Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America

This article addresses the consequences of economic sanctions for the protection of human rights in Latin America. The literature on sanctions and compliance informs three hypotheses, which investigate the relationship between sanctions and the level of rights protection in two groups of countries: those that were targeted by sanctions and those that were not. Using data from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and from Freedom House, I find empirical evidence that sanctions do improve the level of protection in countries that were not targeted. This finding can be explained by the deterrent effect attributed to sanctions by the compliance literature, broadly interpreted. The presence of economic sanctions in a given year increases the probability of observing better human rights practices by almost 50%. These results hold for the 12 Latin American countries that were not subject to economic sanctions for the period 1976-2004.

Myanmar's non-resource export potential after the lifting of economic sanctions : a gravity model analysis

Easing of economic sanctions by Western countries in 2012 augmented the prospect that Myanmar will expand its exports. On the other hand, a sharp rise in natural resource exports during the sanctions brings in a concern about the "Dutch disease". This study projects Myanmar's export potential by calculating counterfactual export values with an augmented gravity model that takes into account the effects of natural resource exports on non-resource exports. Without taking into account the effects of natural resource exports, the counterfactual predicted values of non-resource exports during 2004–2011 are more than five times larger than the actual exports. If we take into account the effects, however, the predicted values are smaller than the actual exports. The empirical results imply that the "Dutch disease" is at stake in Myanmar than any other Southeast Asian countries.

E3+3 coercive diplomacy towards Iran: Do the economic sanctions add up? CEPS Policy Brief No. 292, 6 June 2013

More than ten years of international negotiations have brought no resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran. In January 2012 the EU and US autonomously adopted an unprecedented sanctions package, mainly directed at the Iranian oil industry. Eighteen months later, figures show that the Iranian economy has been hit hard. Sanctions have not changed the regime’s calculus, however. Instead of further upping the pressure on Iran, the authors argue for a return to a more balanced dual-track approach so as to reinforce the moderate narrative within the Iranian ruling elite.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

Proposed economic sanctions against South Africa [microform] : hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, and on Africa, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, second session, on H.R. 1590, H.R. 1051, H.R. 2443, H.R. 3317, and H.R. 3328, March 22, 23; April 20, 28; and May 3, 1988.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 H381-23

Economic sanctions against Rhodesia [microform] : hearings before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session ....

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and Autocrats’ Duration

This paper enquires into whether economic sanctions are effective in destabilizing authoritarian rulers. We argue that this effect is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Thus, personalist regimes and monarchies, which are more dependent on aid and resource rents to maintain their patronage networks, are more likely to be affected by sanctions. In contrast, single-party and military regimes are able to maintain (and even increase) their tax revenues and to reallocate their expenditures and so increase their levels of cooptation. Data on sanction episodes, authoritarian rulers and regimes covering the period 1946–2000 have allowed us to test our hypotheses. To do so, duration models have been run, and the results confirm that personalist autocrats are more vulnerable to foreign pressure. Concretely, the analysis of the modes of exit reveals that sanctions increase the likelihood of an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup. Sanctions are basically ineffective when targeting single-party or military regimes.

The Impact of United States Sanctions on the Myanmar Garment Industry

The United States imposed trade sanctions against the military regime in Myanmar in July 2003. The import ban damaged the garment industry in particular. This industry exported nearly half of its products to the United States, and more than eighty percent of United States imports from Myanmar had been clothes. The garment industry was probably the main target of the sanctions. Nevertheless, the impact on the garment industry and its workers has not been accurately evaluated or closely examined. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the sanctions and to further understand the present situation. This is done using several sources of information, including the author's field and questionnaire surveys. This paper also describes the process of selection and polarization underway in the garment industry, an industry that now has more severe competition fueled by the sanctions. Through such a process, the impact was inflicted disproportionately on small and medium-sized domestic firms and their workers.

The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle. CEPS Commentary, 13 October 2014

The EU and the US have been stepping up sanctions against Russia because the Kremlin has broken every basic rule of the pan-European security order enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. The effective closure of financial markets for Russia’s big businesses now has serious bite. The Kremlin’s counter-sanctions are marginal. Russia’s actual and threatened trade sanctions against Ukraine, alongside its aggression over Crimea and east Ukraine, mean that it has cast itself in the image of an enemy for most Ukrainians. Europe’s trust of the Kremlin has sunk to its lowest level since pre-Gorbachev times. If Russia were to switch to a sincerely cooperative, long-term peace mode with Ukraine, the EU and the US would no doubt be happy to scrap the sanctions. In the absence of this, however, the logic would be for the EU and the US to sustain the most significant economic sanctions for as long as it takes, with preparedness to intensify them.

