The economics of awards, status and performance: the John Bates Clark Medal and the Fellowship of the Econometric Society

This thesis investigates whether receiving an important award in academia raises recipients’ subsequent research productivity and status compared to a synthetic control group of non-recipient scholars with similar previous research performance. It examines the case of being awarded the John Bates Clark Medal and becoming a Fellow of the Econometric Society finding evidence of positive incentive and status effects that raise both productivity and citation levels.

Econometric fellows and Nobel Laureates in economics

An academic award is method by which peers offer recognition of intellectual efforts. In this paper we take a purely descriptive look at the relationship between becoming a Fellow of the Econometric Society and receiving the Nobel Prize in economics. We discover some interesting aspects: of all 69 Nobel Prize Laureates between 1969 and 2011, only 9 of them were not also Fellows. Moreover, the proportion of future novel winners among the Fellows has been quite high throughout time and a large share of researchers who became Fellows between the 1930s and 1950s became Nobel Laureates at a later stage. On average, researchers became Fellows relatively early in their career (14.9 years after their PhD) and those who were subsequently made Nobel Laureates became Fellows earlier than other researchers. Interestingly, Harvard and MIT have been the dominant PhD granting institutions to generate Fellows and Nobel Laureates in the past.

Econometric Methods and their Applications in Finance, Macro and Related Fields

The volume aims at providing an outlet for some of the best papers presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the African Econometric Society, which is one of the “chapters” of the International Econometric Society. Many of these papers represent the state of the art in financial econometrics and applied econometric modeling, and some also provide useful simulations that shed light on the models' ability to generate meaningful scenarios for forecasting and policy analysis.

Some Remarks on the Approximation of Transitional Density in Stochastic Differential Equations

Aijt-Sahalia (2002) introduced a method to estimate transitional probability densities of di®usion processes by means of Hermite expansions with coe±cients determined by means of Taylor series. This note describes a numerical procedure to ¯nd these coe±cients based on the calculation of moments. One advantage of this procedure is that it can be used e®ectively when the mathematical operations required to ¯nd closed-form expressions for these coe±cients are otherwise infeasible.

The mystery of polygamy

The economic literature on marriage identifies a number of benefits of marriage and discusses mechanisms that cause societies to prefer certain marital structures such as polygamy or monogamy. In principle, however, these benefits and mechanisms might lead societies towards polyandry and even cenogamy. The rareness of polyandry and the absence of cenogamy, however, clearly indicate that important aspects of marriage are omitted. This paper argues that the reproductive nature of marital arrangements must be taken into account when analyzing the foundations of marriage. Monogamy always achieves efficient parental investments in offspring. For polygamous arrangements this might be often true. It fails, however, in polyandry because paternity cannot be established with certainty. Cenogamy is shown to be an unstable arrangement.

Health, endogenous time preference, and inequality : a political economy perspective

We study an overlapping-generations model in which agents' mortality risks, and consequently impatience, are endogenously determined by private and public investment in health care. Revenues allocated for public health care arc determined by a voting process. We find that the degree of substitutability between public and private health expenditures matters for macroeconomic outcomes of the model. Higher substitutability implies a “crowding-out" effect, which in turn impacts adversely on morality risks and impatience leading to lower public expenditures on health care in the political equilibrium. Consequently, higher substitutability is associated with greater polarization in wealth, and long-run distributions that are bimodal.

The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services

Theory predicts that efficiency prevails on credence goods markets if customers are able to verify which quality they receive from an expert seller. In a series of experiments with endogenous prices we observe that verifiability fails to result in efficient provision behaviour and leads to very similar results as a setting without verifiability. Some sellers always provide appropriate treatment even if own money maximization calls for over- or undertreatment. Overall our endogenous-price-results suggests that both inequality aversion and a taste for efficiency play an important role for experts’ provision behaviour. We contrast the implications of those two motivations theoretically and discriminate between them empirically using a fixed-price design. We then classify experimental experts according to their provision behaviour.

Social norms and corruption

We explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This disutility depends negatively on the number of people engaging in corruption. The empirical section presents evidence using two international panel data data sets, one at the micro and one at the macro level. Results indicate that corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers. Moreover, macro level data indicates that past levels of corruption impact current corruption levels.

Verifiability in Markets for Credence Goods

Theory predicts that efficiency prevails on credence goods markets if customers are able to verify which quality they receive from an expert seller. In a series of experiments with endogenous prices we observe that variability fails to result in efficient provision behavior and leads to very similar results as a setting without variability. Some sellers always provide appropriate treatment even if own money maximization calls for over- or undertreatment. Overall our endogenous price-results suggests that both inequality aversion and a taste for efficiency play an important role for experts provision behavior. We contrast the implications of those two motivations theoretically and discriminate between them empirically using a �xed-price design. We then classify experimental experts according to their provision behavior.

On the efficacy of techniques for evaluating multivariate volatility forecasts

The performance of techniques for evaluating multivariate volatility forecasts are not yet as well understood as their univariate counterparts. This paper aims to evaluate the efficacy of a range of traditional statistical-based methods for multivariate forecast evaluation together with methods based on underlying considerations of economic theory. It is found that a statistical-based method based on likelihood theory and an economic loss function based on portfolio variance are the most effective means of identifying optimal forecasts of conditional covariance matrices.

Variation in risk seeking behavior in a natural experiment following a large negative wealth shock induced by a natural disaster

An ongoing challenge in behavioral economics is to understand the variations observed in risk attitudes as a function of their environmental context. Of particular interest is the effect of wealth on risk attitudes. The research in this area has however faced two constraints: the difficulty to study the causal effects of large changes in wealth, and the causal effects of losses on risk behavior. The present paper address this double limitation by providing evidence of the variation of risk attitude after large losses using a natural disaster (Brisbane floods) as the setting for a natural experiment.