The egalitarian leader: A comparison of leadership in Australia and New Zealand

This article compares leadership in Australia and New Zealand based on data collected as a part of the GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior effectiveness) 62-nation culture and leadership project. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were used to demonstrate that etic (universal) dimensions of 'Charismatic' and 'Self-Protective' leadership are evident in both cultures, but that the dimensions have emic (local) culturally determined manifestations. These emic manifestations were stronger in New Zealand than in Australia. Leadership effectiveness incorporated the negative emic dimension of 'Bureaucratic' leadership (both countries), and the positive emic dimension of 'Egalitarian leadership' in Australia and 'Team leadership' in New Zealand. Both models of leadership nonetheless represent styles of leadership based on egalitarian principles.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution

In this paper we axiomatize the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991) over the class of weak superadditive games using constrained egalitarianism, order-consistency, and converse order-consistency. JEL classification: C71, C78. Keywords: Cooperative TU-game, strong constrained egalitarian solution, axiomatization.

Social justice in education : how the function of selection in educational institutions predicts support for (non)egalitarian assessment practices

Educational institutions are considered a keystone for the establishment of a meritocratic society. They supposedly serve two functions: an educational function that promotes learning for all, and a selection function that sorts individuals into different programs, and ultimately social positions, based on individual merit. We study how the function of selection relates to support for assessment practices known to harm vs. benefit lower status students, through the perceived justice principles underlying these practices. We study two assessment practices: normative assessment-focused on ranking and social comparison, known to hinder the success of lower status students-and formative assessment-focused on learning and improvement, known to benefit lower status students. Normative assessment is usually perceived as relying on an equity principle, with rewards being allocated based on merit and should thus appear as positively associated with the function of selection. Formative assessment is usually perceived as relying on corrective justice that aims to ensure equality of outcomes by considering students' needs, which makes it less suitable for the function of selection. A questionnaire measuring these constructs was administered to university students. Results showed that believing that education is intended to select the best students positively predicts support for normative assessment, through increased perception of its reliance on equity, and negatively predicts support for formative assessment, through reduced perception of its ability to establish corrective justice. This study suggests that the belief in the function of selection as inherent to educational institutions can contribute to the reproduction of social inequalities by preventing change from assessment practices known to disadvantage lowerstatus student, namely normative assessment, to more favorable practices, namely formative assessment, and by promoting matching beliefs in justice principles.

On the Scope of Egalitarian Justice.

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An Egalitarian Argument in Favour of Free Access to Healthcare and Rationing

La pensée égalitariste a traditionnellement promu l’idéal d’un système de santé universel, gratuit et accessible à tous les membres de la société. J’appuie cette position en répliquant tout d’abord à la critique qui prétend que les riches tireraient plus d’avantages que les pauvres de la gratuité du système de santé. J’ouvre ensuite la réflexion sur ce qui me semble être un enjeu crucial pour l’avenir des systèmes modernes de santé : le rationnement de l’offre. Cette idée ne plaît généralement pas à la population, aux décideurs politiques et à de nombreux égalitaristes. Je considère pourtant que les principaux arguments invoqués contre le rationnement sont incohérents ou faussement égalitaristes. La gratuité des services de santé n’est pas incompatible avec la limitation de l’offre publique.

‘Bringing the Middle Classes Back In’ An Egalitarian Case for (Truly) Universal Public Services

Some egalitarians argue against public services that are free for all, on the grounds that free access appears to primarily benefit the middle classes. I advocate, instead, the inclusion of the middle classes in public services, arguing that only truly universal intake of public services prevents the inegalitarian effects of economic segregation. Such universal participation in public services is achieved, partly, through subsidies for, and regulation of, privately produced services.

Egalitarian behaviour in multi unit combinatorial auctions

En entornos donde los recursos son precederos y la asignación de recursos se repite en el tiempo con el mismo conjunto o un conjunto muy similar de agentes, las subastas recurrentes pueden ser utilizadas. Una subasta recurrente es una secuencia de subastas donde el resultado de una subasta puede influenciar en las siguientes. De todas formas, este tipo de subastas tienen problemas particulares cuando la riqueza de los agentes esta desequilibrada y los recursos son precederos. En esta tesis se proponen algunos mecanismos justos o equitativos para minimizar los efectos de estos problemas. En una subasta recurrente una solución justa significa que todos los participantes consiguen a largo plazo sus objetivos en el mismo grado o en el grado más parecido posible, independientemente de su riqueza. Hemos demostrado experimentalmente que la inclusión de justicia incentiva a los bidders en permanecer en la subasta minimizando los problemas de las subastas recurrentes.

Can I be a luck egalitarian and a Rawlsian?

Luck egalitarianism and Rawlsianism have been presented as competing answers to the same question: the question of distributive justice. In this paper, I show how they are in fact not different theories of the same thing, but rather different theories of different things - different answers to different questions. I trace the history of luck egalitarian thinking and try to show why Rawlsianism and luck egalitarianism were taken to be the same kind of project. I then examine different ways that one could consistently endorse (some version of) luck egalitarianism and (some version of/elements of) Rawls' theory.