The Impact of the Electoral System on Political Campaigning : Are Candidates for the Council of States More Moderate than their Fellow Candidates for the National Council ?

It is commonly believed that majority voting enhances parties to cluster around the centre of the political space, whereas proportional systems (PR) foster great ideological divergence. The theoretical arguments for these expectations go back to the work of Downs (1957) and Duverger (1954). More recent studies, however, produced quite contradictory empirical findings. In this paper I will test whether similar arguments hold true for the positioning of candidates campaigning in different electoral systems. The elections for the two chambers of the Swiss Parliament and the data from the Swiss Electoral Studies (SELECTS) and the Swiss Voting Advice Application (VAA) smartvote offer an excellent - almost laboratory like - opportunity to do so empirically. The analyses show clearly, the theoretical claims that majority voting necessarily fosters more moderate positions find no support. The candidates for the Council of States, elected in a majority system, are not more moderate than their fellow party candidates for the National Council which are elected in a PR system.

The quality of referendum debate: the UK's electoral system referendum in the print media

This paper analyses the quality of debate surrounding the UK’s 2011 electoral reform referendum as represented in the print media. It first considers how debate quality in the context of a referendum campaign may best be conceptualized. It then uses content analysis of media coverage to investigate three aspects of that debate: its quantity; the balance between Yes and No arguments, and the quality of reason-giving. It finds that the quantity of debate was comparable to other recent electoral reform referendums. Coverage was predominantly, but not overwhelmingly, hostile to change. The different indicators of the quality of reason-giving present a mixed picture. The paper concludes by considering how the analysis could be extended through further comparison with other cases.

The extent of the population paradox in the Hungarian electoral system

The Hungarian mixed-member electoral system, adopted in 1989, is one of the world’s most complicated electoral systems, and, as this paper demonstrates, it suffers from the "population paradox". In particular, the governing coalition may lose as many as 8 seats either by getting more votes or by the opposition obtaining fewer votes on each territorial list.

EVIV: An end-to-end verifiable Internet voting system

Traditionally, a country's electoral system requires the voter to vote at a specific day and place, which conflicts with the mobility usually seen in modern live styles. Thus, the widespread of Internet (mobile) broadband access can be seen as an opportunity to deal with this mobility problem, i.e. the adoption of an Internet voting system can make the live of voter's much more convenient; however, a widespread Internet voting systems adoption relies on the ability to develop trustworthy systems, i.e. systems that are verifiable and preserve the voter's privacy. Building such a system is still an open research problem. Our contribution is a new Internet voting system: EVIV, a highly sound End-to-end Verifiable Internet Voting system, which offers full voter's mobility and preserves the voter's privacy from the vote casting PC even if the voter votes from a public PC, such as a PC at a cybercafe or at a public library. Additionally, EVIV has private vote verification mechanisms, in which the voter just has to perform a simple match of two small strings (4-5 alphanumeric characters), that detect and protect against vote manipulations both at the insecure vote client platform and at the election server side. (c) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

On the origins of electoral systems and political parties. The role of elections in multi-member districts

The old, understudied electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is presented as the most remote scene of the origin of both political parties and new electoral systems. A survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules in different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its wide spread. A model of voting by this electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce varied and pluralistic representation, it also provides incentives to form factional or partisan candidacies. Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context. Many electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th century, including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative ballots, and proportional representation rules, derived from the search to reduce the effects of the originating multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep. The general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to account for the foundational stage here discussed.

Estimating parliamentary composition through electoral polls

Any electoral system has an electoral formula that converts voteproportions into parliamentary seats. Pre-electoral polls usually focuson estimating vote proportions and then applying the electoral formulato give a forecast of the parliament's composition. We here describe theproblems arising from this approach: there is always a bias in theforecast. We study the origin of the bias and some methods to evaluateand to reduce it. We propose some rules to compute the sample sizerequired for a given forecast accuracy. We show by Monte Carlo simulationthe performance of the proposed methods using data from Spanish electionsin last years. We also propose graphical methods to visualize how electoralformulae and parliamentary forecasts work (or fail).

