Essays in economics of information

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en économie de l'information. Le premier chapitre sert d'introduction et les Chapitres 2 à 4 constituent le coeur de l'ouvrage. Le Chapitre 2 porte sur l’acquisition d’information sur l’Internet par le biais d'avis de consommateurs. En particulier, je détermine si les avis laissés par les acheteurs peuvent tout de même transmettre de l’information à d’autres consommateurs, lorsqu’il est connu que les vendeurs peuvent publier de faux avis à propos de leurs produits. Afin de comprendre si cette manipulation des avis est problématique, je démontre que la plateforme sur laquelle les avis sont publiés (e.g. TripAdvisor, Yelp) est un tiers important à considérer, autant que les vendeurs tentant de falsifier les avis. En effet, le design adopté par la plateforme a un effet indirect sur le niveau de manipulation des vendeurs. En particulier, je démontre que la plateforme, en cachant une partie du contenu qu'elle détient sur les avis, peut parfois améliorer la qualité de l'information obtenue par les consommateurs. Finalement, le design qui est choisi par la plateforme peut être lié à la façon dont elle génère ses revenus. Je montre qu'une plateforme générant des revenus par le biais de commissions sur les ventes peut être plus tolérante à la manipulation qu'une plateforme qui génère des revenus par le biais de publicité. Le Chapitre 3 est écrit en collaboration avec Marc Santugini. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions les effets de la discrimination par les prix au troisième degré en présence de consommateurs non informés qui apprennent sur la qualité d'un produit par le biais de son prix. Dans un environnement stochastique avec deux segments de marché, nous démontrons que la discrimination par les prix peut nuire à la firme et être bénéfique pour les consommateurs. D'un côté, la discrimination par les prix diminue l'incertitude à laquelle font face les consommateurs, c.-à-d., la variance des croyances postérieures est plus faible avec discrimination qu'avec un prix uniforme. En effet, le fait d'observer deux prix (avec discrimination) procure plus d'information aux consommateurs, et ce, même si individuellement chacun de ces prix est moins informatif que le prix uniforme. De l'autre côté, il n'est pas toujours optimal pour la firme de faire de la discrimination par les prix puisque la présence de consommateurs non informés lui donne une incitation à s'engager dans du signaling. Si l'avantage procuré par la flexibilité de fixer deux prix différents est contrebalancé par le coût du signaling avec deux prix différents, alors il est optimal pour la firme de fixer un prix uniforme sur le marché. Finalement, le Chapitre 4 est écrit en collaboration avec Sidartha Gordon. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions une classe de jeux où les joueurs sont contraints dans le nombre de sources d'information qu'ils peuvent choisir pour apprendre sur un paramètre du jeu, mais où ils ont une certaine liberté quant au degré de dépendance de leurs signaux, avant de prendre une action. En introduisant un nouvel ordre de dépendance entre signaux, nous démontrons qu'un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la plus dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, compléments stratégiques et isotoniques, soit substituts stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. De même, un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la moins dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, substituts stratégiques et isotoniques, soit compléments stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. Nous établissons également des conditions suffisantes pour qu'une structure d'information donnée, information publique ou privée par exemple, soit possible à l'équilibre.

Application of Information Statistical Theory to the Description of the Effect of Heat Conduction on the Chemical Reaction Rate in Gases

The effect of the heat flux on the rate of chemical reaction in dilute gases is shown to be important for reactions characterized by high activation energies and in the presence of very large temperature gradients. This effect, obtained from the second-order terms in the distribution function (similar to those obtained in the Burnett approximation to the solution of the Boltzmann equation), is derived on the basis of information theory. It is shown that the analytical results describing the effect are simpler if the kinetic definition for the nonequilibrium temperature is introduced than if the thermodynamic definition is introduced. The numerical results are nearly the same for both definitions

An information theory model of hydrophobic interactions.

A molecular model of poorly understood hydrophobic effects is heuristically developed using the methods of information theory. Because primitive hydrophobic effects can be tied to the probability of observing a molecular-sized cavity in the solvent, the probability distribution of the number of solvent centers in a cavity volume is modeled on the basis of the two moments available from the density and radial distribution of oxygen atoms in liquid water. The modeled distribution then yields the probability that no solvent centers are found in the cavity volume. This model is shown to account quantitatively for the central hydrophobic phenomena of cavity formation and association of inert gas solutes. The connection of information theory to statistical thermodynamics provides a basis for clarification of hydrophobic effects. The simplicity and flexibility of the approach suggest that it should permit applications to conformational equilibria of nonpolar solutes and hydrophobic residues in biopolymers.

Social welfare aspects of information with special reference to news.