Russian sanctions against Moldova. Minor effects, major potential. OSW COMMENTARY No. 152, 2014-11-06

Russia has been Moldova’s main trade partner and Russian capital has accounted for a large part of its foreign investments, dominating in the energy and the banking sectors. Moreover, Russia has been a key job market for Moldovan expatriate workers. In the economic sphere, this is making Moldova unilaterally dependent on Russia. Moscow has been attempting to exploit this situation to put pressure on the authorities in Chișinău for quite some time. In recent months Russia has increasingly used instruments for exerting economic pressure on Moldova, as a means of responding to the current authorities’ pro-Western policy. A key element of this policy was Moldova’s signing on 27 June 2014 of the Association Agreement with the EU (which came into force on 1 September 2014). Over the last year, Russia has implemented a number of import restrictions on Moldovan goods. The aim of the Russian actions is to fuel social disappointment, and ultimately – to prevent the pro-European coalition currently in power from winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 30 November 2014. Another aim might be to convince the Moldovan authorities to suspend the implementation of the Association Agreement – a plan openly put forward by Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit in Minsk on 10 October 2014. So far, however, the Russian economic sanctions have failed to produce the expected results. Support for the pro-European parties has been high, and there is little chance that the pro-Russian groups might achieve a parliamentary majority. It is not inconceivable, then, that in the upcoming months Moscow might decide to resort to other, more potent instruments of economic pressure such as speculation on the financial market, carried out as part of its de facto control over the banking sector. Another possibility is further tightening of trade restrictions, issuing expatriate workers from Russia or using Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy.

The economic and financial crisis in Russia – background, symptoms and prospects for the future. OSW Report 02/2015

The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macroeconomic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking resources. According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert communities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, although an effective development policy will be impossible without a fundamental change of the political and economic system in Russia.

Terrorism : laws cited imposing sanctions on nations supporting terrorism : fact sheet for the Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg, United States Senate /

"B-226205"--P. [1].

2014 Ukraine crisis – Implications for corporate crisis management

In the late year 2013 events started to unfold in Ukraine’s capital city Kiev that would change the political and economic environment of the EU and Russia. The tension had been building for years between the two parties with Ukraine in the middle and during 2014 the tension blew up and events started to escalate into a crisis, which we now know as the 2014 Ukraine crisis. The crisis would include political, economic, and even military actions by all the parties involved with Ukraine slipping close to civil war. Both political and economic hardships followed for others as well with both the EU and Russia placing heavy political and economic sanctions on each other. Most notably in terms of this paper, the Russian federation placed total import embargo sanctions on food imports from the EU and some other countries. This meant that a Finnish dairy company, Valio, had to engage in corporate crisis management as almost a fifth of its total revenue was cut in a heartbeat. Valio had been prepared for some kind of complications with their Russian market as events started to unfold in Ukraine in the beginning of 2014 but never did they suspect that a complete shutdown of the Russian market would follow. The company is still recovering after more than a year after the sanctions were posed and have not been able to supplement the lost revenue streams. This research is a qualitative research aiming to find answers to the main questions: 1) What is the 2014 Ukraine crisis and what kind of special implications does it have and 2) How did the crisis affect Valio and how did Valio fare in its crisis management efforts. The data has been collected both from secondary document sources and primary sources. The main findings of this research are that the political and economic environment of the EU and Russia has gone through a profound change during the years 2013-2015. The companies and governments should re-evaluate what kind of environment they are now facing and what kinds of risks the new situation poses. This also calls for a deep academic analysis from the academic community. In corporate crisis management of Valio the main findings are that the former literature has looked into crisis management as one-time occurrence but the new crises and global events would call for a more on-going crisis analysis and active crisis management. Thus, corporate crisis management should be viewed as a cycle. Valio specifically handled the situation surprisingly well, considering that their revenue was indeed cut by a fifth. The main aspects of crisis management, which Valio did not handle as well, concern the learning curve of crisis management. They could be doing more in order to prepare for future crises better by learning from this experience. The situation is then still on-going in the autumn 2015 both in Ukraine and within Valio.