North-south trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual propertyrights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Throughthis channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the sametime, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protectedcan slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is thatprotection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction,which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countriesobserved in the years 1965-1990.

Globalization, Divergence and Stagnation

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990.

North-South trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs), market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where IPRs are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. An important implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, is consistent with evidence from a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990. The paper also provides empirical support for the mechanism linking North-South trade to the direction of technical change: an increase in import penetration from low-wage, low-IPRs, countries is followed by a sharp fall in R&D investment in a panel of US manufacturing sectors.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

Multinational drug corporations, intellectual property rights and the Canadian state : a historical and critical analysis

This study critically analyzes the historical role and influence of multinational drug cotpOrations and multinational corporations in general; the u.s. government and the Canadian state in negotiating the global recognition ofIntellectual Property Rights (IPR) under GATT/NAFTA. This process began in 1969 when the Liberal government, in response to high prices for brand-name drugs amended the Patent Act to introduce compulsory licensing by reducing monopoly protection from 20 to seven years. Although the financial position ofthe multinational drug industry was not affected, it campaigned vigorously to change the 1969 legislation. In 1987, the Patent Act was amended to extend protection to 10 years as a condition for free trade talks with the u.s. Nonetheless, the drug industry was not satisfied and accused Canada of providing a bad example to other nations. Therefore, it continued to campaign for global recognition ofIPR laws under GATT. Following the conclusion of the GATTI Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS) in 1991, the multinational drug industry and the American government, to the surprise of many, were still not satisfied and sought to implement harsher conditions under NAFTA. The Progressive Conservative government readily agreed without any objections or consideration for the social consequences. As a result, Bill C-91 was introduced. It abandoned compulsory licenses and was made retroactive from December 21, 1991. It is the contention of this thesis that the economic survival of multinational corporations on a global scale depends on the role and functions of the modem state. Similarly, the existence of the state depends on the ideological-political and socioeconomic assistance it gives to multinational corporations on a national and international scale. This dialectical relation of the state and multinational corporations is explored in our theoretical and historical analysis of their role in public policy.

Intellectual property rights and sustainable development: a survey of major issues

Includes bibliography

The abuse of intellectual property rights and regulations in China: a law and economic analysis

From the institutional point of view, the legal system of IPR (intellectual property right, hereafter, IPR) is one of incentive institutions of innovation and it plays very important role in the development of economy. According to the law, the owner of the IPR enjoy a kind of exclusive right to use his IP(intellectual property, hereafter, IP), in other words, he enjoys a kind of legal monopoly position in the market. How to well protect the IPR and at the same time to regulate the abuse of IPR is very interested topic in this knowledge-orientated market and it is the basic research question in this dissertation. In this paper, by way of comparing study and by way of law and economic analyses, and based on the Austrian Economics School’s theories, the writer claims that there is no any contradiction between the IPR and competition law. However, in this new economy (high-technology industries), there is really probability of the owner of IPR to abuse his dominant position. And with the characteristics of the new economy, such as, the high rates of innovation, “instant scalability”, network externality and lock-in effects, the IPR “will vest the dominant undertakings with the power not just to monopolize the market but to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers to enter and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance for quite a long time.”1 Therefore, in order to keep the order of market, to vitalize the competition and innovation, and to benefit the customer, in EU and US, it is common ways to apply the competition law to regulate the IPR abuse. In Austrian Economic School perspective, especially the Schumpeterian theories, the innovation/competition/monopoly and entrepreneurship are inter-correlated, therefore, we should apply the dynamic antitrust model based on the AES theories to analysis the relationship between the IPR and competition law. China is still a developing country with relative not so high ability of innovation. Therefore, at present, to protect the IPR and to make good use of the incentive mechanism of IPR legal system is the first important task for Chinese government to do. However, according to the investigation reports,2 based on their IPR advantage and capital advantage, some multinational companies really obtained the dominant or monopoly market position in some aspects of some industries, and there are some IPR abuses conducted by such multinational companies. And then, the Chinese government should be paying close attention to regulate any IPR abuse. However, how to effectively regulate the IPR abuse by way of competition law in Chinese situation, from the law and economic theories’ perspective, from the legislation perspective, and from the judicial practice perspective, there is a long way for China to go!

FDI inflows and outflows, intellectual property rights, and productivity growth

Using panel data of 57 countries during the period of 1995-2012, this study investigates the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) processes on productivity growth. The IPR processes are decomposed into three stages, innovation process, commercialization process, and IPR protection process. Our results suggest that better IPR protection is directly associated with productivity improvement only in developed economies. In addition, the contribution of IPR processes on growth through foreign direct investment (FDI) appears to be very limited. Only FDI inflows in developed countries which help to create a better innovative capability lead to a higher growth. And in connection with FDI outflows, only IPR protection and commercialization processes are proven to improve productivity in the case of developing countries, particularly when the country acts as the investing country.

Can intellectual property rights impact directly on productivity: a case study in manufacturing industries

According to the institutional economics thesis the role of IPRs is one of the relevant determinants of economic growth in long run. Measures of IPRs have been limited and empirical studies have not been able to evaluate their impacts on productivity growth. The major conclusion that the author can be drawn from his estimations is that the extent to which patent rights and trademarks, ceteris paribus, positively correlated with output per capita depends on the intensity of technology.

Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction, June 2007

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.

Intellectual property rights and the campaign for access to essential medicines : the advocacy role assumed by Médecins Sans Frontières

Non-governmental organizations and transnational networks have been increasingly successful a t gaining influence within issue areas traditionally controlled by the state. In many instances, non-state actors have been instrumental in forcing issues onto the global agenda, have aided in the development or transformation of global regimes, and have participated in securing state compliance for the adoption of new international norms. This paper argues that, consistent with social constructivist theory, ideas are important in influencing state preferences and change may be possible when certain factors are present. I f non-state actors can influence states, it is meaningful to understand how this happens. This paper focuses on a campaign led by Medecins Sans Frontieres that began in the late 1990s to acquire affordable medicines for patients in developing states that could not afford patented drugs. The campaign reached a measure of success in that member states of the World Trade Organization re-negotiated contested terms and meanings within the trade agreement for intellectual property rights and allowed concessions that would benefit lower income states. What factors contributed to the success of the campaign? And what were the most important factors - the issue, the actors or the mechanisms used?

Management for a Variety of Environmental Pollution and North-South Trade

A simple static model incorporating a variety of environmental pollution is developed. An autarky model shows that a developing country regulates fewer types of pollution by income-induced environmental policy. As income grows, the types of regulated pollution increase and also introduced regulations become tougher.Then the model incorporates international trade between a developed country and a developing country. The model gives a new interpretation for the pollution haven hypothesis. Some types of pollution abated with inefficient technology are emitted more in a developing country but other types necessarily increase in a developed country in order to meet the trade balance.