Integrating Human Rights? Socio-Economic Rights and Budget Analysis

This article explores an opportunity for mutual learning between the fields of human rights law and economic analysis. Specifically it considers how economic techniques might be used to appraise public expenditure in line with international obligations arising from the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR). Our argument is that such tools do have the potential to contribute to this aim, but that embedding them within government budget processes through “human rights mainstreaming” may prove problematic in practice. We therefore suggest, as part of a broader strategy which includes judicial enforcement, that mainstreaming initiatives and budget analysis can be useful as complementary tools for the full realisation of all human rights.

Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions

This paper focuses on the link between economic rights and institutions. Simple analysis of data is used to demonstrate countries' human development effort in advancing economics rights of the citizens. A country's human development effort is evaluated on the basis of the well-being of the poorest members of the society. An analysis of data reveals that there is a wide variation in countries' pro-poor stance. While it is accepted that positive rights are pro-poor, this paper argues that so too are negative economic rights and in fact the two are complements rather than substitutes. Classifying countries into human development income deficit and human development effort deficit, it is demonstrated that a large number of countries could achieve higher welfare levels for the poor if they improved on bother positive and negative economic rights. The paper attempts to explain variations in the observed commitment to economic rights by focusing on pro-poor institutions. The basic thesis advanced in the paper is that pro-poor policies are more likely to be implemented and sustained in those institutions where power is sufficiently diffused such that even the poor have leverage over policy outcomes. The paper focuses on how institutions impact on power diffusion and therefore the adoption of pro-poor growth and policies. The failure of countries to adopt pro-poor growth and policies is attributed to institutional failures manifested in concentration of power. The policy recommendations emanating from the analysis focus on institutional reforms to enhance power diffusion. These policies include enlarging the political space through democratization, strengthening institutions and capacity to fight corruption and improve transparency, and bringing the government closer to the people through appropriate design and implementation of decentralization schemes. Some recent examples of improvements in economic rights following power diffusion are provided.

EU South African Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement: Bane or boon for socio-economic rights under the South African Constitution?

How does the EU–South African Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement serve as a tool to ensure that basic services recognised under the South African Constitution are secured and reinforced so that the most vulnerable are protected? Benefits under the agreement will be hardly maximised by South Africans if political institutions and those who serve in them fail to duly channel the benefits of the agreement to the people while at the same time minimising potential deleterious effects of the liberalisation fallout engendered by the agreement.

Integrity, attribution, and exploitation : contractual and normative moral rights protection in open licensing

Over the last twenty years, the use of open content licenses has become increasingly and surprisingly popular. The use of such licences challenges the traditional incentive-based model of exclusive rights under copyright. Instead of providing a means to charge for the use of particular works, what seems important is mitigating against potential personal harm to the author and, in some cases, preventing non-consensual commercial exploitation. It is interesting in this context to observe the primacy of what are essentially moral rights over the exclusionary economic rights. The core elements of common open content licences map somewhat closely to continental conceptions of the moral rights of authorship. Most obviously, almost all free software and free culture licences require attribution of authorship. More interestingly, there is a tension between social norms developed in free software communities and those that have emerged in the creative arts over integrity and commercial exploitation. For programmers interested in free software, licence terms that prohibit commercial use or modification are almost completely inconsistent with the ideological and utilitarian values that underpin the movement. For those in the creative industries, on the other hand, non-commercial terms and, to a lesser extent, terms that prohibit all but verbatim distribution continue to play an extremely important role in the sharing of copyright material. While prohibitions on commercial use often serve an economic imperative, there is also a certain personal interest for many creators in avoiding harmful exploitation of their expression – an interest that has sometimes been recognised as forming a component of the moral right of integrity. One particular continental moral right – the right of withdrawal – is present neither in Australian law or in any of the common open content licences. Despite some marked differences, both free software and free culture participants are using contractual methods to articulate the norms of permissible sharing. Legal enforcement is rare and often prohibitively expensive, and the various communities accordingly rely upon shared understandings of acceptable behaviour. The licences that are commonly used represent a formalised expression of these community norms and provide the theoretically enforceable legal baseline that lends them legitimacy. The core terms of these licences are designed primarily to alleviate risk in sharing and minimise transaction costs in sharing and using copyright expression. Importantly, however, the range of available licences reflect different optional balances in the norms of creating and sharing material. Generally, it is possible to see that, stemming particularly from the US, open content licences are fundamentally important in providing a set of normatively accepted copyright balances that reflect the interests sought to be protected through moral rights regimes. As the cost of creation, distribution, storage, and processing of expression continues to fall towards zero, there are increasing incentives to adopt open content licences to facilitate wide distribution and reuse of creative expression. Thinking of these protocols not only as reducing transaction costs but of setting normative principles of participation assists in conceptualising the role of open content licences and the continuing tensions that permeate modern copyright law.

Health care rights and NHS rationing: turning theory into practice

How should we understand the nature of patients’ right in public health care systems? Are health care rights different to rights under a private contract for car insurance? This article distinguishes between public and private rights and the relevance of community interests and notions of social solidarity. It discusses the distinction between political and civil rights, and social and economic rights and the inherently political and redistributive nature of the latter. Nevertheless, social and economic rights certainly give rise to “rights” enforceable by the courts. In the UK (as in many other jurisdictions), the courts have favoured a “procedural” approach to the question, in which the courts closely scrutinise decisions and demand high standards of rationality from decision-makers. However, although this is the general rule, the article also discusses a number of exceptional cases where “substantive” remedies are available which guarantee patients access to the care they need.

Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Support of Petitioners in Obergefell v. Hodges

Supreme Court precedent establishes that the government may not punish children for matters beyond their control. Same-sex marriage bans and non-recognition laws (“marriage bans”) do precisely this. The states argue that marriage is good for children, yet marriage bans categorically exclude an entire class of children – children of same-sex couples – from the legal, economic and social benefits of marriage. This amicus brief recounts a powerful body of equal protection jurisprudence that prohibits punishing children to reflect moral disapproval of parental conduct or to incentivize adult behavior. We then explain that marriage bans punish children of same-sex couples because they: 1) foreclose their central legal route to family formation; 2) categorically void their existing legal parent-child relationships incident to out-of-state marriages; 3) deny them economic rights and benefits; and 4) inflict psychological and stigmatic harm. States cannot justify marriage bans as good for children and then exclude children of same-sex couples based on moral disapproval of their same-sex parents’ relationships or to incentivize opposite-sex couples to “procreate” within the bounds of marriage. To do so, severs the connection between legal burdens and individual responsibility and creates a permanent class or caste distinction.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.