gavin’s Point caused the Missouri River to flow out of its banks covering over 283,000 acres of land in Iowa, forcing hundreds of evacuations, damaging 255,000 acres of cropland and significantly impacting the levee system on the Missouri River basin. Over the course of the summer, approximately 64 miles of primary roads closed due to Missouri River flooding, including 54 miles of Interstate Highway. Many county secondary roads were closed by high water or overburdened due to the numerous detours and road closures in this area. As the Missouri River levels began to increase, municipalities and counties aided by State and Federal agencies began preparing for a sustained flood event. Citizens, businesses, state agencies, local governments and non‐profits made substantial preparations, in some cases expending millions of dollars on emergency protective measures to protect their facilities from the impending flood. Levee monitors detected weak spots in the levee system in all affected counties, with several levees being identified as at risk levees that could potentially fail. Of particular concern was the 28 miles of levees protecting Council Bluffs. Based on this concern, Council Bluffs prepared an evacuation plan for the approximately 30,000 residents that resided in the protected area. On May 25, 2011, Governor Branstad directed the execution of the Iowa Emergency Response Plan in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. On May 31, 2011, HSEMD Administrator, Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, formally requested the USACE to provide technical assistance and advanced measures for the communities along the Missouri River basin. On June 2, 2011 Governor Branstad issued a State of Iowa Proclamation of Disaster Emergency for Fremont, Harrison, Mills, Monona, Pottawattamie, and Woodbury counties. The length of this flood event created a unique set of challenges for Federal, State and local entities. In many cases, these organizations were conducting response and recovery operations simultaneously. Due to the length of this entire event, the State Emergency Operations Center and the local Emergency Operations Centers remained open for an extended period of time, putting additional strain on many organizations and resources. In response to this disaster, Governor Branstad created the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force to oversee the State’s recovery efforts. The Governor announced the creation of this Task Force on October 17, 2011 and appointed Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, HSEMD Administrator as the chairman. This Task Force would be a temporary group of State agency representatives and interested stakeholders brought together to support the recovery efforts of the Iowa communities impacted by the Missouri River Flood. Collectively, this group would analyze and share damage assessment data, coordinate assistance across various stakeholders, monitor progress, capture best practices and identify lessons learned.
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Uusi patoturvallisuuslaki (494/2009) tuli voimaan 1.10.2009 ja valtioneuvoston asetus patoturvallisuudesta (319/2010) 5.5.2010. Tämä patoturvallisuusopas korvaa patoturvallisuusohjeet (MMM:n julkaisuja 7/1997), jotka poistuivat käytöstä 1.10.2009. Patoturvallisuusoppaassa esitetty ei ole padon omistajaa sitovaa, vaan oppaan tarkoitus on täydentää ja selventää esimerkein ja selostuksin laissa ja asetuksessa esitettyä. Oppaassa käsitellään padon suunnittelua kuten hydrologista mitoitusta ja padon teknisiä turvallisuusvaatimuksia, padon rakentamista ja käyttöönottoa sekä vahingonvaaraselvitystä, padon omistajan turvallisuussuunnitelmaa sekä padon kunnossapitoa, käyttöä, tarkkailua, vuosi- ja määräaikaistarkastuksia. Padot luokitellaan vahingonvaaran perusteella luokkiin 1, 2 ja 3. Luokittelua ei tarvitse kuitenkaan tehdä, jos patoturvallisuusviranomainen katsoo, että padosta ei aiheudu vaaraa. Jokaiselle luokitellulle padolle on padon omistajan laadittava tarkkailuohjelma, jonka patoturvallisuusviranomainen hyväksyy päätöksellään. Padosta aiheutuvan vahingonvaaran selvittämiseksi 1-luokan padon omistajan on laadittava vahingonvaaraselvitys padosta ihmisille, omaisuudelle ja ympäristölle aihetuvasta vahingonvaarasta. Myös muusta kuin 1-luokan padosta voi patoturvallisuusviranomainen määrätä tehtäväksi vahingonvaaraselvityksen luokittelua varten. Padon omistajan on laadittava 1-luokan padolle turvallisuussuunnitelma onnettomuus- ja häiriötilanteiden varalle. Suunnitelmassa esitetään padon omistajan omatoiminen varautuminen em. tilanteiden varalle. Pelastusviranomainen arvioi tapauskohtaisesti pelastuslain mukaisen suunnitelman laatimistarpeen. Padon omistajan on toimitettava patoturvallisuusviranomaiselle tietojärjestelmään vietäväksi patoturvallisuusasetuksessa mainitut tiedot. Patoturvallisuusviranomaisen ja padon omistajan on säilytettävä kustakin luokitellusta padosta ajantasaiset tulosteet tietojärjestelmästä sekä muut padon turvallisuuden kannalta tärkeät asiakirjat patoturvallisuuskansiossa siten, että ne ovat mahdollisissa häiriötilanteissa nopeasti saatavilla.
