Proposed economic sanctions against South Africa [microform] : hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, and on Africa, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, second session, on H.R. 1590, H.R. 1051, H.R. 2443, H.R. 3317, and H.R. 3328, March 22, 23; April 20, 28; and May 3, 1988.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 H381-23

Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America

This article addresses the consequences of economic sanctions for the protection of human rights in Latin America. The literature on sanctions and compliance informs three hypotheses, which investigate the relationship between sanctions and the level of rights protection in two groups of countries: those that were targeted by sanctions and those that were not. Using data from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and from Freedom House, I find empirical evidence that sanctions do improve the level of protection in countries that were not targeted. This finding can be explained by the deterrent effect attributed to sanctions by the compliance literature, broadly interpreted. The presence of economic sanctions in a given year increases the probability of observing better human rights practices by almost 50%. These results hold for the 12 Latin American countries that were not subject to economic sanctions for the period 1976-2004.

Myanmar's non-resource export potential after the lifting of economic sanctions : a gravity model analysis

Easing of economic sanctions by Western countries in 2012 augmented the prospect that Myanmar will expand its exports. On the other hand, a sharp rise in natural resource exports during the sanctions brings in a concern about the "Dutch disease". This study projects Myanmar's export potential by calculating counterfactual export values with an augmented gravity model that takes into account the effects of natural resource exports on non-resource exports. Without taking into account the effects of natural resource exports, the counterfactual predicted values of non-resource exports during 2004–2011 are more than five times larger than the actual exports. If we take into account the effects, however, the predicted values are smaller than the actual exports. The empirical results imply that the "Dutch disease" is at stake in Myanmar than any other Southeast Asian countries.

E3+3 coercive diplomacy towards Iran: Do the economic sanctions add up? CEPS Policy Brief No. 292, 6 June 2013

More than ten years of international negotiations have brought no resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran. In January 2012 the EU and US autonomously adopted an unprecedented sanctions package, mainly directed at the Iranian oil industry. Eighteen months later, figures show that the Iranian economy has been hit hard. Sanctions have not changed the regime’s calculus, however. Instead of further upping the pressure on Iran, the authors argue for a return to a more balanced dual-track approach so as to reinforce the moderate narrative within the Iranian ruling elite.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

Economic sanctions against Rhodesia [microform] : hearings before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session ....

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

Terrorism : laws cited imposing sanctions on nations supporting terrorism : fact sheet for the Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg, United States Senate /

"B-226205"--P. [1].

United States policy toward South Africa [microform] : hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, first session, October 22, 1987 and June 22, 23, and 24, 1988.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 S381-10

Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013 : report (to accompany H.R. 850) (Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office).

Mode of access: Internet.

Amendment of the national emergency with respect to Zimbabwe : message from the President of the United States transmitting notification that the national emergency blocking the property of persons undermining democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe on March 6, 2003, by Executive Order 13288, is amended to extend the authority for blocking property and interests in property.

"December 6, 2005."

Special Central American economic assistance [microform] : compensation for hostages in Iran : international conference on Cambodia : hearing and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on H.R. 5954, H. Con. Res. 219 and 221, November 27 and December 11, 1979.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and Autocrats’ Duration

This paper enquires into whether economic sanctions are effective in destabilizing authoritarian rulers. We argue that this effect is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Thus, personalist regimes and monarchies, which are more dependent on aid and resource rents to maintain their patronage networks, are more likely to be affected by sanctions. In contrast, single-party and military regimes are able to maintain (and even increase) their tax revenues and to reallocate their expenditures and so increase their levels of cooptation. Data on sanction episodes, authoritarian rulers and regimes covering the period 1946–2000 have allowed us to test our hypotheses. To do so, duration models have been run, and the results confirm that personalist autocrats are more vulnerable to foreign pressure. Concretely, the analysis of the modes of exit reveals that sanctions increase the likelihood of an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup. Sanctions are basically ineffective when targeting single-party or military regimes.

Career Officers and Political Appointees in American Diplomacy: Contending for Diplomatic Positions through Boundary Work

American Political and Economic Series