The information society thesis, according to which economically advanced nations are undergoing transformation into post-industrial, information-based societies, can, with caveats, be taken as a premise. Essentially empirical or predictive, this influential set of claims quickly gives rise to major normative issues. The paper asks how, as part of a prospective normative theory of the information society, information may be shown to contribute to social goals in general and social welfare in particular. Given the diverse range of referents of the term 'information' in the context of the information society debate, the paper focuses on news as a form of information whose communication is widely held to be important to society. The problem is how to quantify or otherwise prove this intuition. It is suggested that a fusion of welfare economics and the economics of information may yield a solution. The paper is designed to be exploratory, offering a potential line of inquiry for the future research and policy agenda of information society studies.

Quality coding by neural populations in the early olfactory pathway: analysis using information theory

In this article, we analyze the ability of the early olfactory system to detect and discriminate different odors by means of information theory measurements applied to olfactory bulb activity images. We have studied the role that the diversity and number of receptor neuron types play in encoding chemical information. Our results show that the olfactory receptors of the biological system are low correlated and present good coverage of the input space. The coding capacity of ensembles of olfactory receptors with the same receptive range is maximized when the receptors cover half of the odor input space - a configuration that corresponds to receptors that are not particularly selective. However, the ensemble's performance slightly increases when mixing uncorrelated receptors of different receptive ranges. Our results confirm that the low correlation between sensors could be more significant than the sensor selectivity for general purpose chemo-sensory systems, whether these are biological or biomimetic.

The Mathematics of Control Theory

This text contains papers presented at the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications Conference on Control Theory, held at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow. The contributions cover a wide range of topics of current interest to theoreticians and practitioners including algebraic systems theory, nonlinear control systems, adaptive control, robustness issues, infinite dimensional systems, applications studies and connections to mathematical aspects of information theory and data-fusion.

The effect of using claim confirming product cues on the product claim credibility: is seeing believing?

The Cue Utilization Theory establishes that all products are made of multiples cues that may be seen as surrogates for the intangible attributes that make up any given product. However, the results of many years of research have yet yielded little consensus as to the impact generated by the use of such cues. This research aims to contribute to the discussion about the importance of intrinsic cues by investigating the effects that the use of product cues that confirm the product claim may have on Claim Credibility (measured through Ad Credibility), and also on consumers’ Purchase Intention and Perceived Risk toward the product. An experiment was designed to test such effects and the results suggest the effects of the use of Claim Confirming Product Cues depend on consumer’s level of awareness about such cue, and that when consumers are aware of it, Ad Credibility and Purchase Intention increase, as Perceived Risk decreases. Such results may have implications to academicians and practitioners, as well as may provide insights for future research.

The effects of attribute quality information and sources of information on consumers' perceptions and behavior: A model of Pre-purchase Information Utilization in Service Physical Environments

The search-experience-credence framework from economics of information, the human-environment relations models from environmental psychology, and the consumer evaluation process from services marketing provide a conceptual basis for testing the model of "Pre-purchase Information Utilization in Service Physical Environments." The model addresses the effects of informational signs, as a dimension of the service physical environment, on consumers' perceptions (perceived veracity and perceived performance risk), emotions (pleasure) and behavior (willingness to buy). The informational signs provide attribute quality information (search and experience) through non-personal sources of information (simulated word-of-mouth and non-personal advocate sources).^ This dissertation examines: (1) the hypothesized relationships addressed in the model of "Pre-purchase Information Utilization in Service Physical Environments" among informational signs, perceived veracity, perceived performance risk, pleasure, and willingness to buy, and (2) the effects of attribute quality information and sources of information on consumers' perceived veracity and perceived performance risk.^ This research is the first in-depth study about the role and effects of information in service physical environments. Using a 2 x 2 between subjects experimental research procedure, undergraduate students were exposed to the informational signs in a simulated service physical environment. The service physical environments were simulated through color photographic slides.^ The results of the study suggest that: (1) the relationship between informational signs and willingness to buy is mediated by perceived veracity, perceived performance risk and pleasure, (2) experience attribute information shows higher perceived veracity and lower perceived performance risk when compared to search attribute information, and (3) information provided through simulated word-of-mouth shows higher perceived veracity and lower perceived performance risk when compared to information provided through non-personal advocate sources. ^

