On the beach : exploring the complex egalitarianism of the Australian beach

Australia, internationally, is known as a beach loving country, particularly in popular culture. The beach did not figure significantly in academic discussion before the 1980s when Fiske, Hodge, and Turner (1987, 54) researched the beach as a space of myth, seeing it as an integral part of the modern Australian identity. One common myth in Australia is that the beach is an equaliser, a place of multiple ethnicities, shapes, sizes, and genders (Dutton, 1985). I agree that the beach remains a significant aspect of Australian identity; however, limiting its meaning to a mythic space contributing to a homogenous national identity is not adequate. This paper will explore how Australian texts comment on or challenge the myth of the beach as an egalitarian space. I argue that recent Australian texts show a more complex, layered representation of this concept; and that the beach also in this respect can no longer be understood as a myth transcending difference.

Countering disablism: An alternative universal income support system based on egalitarianism

The long-term vision of economic security and social participation for people with a disability held by disability activists and policy-makers has not been realised on a global scale. This is despite the implementation of various poverty alleviation initiatives by international and national governments. Indeed within advanced Western liberal democracies, the inequalities and poverty gaps have widened rather than closed. This article is based on findings from a historical-comparative policy and discourse analysis of disability income support system in Australia and the Basic Income model. The findings suggest that a model such as Basic Income, grounded in principles of social citizenship, goes some way to maintaining an adequate level of subsistence for people with a disability. The article concludes by presenting some challenges and a commitment to transforming income support policy.

Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria.

Choices, chance and change: luck egalitarianism over time

The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the choices of agents). I grant that the broad approach is correct but argue that the temporal standpoint from which we judge whether the person can be held responsible, or the extent to which they can be held responsible, should be radically altered. Instead of asking, as Standard (or Static) Luck Egalitarianism seems to, whether or not, or to what extent, a person was responsible for the choice at the time of choosing, and asking the question of responsibility only once, we should ask whether, or to what extent, they are responsible for the choice at the point at which we are seeking to discover whether, or to what extent, the inequality is just, and so the question of responsibility is not settled but constantly under review. Such an approach will differ from Standard Luck Egalitarianism only if responsibility for a choice is not set in stone – if responsibility can weaken then we should not see the boundary between luck and responsibility within a particular action as static. Drawing on Derek Parfit’s illuminating discussions of personal identity, and contemporary literature on moral responsibility, I suggest there are good reasons to think that responsibility can weaken – that we are not necessarily fully responsible for a choice for ever, even if we were fully responsible at the time of choosing. I call the variant of luck egalitarianism that recognises this shift in temporal standpoint and that responsibility can weaken Dynamic Luck Egalitarianism (DLE). In conclusion I offer a preliminary discussion of what kind of policies DLE would support.

Hypothetical choice, egalitarianism, and the separateness of persons

Luck egalitarians claim that disadvantage is worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk than when it emerges from a chosen risk. I argue that disadvantage is also worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would have declined to take, had he or she been able to do so, than when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would not have declined to take. Such a view is significant because it allows both luck egalitarians and prioritarians to respond to Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey's charge that they fail to accommodate intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries – the so-called separateness of persons objection. I argue that the view is plausible independently of its ability to answer the separateness of persons objection, and is a natural extension of the luck egalitarian concern with the impact of unchosen circumstance.

On the significance of the basic structure: a priori baseline views and luck egalitarianism

This paper uses the exploration of the grounds of a common criticism of luck egalitarianism to try to make an argument about both the proper subject of theorising about justice and how to approach that subject. It draws a distinction between what it calls basic structure views and a priori baseline views, where the former take the institutional aspects of political prescriptions seriously and the latter do not. It argues that objections to luck egalitarianism on the grounds of its harshness can in part be explained by this blindness to relevant features of institutions. Further, it may be that luck egalitarianism cannot regard its own enactment as just. A related objection to Dworkin’s equality of resources, which claims that it cannot pick a particular institutional background to set the costs of resources and so is radically indeterminate, is also presented. These results, I argue, give us good reason to reject all a priori baseline views.

Talking culture? Egalitarianism, color-blindness and racism in Australian elementary schools

This study examines egalitarianism as an ethnic-racial socialization message used by teachers with 8-12 year old children in four socio-demographically diverse elementary schools in Melbourne, Australia. The three main types of egalitarian messages identified are i) procedural-justice color-blindness, ii) distributive-justice color-blindness and iii) colormuteness, and each is explored in relation to how teachers talk to children about racial, ethnic and cultural diversity, and racism. We conclude that teacher confidence and capability, and to a lesser degree, school context, influenced the types of egalitarian messages used about diversity and the extent to which teachers had explicit and critical discussions about racism.

Egalitarianism under Earmark Constraints

Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm. Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers. Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution.

An evolutionary model explaining the Neolithic transition from egalitarianism to leadership and despotism.