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A new Dam Safety Act (494/2009) came into force on 1st October 2009 and a Government Decree on Dam Safety (319/2010) on 5th May 2010. This Dam Safety Guide replaces the Dam Safety Code of Practice (Publication of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 7/1997), removed from circulation on 1st October 2009. The Dam Safety Guide is not binding on the dam owner; the purpose is to complement and elucidate the relevant law and and decree through examples and descriptions. The Guide takes up questions concerning dam design, for instance hydrological dimensioning and technical safety requirements, dam construction and use, the dam break hazard analysis and the dam owner’s emergency action plan, maintenance, use, monitoring as well as the annual and periodic inspections. Dams are classified according to the hazard they pose into class 1, 2 or 3 dams. The classification is not needed, if, according to the dam safety authority, the dam poses no danger. The owner of a classified dam must prepare a monitoring programme, to be approved by decision of the dam safety authority. To establish the hazard caused by a dam, the owner of a class 1 dam must prepare an analysis of the dam hazard to humans and property as well as to the environment. The dam safety authority may also require a dam break hazard analysis for a dam other than class 1 dam if deemed necessary for classification. The owner of a class 1 dam must prepare a plan of measures in case of emergency or operational failure. The plan shall present the dam owner’s state of preparedness to act on their own initiative in the situations described above. In each case, the rescue authorities make a separate assessment for the need to prepare a plan as set out in the Rescue Act. The dam owner must provide the information specified in the Dam Safety Decree to be entered into the dam safety information system. The dam safety authority and the owner of the dam must keep up-to-date printouts in their own dam safety files from the information system for each dam as well as other important documents connected with dam safety to ensure that these are readily available in case of disturbance.
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Pós-graduação em Engenharia Civil - FEIS
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Trauma to the primary dentition present special problems and the management is often different as compared with permanent teeth. An appropriate emergency treatment plan is important for a good prognosis. Guidelines are useful for delivering the best care possible in an efficient manner. The International Association of Dental Traumatology (IADT) has developed a consensus statement after a review of the dental literature and group discussions. Experienced researchers and clinicians from various specialties were included in the group. In cases in which the data did not appear conclusive, recommendations were based on the consensus opinion of the IADT board members. The guidelines represent the current best evidence based on literature research and professional opinion. In this third article out of three, the IADT Guidelines for the management of traumatic injuries in the primary dentition, are presented.
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Context: Due to a unique combination of factors, outdoor athletes in the Southeastern United States are at high risk of lightning deaths and injuries. Lightning detection methods are available to minimize lightning strike victims. Objective: Becoming aware of the risk factors that predispose athletes to lightning strikes and determining the most reliable detection method against hazardous weather will enable Certified Athletic Trainers to develop protocols that protect athletes from injury. Data Sources: A comprehensive literature review of Medline and Pubmed using key words: lightning, lightning risk factors, lightning safety, lightning detection, and athletic trainers and lightning was completed. Data Synthesis: Factors predisposing athletes to lighting death or injury include: time of year, time of day, the athlete’s age, geographical location, physical location, sex, perspiration level, and lack of education and preparedness by athletes and staff. Although handheld lightning detectors have become widely accessible to detect lightning strikes, their performance has not been independently or objectively confirmed. There is evidence that these detectors inaccurately detect strike locations by recording false strikes and not recording actual strikes. Conclusions: Lightning education and preparation are two factors that can be controlled. Measures need to be taken by Certified Athletic Trainers to ensure the safety of athletes during outdoor athletics. It is critical for athletic trainers and supervising staff members to become fully aware of the risks of lightning strikes in order to most effectively protect everyone under their supervision. Even though lightning detectors have been manufactured in an attempt to minimize death and injuries due to lightning strikes, none of the detectors have been proven to be 100% effective. Educating coaches, athletes, and parents on the risks of lightning and the detection methods available, while implementing an emergency action plan for lightning safety, is crucial to ensure the well being of the student-athlete population.
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Water systems in the Sultanate of Oman are inevitably exposed to varied threats and hazards due to both natural and man-made hazards. Natural disasters, especially tropical cyclone Gonu in 2007, cause immense damage to water supply systems in Oman. At the same time water loss from leaks is a major operational problem. This research developed an integrated approach to identify and rank the risks to the water sources, transmission pipelines and distribution networks in Oman and suggests appropriate mitigation measures. The system resilience was evaluated and an emergency response plan for the water supplies developed. The methodology involved mining the data held by the water supply utility for risk and resilience determination and operational data to support calculations of non-revenue water. Risk factors were identified, ranked and scored at a stakeholder workshop and the operational information required was principally gathered from interviews. Finally, an emergency response plan was developed by evaluating the risk and resilience factors. The risk analysis and assessment used a Coarse Risk Analysis (CRA) approach and risk scores were generated using a simple risk matrix based on WHO recommendations. The likelihoods and consequences of a wide range of hazardous events were identified through a key workshop and subsequent questionnaires. The thesis proposes a method of translating the detailed risk evaluations into resilience scores through a methodology used in transportation networks. A water audit indicated that the percentage of NRW in Oman is greater than 35% which is similar to other Gulf countries but high internationally. The principal strategy for managing NRW used in the research was the AWWA water audit method which includes free to use software and was found to be easy to apply in Oman. The research showed that risks to the main desalination processes can be controlled but the risk due to feed water quality might remain high even after implementing mitigation measures because the intake is close to an oil port with a significant risk of oil contamination and algal blooms. The most severe risks to transmission mains were found to be associated with pipe rather than pump failure. The systems in Oman were found to be moderately resilient, the resilience of desalination plants reasonably high but the transmission mains and pumping stations are very vulnerable. The integrated strategy developed in this study has a wide applicability, particularly in the Gulf area, which may have risks from exceptional events and will be experiencing NRW. Other developing countries may also experience such risks but with different magnitudes and the risk evaluation tables could provide a useful format for further work.
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This executive order by Governor Nikki R. Haley declares that a State of Emergency exists in South Carolina. She directs that the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan be placed into effect and directs that all prudent preparations be taken at the individual, local, and state levels to protect against the possible effects of Hurricane Matthew.