El sistema electoral de les Corts Valencianes: orígens i reforma

[cat] Aquest article vol refutar la hipòtesi que els partits decideixen sistemes electorals majoritaris i que decideixen també mantenir-los invariables, sempre que el sistema de partits s"aproximi al bipartidisme i cap dels dos grans partits pugui perdre la seva posició a favor d"un nou competidor. De manera inversa, els sistemes electorals proporcionals són la conseqüència del multipartidisme, en el qual cap partit té opcions de rebre la majoria dels vots. El cas valencià, però, confirma només parcialment la hipòtesi: els partits van aprovar el 1982 regles proporcionals perquè les eleccions dels parlaments autonòmics eren considerades secundàries, no només pel multipartidisme existent aleshores. En canvi, sí que es confirma que el canvi iniciat el 2006 amb la reforma estatutària manté, de moment, l"status quo per no alterar la formació de majories parlamentàries. Encara queda pendent, però, que es modifiqui la Llei Electoral, de la qual depèn quin mínim de vots per entrar a les Corts s"establirà.

Mind the Gap. Do Proportional Electoral Systems Foster a More Equal Representation of Women and Men, Poor and Rich ?

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: 1) Are parties ideologically biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens? 2) Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of underrepresentation of women and poor citizens in the party system? A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of underrepresentation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

Voto preferente: como instrumento electoral para la constitución del personalismo político en Colombia, en las elecciones del Senado 2006.

Para Colombia, la reforma política de 2003 marcó una transformación en el sistema político y electoral debido a que proponía reinstitucionalizar los movimientos y los partidos políticos del país, a la vez que planteaba transformaciones importantes al sistema electoral. La hipótesis plantea el hecho de que el voto preferente es la herramienta ideal para mantener los personalismos políticos por parte de aquellos candidatos beneficiados con la reforma. Como justificación se plantea que en Colombia y en los países con sistemas de partidos institucionalizados, un proceso de reforma política se circunscribe a modificaciones o ajustes de alguna norma o ley que se encuentre vigente en el marco jurídico o la Constitución Política actual de un Estado determinado. Cuando estos procesos se llevan a cabo, la intención es, por un lado, suprimir normas que afectan de manera adversa el desarrollo de ciertos sectores específicos, o por el otro, modificar procedimientos de orden institucional que terminan perjudicando, en el caso de nuestro país, el ejercicio democrático en términos de una idónea representación dentro de los cargos legislativos de la nación. Puede decirse entonces que esta monografía logra analizar las distintas situaciones políticas y sociales que enmarcan la reforma política de 2003 y de manera particular se logra comprender todas las implicaciones políticas que tiene el voto preferente como medio para estructurar las estrategias electorales de los sistemas de partidos en Colombia.

Congress composition and electoral advantage

In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.

Electoral reform in Europe since 1945

This article surveys and analyses democratic electoral reform in Europe since 1945 in order to pursue three issues. First, it seeks understanding of the processes through which electoral systems change. Second, it asks how the incidence of these processes varies over context and time. Third, it investigates whether there are relationships between the nature of the processes through which electoral system change occurs and the electoral reforms that are thereby adopted. The analysis suggests, most importantly, that electoral system changes occur via multiple contrasting processes, that there is a tendency towards increasing impact of mass opinion upon these changes, and that this is beginning to generate a trend towards greater personalisation in the electoral systems adopted. These findings are, however, preliminary; the article is intended to encourage further discussion and research.

The expenses scandal and the politics of electoral reform

The scandal over MPs' expenses that erupted in 2009 was followed by a surge in discussion of electoral reform. A range of reforms to Westminster's existing electoral system are now high on the political agenda. This article examines the extent and the nature of the scandal's impact on the electoral reform debate and draws out comparative implications for the sorts of conditions that can force politicians to accept electoral reforms that they do not want. It finds that the expenses scandal significantly changed debate about some electoral reform topics, but not about others. It proposes three factors likely to increase the impact of scandal in sparking reform: that the scandal is seen as harming ordinary people in their daily lives; that reforms can readily be understood as likely to mitigate the sources of scandal; and that those reforms do not seriously harm politicians' own perceived interests.