Equilibrium unemployment insurance

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

Equilibrium Principle in Colombian Public Contracting

Public contracting in Colombia is conflicting and inefficient. It frequently leads to damage to State property. The Colombian legal system cannot assure efficient and transparent public contracting. The cause is the institutional environment characterized by high transaction costs. Colombian law worsens the process by recognizing the principle of economic equilibrium in public contracts. This principle increasese contract incompleteness and renders impossible the use of economic incentives to control the opportunism of the economic agents. The authors present the hypothesis that the economic equilibrium principle increases the conflictive nature of public contracting. They test the hypothesis empirically. The first section of the paper presents a summary of the literature on transaction costs economics, as well as the legal literature on the historical origin and the content of the economic equilibrium principle. The second section describes the methodology of the empirical study. The third section shows the empirical evidence of the effects that the economic equilibrium principle exerts over the public contracting. The last section presents the conclusions.

Immigration as a strategic vector for the socio-economic and institutional development of Brazil

Brazil has demonstrated resilience in relation to the recent economic crises and has an auspicious development potential projected for the coming decades, which, linked to the globalization process, provides important opportunities for our people. Gradually we have established ourselves as one of the leading nations in the world and we have become a reference in questions linked to economic equilibrium, development, energy, agriculture and the environment. This international recognition favors the exchange of experiences with other cultures, governments and organizations, bringing with it the possibility of stimulating a dynamic process of development and innovation.

Loss of Ergodicity in the Transition from Annealed to Quenched Disorder in a Finite Kinetic Ising Model

We consider a kinetic Ising model which represents a generic agent-based model for various types of socio-economic systems. We study the case of a finite (and not necessarily large) number of agents N as well as the asymptotic case when the number of agents tends to infinity. The main ingredient are individual decision thresholds which are either fixed over time (corresponding to quenched disorder in the Ising model, leading to nonlinear deterministic dynamics which are generically non-ergodic) or which may change randomly over time (corresponding to annealed disorder, leading to ergodic dynamics). We address the question how increasing the strength of annealed disorder relative to quenched disorder drives the system from non-ergodic behavior to ergodicity. Mathematically rigorous analysis provides an explicit and detailed picture for arbitrary realizations of the quenched initial thresholds, revealing an intriguing ""jumpy"" transition from non-ergodicity with many absorbing sets to ergodicity. For large N we find a critical strength of annealed randomness, above which the system becomes asymptotically ergodic. Our theoretical results suggests how to drive a system from an undesired socio-economic equilibrium (e. g. high level of corruption) to a desirable one (low level of corruption).

Solving a signalized traffic intersection problem with an hyperbolic penalty function

Mathematical Program with Complementarity Constraints (MPCC) finds many applications in fields such as engineering design, economic equilibrium and mathematical programming theory itself. A queueing system model resulting from a single signalized intersection regulated by pre-timed control in traffic network is considered. The model is formulated as an MPCC problem. A MATLAB implementation based on an hyperbolic penalty function is used to solve this practical problem, computing the total average waiting time of the vehicles in all queues and the green split allocation. The problem was codified in AMPL.

On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: the Critical Role of the Strategy Space.

Nous Considerons Dans Cet Article un Modele de Duopole Avec Produits Differencies; Nous Montrons Que le Caractere Substituts Vs Complements de Ces Produits Est un Facteur Important Dans la Determination du Mode de Concurrence Strategique (Cournot-Bertrand, Nash Mixte, Stackelberg; En Prix Ou Quantites) Que L'on Est Susceptible D'observer. Si les Produits Sont Substituts (Complements), la Concurrence Sera du Type Cournot (Bertrand) Plutot Que du Type Nash Mixte a Moins Qu'une Firme Puisse Affirmer Son Leadership et Forcer une Concurrence a la Stackelberg Mais Quel Soit le Role Tenu Par une Firme, Il Sera Preferable Pour Elle Que la Concurrence S'exprime En Quantite (Prix). Par Ailleurs, la Concurrence a la Bertrand Est Toujours la Meilleure du Point de Vue des Consommateurs et du Point de Vue de L'efficacite Sociale, et Ce, Que les Produits Soient Susbtituts Ou Complements.