ASSESSING QUALITY IN HIGH-UNCERTAINTY MARKETS: ONLINE REVIEWS OF CREDENCE SERVICES

In economics of information theory, credence products are those whose quality is difficult or impossible for consumers to assess, even after they have consumed the product (Darby & Karni, 1973). This dissertation is focused on the content, consumer perception, and power of online reviews for credence services. Economics of information theory has long assumed, without empirical confirmation, that consumers will discount the credibility of claims about credence quality attributes. The same theories predict that because credence services are by definition obscure to the consumer, reviews of credence services are incapable of signaling quality. Our research aims to question these assumptions. In the first essay we examine how the content and structure of online reviews of credence services systematically differ from the content and structure of reviews of experience services and how consumers judge these differences. We have found that online reviews of credence services have either less important or less credible content than reviews of experience services and that consumers do discount the credibility of credence claims. However, while consumers rationally discount the credibility of simple credence claims in a review, more complex argument structure and the inclusion of evidence attenuate this effect. In the second essay we ask, “Can online reviews predict the worst doctors?” We examine the power of online reviews to detect low quality, as measured by state medical board sanctions. We find that online reviews are somewhat predictive of a doctor’s suitability to practice medicine; however, not all the data are useful. Numerical or star ratings provide the strongest quality signal; user-submitted text provides some signal but is subsumed almost completely by ratings. Of the ratings variables in our dataset, we find that punctuality, rather than knowledge, is the strongest predictor of medical board sanctions. These results challenge the definition of credence products, which is a long-standing construct in economics of information theory. Our results also have implications for online review users, review platforms, and for the use of predictive modeling in the context of information systems research.

The economics of credit markets: theory and evidence.

Doutoramento em Economia.

Economics of public governance with strategic production of information: four essays

SUMMARY This paper analyses the outcomes of the EEA and bilateral agreements vote at the level of the 3025 communities of the Swiss Confederation by simultaneously modelling the vote and the participation decisions. Regressions include economic and political factors. The economic variables are the aggregated shares of people employed in the losing, Winning and neutral sectors, according to BRUNETTI, JAGGI and WEDER (1998) classification, Which follows a Ricardo-Viner logic, and the average education levels, which follows a Heckscher-Ohlin approach. The political factors are those used in the recent literature. The results are extremely precise and consistent. Most of the variables have the predicted sign and are significant at the l % level. More than 80 % of the communities' vote variance is explained by the model, substantially reducing the residuals when compared to former studies. The political variables do have the expected signs and are significant as Well. Our results underline the importance of the interaction between electoral choice and participation decisions as well as the importance of simultaneously dealing with those issues. Eventually they reveal the electorate's high level of information and rationality. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Unser Beitrag analysiert in einem Model, welches gleichzeitig die Stimm- ("ja" oder "nein") und Partizipationsentscheidung einbezieht, den Ausgang der Abstimmungen über den Beitritt zum EWR und über die bilateralen Verträge für die 3025 Gemeinden der Schweiz. Die Regressionsgleichungen beinhalten ökonomische und politische Variabeln. Die ökonomischen Variabeln beinhalten die Anteile an sektoriellen Arbeitsplatzen, die, wie in BRUNETTI, JAGGIl.1I1d WEDER (1998), in Gewinner, Verlierer und Neutrale aufgeteilt Wurden, gemäß dem Model von Ricardo-Viner, und das durchschnittliche Ausbildungsniveau, gemäß dem Model von Heckscher-Ohlin. Die politischen Variabeln sind die in der gegenwärtigen Literatur üblichen. Unsere Resultate sind bemerkenswert präzise und kohärent. Die meisten Variabeln haben das von der Theorie vorausgesagte Vorzeichen und sind hoch signifikant (l%). Mehr als 80% der Varianz der Stimmabgabe in den Gemeinden wird durch das Modell erklärt, was, im Vergleich mit früheren Arbeiten, die unerklärten Residuen Wesentlich verkleinert. Die politischen Variabeln haben auch die erwarteten Vorzeichen und sind signifikant. Unsere Resultate unterstreichen die Bedeutung der Interaktion zwischen der Stimm- und der Partizipationsentscheidung, und die Bedeutung diese gleichzeitig zu behandeln. Letztendlich, belegen sie den hohen lnformationsgrad und die hohe Rationalität der Stimmbürger. RESUME Le présent article analyse les résultats des votations sur l'EEE et sur les accords bilatéraux au niveau des 3025 communes de la Confédération en modélisant simultanément les décisions de vote ("oui" ou "non") et de participation. Les régressions incluent des déterminants économiques et politiques. Les déterminants économiques sont les parts d'emploi sectoriels agrégées en perdants, gagnants et neutres selon la classification de BRUNETTI, JAGGI ET WEDER (1998), suivant la logique du modèle Ricardo-Viner, et les niveaux de diplômes moyens, suivant celle du modèle Heckscher-Ohlin. Les déterminants politiques suivent de près ceux utilisés dans la littérature récente. Les résultats sont remarquablement précis et cohérents. La plupart des variables ont les signes prédits par les modèles et sont significatives a 1%. Plus de 80% de la variance du vote par commune sont expliqués par le modèle, faisant substantiellement reculer la part résiduelle par rapport aux travaux précédents. Les variables politiques ont aussi les signes attendus et sont aussi significatives. Nos résultats soulignent l'importance de l'interaction entre choix électoraux et décisions de participation et l'importance de les traiter simultanément. Enfin, ils mettent en lumière les niveaux élevés d'information et de rationalité de l'électorat.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.