Aviation unit maintenance repair parts and special tools list for countermeasures set AN/ALQ-136(V)1 (NSN 5865-01-127-6880).

"30 March 1984."

Organizational, direct support, and general support maintenance repairs parts and special tools lists (including depot maintenance repair parts and special tools) for receiving set, countermeasures AN/ALQ-133 (NSN 5865-00-134-2601).

"December 1978."

Hand receipt covering contents of Components of End Item (COEI), Basic Issue Items (BII), and Additional Authorization List (AAL) for countermeasures sets AN/ALQ-144(V)1 and (V)3 (NSN 5865-01-037-1334).

"October 1981."

Aviation intermediate maintenance manual (AVIM) : countermeasures set AN/TLQ-156(V)1, NSN 5865-01-145-5197.

Includes index.

Operator's and aviation unit maintenance manual : countermeasures set AN/ALQ-156(V)1 (NSN 5865-01-145-5197).

"March 1984."

Organizational maintenance repair parts and special tools list for countermeasures set AN/ALQ-156(V)1 (NSN 5865-01-145-5197).

"18 May 1984."

Aviation intermediate maintenance repair parts and special tools list ... for countermeasures set AN/ALQ-136(V)1 (NSN 5865-01-127-6880).

"30 March 1984."

Operator's and organizational maintenance manual, aviation unit maintenance : countermeasures sets AN/ALQ-147A(V)1 and (V)2 : ((V)1-NSN-5865-01-077-6320) ((V)2-NSN-5865-01-077-6321).

"29 January 1980."

Operator's and aviation unit maintenance manual : test set, countermeasures set TS-3615/ALQ-136(V) (NSN 6625-01-121-8984).

"23 February 1984"--P. i.

Procurement irregularities associated with the Department of Defense's airborne self-protection jammer program : hearing before the Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, March 25, 1992.

Shipping list no.: 93-0170-P.

Router Attack toward NoC-enabled MPSoC and Monitoring Countermeasures against such Threat

The growing number of applications and processing units in modern Multiprocessor Systems-on-Chips (MPSoCs) come along with reduced time to market. Different IP cores can come from different vendors, and their trust levels are also different, but typically they use Network-on-Chip (NoC) as their communication infrastructure. An MPSoC can have multiple Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Apart from performance, power, and area research in the field of MPSoC, robust and secure system design is also gaining importance in the research community. To build a secure system, the designer must know beforehand all kinds of attack possibilities for the respective system (MPSoC). In this paper we survey the possible attack scenarios on present-day MPSoCs and investigate a new attack scenario, i.e., router attack targeted toward NoC architecture. We show the validity of this attack by analyzing different present-day NoC architectures and show that they are all vulnerable to this type of attack. By launching a router attack, an attacker can control the whole chip very easily, which makes it a very serious issue. Both routing tables and routing logic-based routers are vulnerable to such attacks. In this paper, we address attacks on routing tables. We propose different monitoring-based countermeasures against routing table-based router attack in an MPSoC having multiple TEEs. Synthesis results show that proposed countermeasures, viz. Runtime-monitor, Restart-monitor, Intermediate manager, and Auditor, occupy areas that are 26.6, 22, 0.2, and 12.2 % of a routing table-based router area. Apart from these, we propose Ejection address checker and Local monitoring module inside a router that cause 3.4 and 10.6 % increase of a router area, respectively. Simulation results are also given, which shows effectiveness of proposed monitoring-based countermeasures.

Electronic and vibrational spectra of gaspeite

Visible, near-infrared, IR and Raman spectra of magnesian gaspeite are presented. Nickel ion is the main source of the electronic bands as it is the principal component in the mineral where as the bands in IR and Raman spectra are due to the vibrational processes in the carbonate ion as an entity. The combination of electronic absorption and vibrational spectra (including near-infrared, FTIR and Raman) of magnesian gaspeite are explained in terms of the cation co-ordination and the behaviour of CO32– anion in the Ni–Mg carbonate. The electronic absorption spectrum consists of three broad and intense bands at 8130, 13160 and 22730 cm–1 due to spin-allowed transitions and two weak bands at 20410 and 30300 cm–1 are assigned to spin-forbidden transitions of Ni2+ in an octahedral symmetry. The crystal field parameters evaluated from the observed bands are Dq = 810; B = 800 and C = 3200 cm–1. The two bands in the near-infrared spectrum at 4330 and 5130 cm–1 are overtone and combination of CO32– vibrational modes. For the carbonate group, infrared bands are observed at 1020 cm–1(1 ), 870 cm–1 (2), 1418 cm–1 (3) and 750 cm–1 (4), of which3, the asymmetric stretching mode is most intense. Three well resolved Raman bands at 1571, 1088 and 331 cm–1 are assigned to 3, 1 and MO stretching vibrations.