The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalitarian groups, to much larger groups with increased stratification. But the dynamics of this remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how despotism can arise without coercion, yet coercion could not easily have occurred in an egalitarian setting. Using a quanti- tative model of evolution in a patch-structured population, we demonstrate that the interaction between demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum. We model the co-evolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree of despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that voluntary leadership without coercion can evolve in small groups, when leaders help to solve coordination problems related to resource production. An example is coordinating construction of an irrigation system. Our model predicts that the transition to larger despotic groups will then occur when: 1. surplus resources lead to demographic expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acephalous niche in the same area and so locking individuals into hierarchy; 2. high dispersal costs limit followers' ability to escape a despot. Empirical evidence suggests that these conditions were likely met for the first time during the subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.

Flagging Spaces : exploring the myth of the Australian beach as an egalitarian space

The Australian beach is now accepted as a significant part of Australian national culture and identity. However, Huntsman (2001) and Booth (2001) both believe that the beach is dying: “intellectuals have failed to apply to the beach the attention they have lavished on the bush…” (Huntsman 2001, 218). Yet the beach remains a prominent image in contemporary literature and film; authors such as Tim Winton and Robert Drewe frequently set their stories in and around the coast. Although initially considered a space of myth (Fiske, Hodge, and Turner 1987), Meaghan Morris labelled the beach as ‘ordinary’ (1998), and as recently as 2001 in the wake of the Sydney Olympic Games, Bonner, McKee, and Mackay termed the beach ‘tacky’ and ‘familiar’. The beach, it appears, defies an easy categorisation. In fact, I believe the beach is more than merely mythic or ordinary, or a combination of the two. Instead it is an imaginative space, seamlessly shifting its metaphorical meanings dependent on readings of the texts. My studies examine the beach through five common beach myths; this paper will explore the myth of the beach as an egalitarian space. Contemporary Australian national texts no longer conform to these mythical representations – (in fact, was the beach ever a space of equality?), instead creating new definitions for the beach space that continually shifts in meaning. Recent texts such as Tim Winton’s Breath (2008) and Stephen Orr’s Time’s Long Ruin (2010) lay a more complex metaphorical meaning upon the beach space. This paper will explore the beach as a space of egalitarianism in conjunction with recent Australian fiction and films in order to discover how the contemporary beach is represented.

Processpedia : an ecological environment for BPM stakeholders' collaboration

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to clarify how end-users’ tacit knowledge can be captured and integrated in an overall business process management (BPM) approach. Current approaches to support stakeholders’ collaboration in the modelling of business processes envision an egalitarian environment where stakeholders interact in the same context, using the same languages and sharing the same perspectives on the business process. Therefore, such stakeholders have to collaborate in the context of process modelling using a language that some of them do not master, and have to integrate their various perspectives. Design/methodology/approach: The paper applies the SECI knowledge management process to analyse the problems of traditional top-down BPM approaches and BPM collaborative modelling tools. Besides, the SECI model is also applied to Wikipedia, a successful Web 2.0-based knowledge management environment, to identify how tacit knowledge is captured in a bottom-up approach. Findings – The paper identifies a set of requirements for a hybrid BPM approach, both top-down and bottom-up, and describes a new BPM method based on a stepwise discovery of knowledge. Originality/value: This new approach, Processpedia, enhances collaborative modelling among stakeholders without enforcing egalitarianism. In Processpedia tacit knowledge is captured and standardised into the organisation’s business processes by fostering an ecological participation of all the stakeholders and capitalising on stakeholders’ distinctive characteristics.

Democracy and the Project of Liberal Inclusion

Democracy is a multi-dimensional concept, ranging from definitions based exclusively on institutional frameworks (for example, Held, 2005, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000) to complex and integrated measures that include political and civil rights, democratic practices, values and, finally, a diverse set of institutional arrangements in society, including welfare, education, industrial relations and the legal system (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, Jaggers and Gurr, 1995, O'Donnell, Cullel and Iazetta, 2004). This reflects the range of and distinction between merely formal electoral democracy and genuinely 'effective liberal democracy' (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 149), where democracy is firmly embedded not only in its institutions but in the values of its citizenry. Evidence from cross-national research confirms that formal democratic institutions, different dimensions of effective democracy, and democratic values are indeed strongly linked (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 154, Jaggers and Gurr, 1995: 446). Democracy is more than just a set of institutions, rules and mechanisms: it is a set of core values engrained in the 'lived experience' of its citizens. Core values of democracies are individual autonomy and egalitarianism, tolerance of diversity, and freedom from oppression for both individuals and institutions. Democracies restrain their governments by the rule of law and grant its citizens equal access to and equal treatment by legal institutions. Among these institutions, criminal justice and the treatment of those who violated rules and regulations represent sensitive seismographs for the quality of effective democracies, and the ways how democracies realise their core values.