Macroclosures in Open Economy Cge Models: a Numerical Reappraisal

It Has Been Argued That in the Construction and Simulation Process of Computable General Equilibrium (Cge) Models, the Choice of the Proper Macroclosure Remains a Fundamental Problem. in This Study, with a Standard Cge Model, We Simulate Disturbances Stemming From the Supply Or Demand Side of the Economy, Under Alternative Macroclosures. According to Our Results, the Choice of a Particular Closure Rule, for a Given Disturbance, May Have Different Quantitative and Qualitative Impacts. This Seems to Confirm the Imiportance of Simulating Cge Models Under Alternative Closure Rules and Eventually Choosing the Closure Which Best Applies to the Economy Under Study.

Entwicklung des Emirates Qatar : Strategien - Probleme - Erfolge

Qatar boomt. Da es hierzu keine ganzheitlichen Forschungsarbeiten gibt, werden in dieser Arbeit die neuesten Entwicklungen und Planungen mit hoher Aktualität und Praxisrelevanz erstmals erfasst und analysiert. Der Autor führt Informationssplitter von internationalen Organisationen und eigene Recherchen in ein ganzheitliches Bild zusammen. Qatar ist sich bewusst, dass Wachstum endlich sein kann. Welche Möglichkeiten hat das kleine Qatar von der Globalisierung zu profitieren und für sich Vorteile für die Zukunft nach dem Öl zu generieren? Der Fokus der Arbeit liegt auf den ökonomische und ökologischen Stellschrauben der Transformation unter wirtschaftsgeographischen, soziodemographischen und strategischen Gesichtspunkten mit lokalen, regionalen und internationalen Betrachtungsweisen in den Themenfeldern (Welt-) Wirtschaft, Bildung, Infrastruktur und Umwelt. Ausgewählte Faktorungleichgewichte werden in Bezug auf Aussenwirtschaft und Binnenwirtschaft erläutert sowie die Nutzung von korankonformen Finanzierungsinstrumenten und Direktinvestitionen von und in Qatar.rnrnKeywords: Qatar / Katar / Peak-Oil / Emirat / FDI / Qatarisches Modell / Masterplan / Wohlfahrtsmehrung / Disparität / Nachhaltigkeit / Islamic Banking / Agglomeration / Akkumulation / Globalisierung / Arabische Halbinsel / Persischer Golf / Faktor- Gleichgewichte / Doha / Aluminium / LNG / Gas / best practicern

The Eurozone crisis and the erosion of democratic legitimacy: Lessons from the gold standard. ACES Cases No. 2013.3

This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.

Explaining High Economic Growth in Small Tourism Countries with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper shows that tourism specialisation can help to explain the observed high growth rates of small countries. For this purpose, two models of growth and trade are constructed to represent the trade relations between two countries. One of the countries is large, rich, has an own source of sustained growth and produces a tradable capital good. The other is a small poor economy, which does not have an own engine of growth and produces tradable tourism services. The poor country exports tourism services to and imports capital goods from the rich economy. In one model tourism is a luxury good, while in the other the expenditure elasticity of tourism imports is unitary. Two main results are obtained. In the long run, the tourism country overcomes decreasing returns and permanently grows because its terms of trade continuously improve. Since the tourism sector is relatively less productive than the capital good sector, tourism services become relatively scarcer and hence more expensive than the capital good. Moreover, along the transition the growth rate of the tourism economy holds well above the one of the rich country for a long time. The growth rate differential between countries is particularly high when tourism is a luxury good. In this case, there is a faster increase in the tourism demand. As a result, investment of the small economy is boosted and its terms of trade highly improve.

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.