El papel de las herramientas del Marketing Político utilizadas durante la campaña de Gustavo Petro para las elecciones a la presidencia de la República en Colombia en el 2010

A través del estudio de las herramientas de Marketing Político utilizadas durante la campaña de Gustavo Petro para la presidencia de la República en 2010, se busca determinar el papel político de las mismas. En la investigación se hace un aporte metodológico a través de un modelo para estudiar las herramientas del Marketing Político sin dejar de lado el papel político el cual se analiza en el trabajo.

Comportamento eleitoral e a variável religiosa na decisão do voto: um estudo sobre eleitores neopentecostais

Apresentando como principal expoente a Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, o segmento evangélico neopentecostal tem obtido sucesso em sua inserção político eleitoral, através da utilização de estratégias eleitorais características, como o cadastramento de fiéis, a adoção de campanhas oficiais distribuídas por região de acordo com o potencial do eleitorado e o uso da mídia própria e dos púlpitos para o marketing político. Inserida nos estudos de comportamento eleitoral, esta dissertação fará uma análise sobre os eleitores dos autodenominados políticos de Deus, com a utilização de surveys, dados eleitorais e pesquisa de campo. Através da aplicação da Teoria da Escolha Racional, será investigada a hipótese de que os eleitores neopentecostais não se distanciam da concepção de Homo politicus da teoria downsiana, agindo racionalmente quando atribuem seu voto a um irmão de fé.

Análisis del voto obligatorio en Chile como referencia para una eventual aplicación en Colombia

La siguiente monografía es un análisis del voto obligatorio en Chile como referencia para una eventual aplicación en Colombia. A través de ella se busca identificar las características esenciales – recomendaciones- para la implementación de un voto obligatorio en Colombia que contribuya al fortalecimiento del sistema electoral colombiano a partir de un aumento de la participación política electoral colombiana (sin que con ello se pretenda desconocer otros mecanismos de participación política ni mucho menos reducirla al ejercicio del voto), tomando como punto de referencia el análisis de la implementación del voto obligatorio en Chile.

Ciclos político-económico-electorales y su incidencia en los niveles de pobreza en el marco de la competencia por el poder

El interés de la presente monografía es analizar los efectos de los ciclos político-económico-electorales (CPEE) sobre los niveles de pobreza en Colombia para el periodo del 2002 al 2010. Se analiza el manejo de la política fiscal por parte del gobierno con el fin de caracterizar el ciclo político entre oportunista o partidista. De esta forma, se pretende corroborar que en Colombia los CPEE generan efectos en la economía. No obstante, estos efectos pueden ser más o menos duraderos en función de la sostenibilidad del discurso ganador en la contienda electoral. Como resultado de este trabajo se determinó que la discontinuidad en el manejo de la política fiscal presenta un ciclo político-económico-electoral oportunista que contribuye negativamente los niveles de pobreza. Para desarrollar lo anterior, se realiza un análisis el cual se aborda desde el Enfoque de la Elección Racional.

A campanha presidencial e o Vota Brasil em 2006: marketing e contexto político

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Análise organizacional do partido da social democracia brasileira no estado de São Paulo (1988-2006): a estrutura relacional e o capital político

Pós-graduação em Ciências Sociais - FCLAR

Coevolution of capitalism and political representation: The choice of electoral systems

Protocorporatist West European countries in which economic interests were collectively organized adopted PR in the first quarter of the twentieth century, whereas liberal countries in which economic interests were not collectively organized did not. Political parties, as Marcus Kreuzer points out, choose electoral systems. So how do economic interests translate into party political incentives to adopt electoral reform? We argue that parties in protocorporatist countries were representative of and closely linked to economic interests. As electoral competition in single member districts increased sharply up to World War I, great difficulties resulted for the representative parties whose leaders were seen as interest committed. They could not credibly compete for votes outside their interest without leadership changes or reductions in interest influence. Proportional representation offered an obvious solution, allowing parties to target their own voters and their organized interest to continue effective influence in the legislature. In each respect, the opposite was true of liberal countries. Data on party preferences strongly confirm this model. (Kreuzer's historical criticisms are largely incorrect, as shown in detail in the online supplementary Appendix.). © 2010 American Political Science Association.

Análisis de la estrategia de comunicación que articula la campaña electoral del candidato Sergio Fajardo a la presidencia en el periodo comprendido entre mayo de 2009 y febrero de 2010.

Es un análisis a la estrategia electoral de la campaña presidencial del candidato Sergio Fajardo teniendo en cuenta elementos básicos como la Imagen, los temas de campaña y la estrategia de comunicación en contextos específicos de la campaña electoral.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This paper examines corruption as potential determinant of their electoral success. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: On the onehand, the historically-grown corruption level reduces the electoral success of new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase of the perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral success of new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2011 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Corruption and the Electoral Support of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This article examines corruption as a potential determinant of their electoral support. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: on the one hand, the historically derived corruption level reduces the electoral support for new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase in perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral support for new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2013 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Immigration and free movement in an unusual electoral race: what implications for the next political cycle? EPC Policy Brief, 20 May 2014

Immigration and freedom of movement of EU citizens are among the main issues debated throughout the European Parliament election campaign and have some potential in determining who tomorrow’s EU leaders will be. This Policy Brief looks at how the two policies are debated at national level – in France, Germany and the UK – and at EU level between the ‘top candidates’ for European Commission Presidency – Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP), Ska Keller (Greens), Martin Schulz (PES) and Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE) – who have participated in several public debates. Two different campaigns have been unfolding in front of EU citizens’ eyes. The tense debate that can be identified at national level on these issues, is not transferred to the EU level, where immigration and free movement are less controversial topics. Furthermore, although participating in European elections, national parties present agendas responding exclusively to the economic and social challenges of their Member State, while the candidates for the Commission Presidency bring forward ‘more European’ programmes. Hence, several aspects need to be reflected upon: What will the consequences of this discontinuity be? How will this impact the future European agenda in terms of immigration and free movement? What institutional consequences will there be? Answering these questions is not a simple task, however, this paper aims to identify the parameters that need to be taken into account and the political landscape which will determine the future EU agenda in terms of immigration and free movement.

A Pan-European District for the European Elections? The Rise and Fall of the Duff Proposal for the Electoral Reform of the European Parliament. Bruges Political Research Papers 44/2015.

The aim of the present article is to understand the dynamics underlying the birth, the development and the eventual failure of the Duff proposal of 2009-2012, an ambitious attempt to change the provisions governing the elections for the European Parliament. In particular, the way agenda-setting on electoral reform is shaped in the European Union will be analysed, trying to understand if the current stalemate on the issue can be explained in light of factors specific to the EU. The report presented by liberal MEP Andrew Duff at the beginning of the seventh legislature called on Member States to gather a Convention, in order to introduce fundamental improvements in the way Members of the European Parliament are elected. Among the envisaged changes, the creation of a pan-European constituency to elect twenty-five Members on transnational lists represented the most controversial issue. After having analysed its main elements, the path of the Duff report from the committee of Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) to the plenary will be analysed. It will be concluded that a sharp contrast exists between the way electoral issues are raised in the AFCO committee and the way the Parliament as a whole deals with them. Moreover, diverging interests between national delegations inside groups seem to play a decisive role in hampering electoral reform. While further research is needed to corroborate the present findings, the analysis of the Duff proposal appears to shed light on the different barriers that ensure electoral reform is taken off the agenda of the Union, and on the relative weight each of them carries.

Electoral Volatility, Political Sophistication, Trust and Efficacy

In this article we investigate voter volatility and analyze the causes and motives of switching vote intentions. We test two main sets of variables linked to volatility in literature; political sophistication and ‘political (dis)satisfaction’. Results show that voters with low levels of political efficacy tend to switch more often, both within a campaign and between elections. In the analysis we differentiate between campaign volatility and inter-election volatility and by doing so show that the dynamics of a campaign have a profound impact on volatility. The campaign period is when the lowly sophisticated switch their vote intention. Those with higher levels of interest in politics have switched their intention before the campaign has started. The data for this analysis are from the three wave PartiRep Belgian Election Study (2009).