East Timor : beyond independence

The chapters in this book examine the major themes of development, borders and security, politics and justice, resource and land management, education, and language policy. Though the country was initially lauded as a case study in successful state-building, the crisis of 2006 demonstrated that East Timor had more in common with other post-colonial, post-conflict societies than some of thse earlier optimistic assessments suggested. East Timor continues to attract the interest and attention of governments, scholars, development institutions and aid workers as a society rebuilding itself after almost a quarter of a century of profound trauma, and the consecutive eras of colonialism. Covering the era from the independence referendum in August 1999 to the political crisis in 2006, and future prospects and challenges, this book is an invaluable resource for understanding the challenges facing the first new nation of the 21st century.

The political economy of cross-border relations : the TNI and East Timor

Within a framework of formally increasingly cordial bilateral relations, the Indonesian military, the TNI, was engaging in and allowing extensive cross-border trade and smuggling while pursuing a policy of limited cross-border destabilization of East Timor. This seemingly contradictory policy, run from the TNI's 'strategic command centre' in Atambua, West Timor, met the TNI's continuing need to fund its own activities (and those of its proxies) through both legal and illegal means, to provide leverage for the coming talks about the formal demarcation of the border, and to provide a foothold to longer-term irredentist claims to the former occupied province and now independent state.

Australia and East Timor : elitism, pragmatism and the national interest

For over two decades the issue of East Timor's right to self-determination has been a ‘prickly’ issue in Australian foreign policy. The invasion by Indonesian forces in 1975 was expected, as Australian policy-makers had been well informed of the events leading up to the punitive action being taken. Indeed, prior discussions involving the future of the territory were held between the Australian Prime Minister and the Indonesian President in 1974. In response to the events unfolding in the territory the Australian Labor Government at the time was presented with two policy options for dealing with the issue. The Department of Defence recommended the recognition of an independent East Timor; whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs proposed that Australia disengage itself as far as possible from the issue. The decision had ramifications for future policy considerations especially with changes in government. With the Department of Foreign Affairs option being the prevailing policy what were the essential ingredients that give explanation for the government's choice? It is important to note the existence of the continuity and cyclical nature of attitudes by Labor governments toward Indonesia before and after the invasion. To do so requires an analysis of the influence ‘Doc’ Evatt had in shaping any possible Labor tradition in foreign policy articulation. The support given by Evatt for the decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) gave rise to the development of a special relationship-so defined. Evidence of the effect Evatt had on future Labor governments may be found in the opinions of Gough Whitlam. In 1975 when he was Prime Minister, Whitlam felt the East Timor issue was merely the finalisation of Indonesia's decolonisation honouring Evatt's long held anti-colonialist tradition existing in the Australian Labor Party. The early predisposition toward Indonesia's cohesiveness surfaced again in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of later years. It did not vary a great deal with changes in government The on-going commitment to preserving and strengthening the bilateral relationship meant Indonesia's territorial integrity became the focus of the Australian political elites’ regional foreign policy determinations. The actions taken by policy-makers served to promote the desire for a stable region ahead of independence claims of the East Timorese. From a realist perspective, the security dilemma for Australian policy-makers was how to best promote regional order and stability in the South East Asian region. The desire for regional cohesiveness and stability continues to drive Australian political elites to promote policies that gives a priority to the territorial integrity of regional states. Indonesia, in spite of its diversity, was only ever thought of as a cohesive unitary state and changes to its construct have rarely been countenanced. Australia's political elite justifications for this stance vacillate between strategic and economic considerations, ideological (anti-colonialism) to one of being a pragmatic response to international politics. The political elite argues the projection of power into the region is in Australia’s national interest. The policies from one government to the next necessarily see the national interest as being an apparent fixed feature of foreign policy. The persistent fear of invasion from the north traditionally motivated Australia's political elite to adopt a strategic realist policy that sought to ‘shore up’ the stability, strength and unity of Indonesia. The national interest was deemed to be at risk if support for East Timorese independence was given. The national interest though can involve more than just the security issue, and the political elite when dealing with East Timor assumed that they were acting in the common good. Questions that need to be addressed include determining what is the national interest in this context? What is the effect of a government invoking the national interest in debates over issues in foreign policy? And, who should participate in the debate? In an effort to answer these questions an analysis of how the ex-foreign affairs mandarin Richard Woolcott defines the national interest becomes crucial. Clearly, conflict in East Timor did have implications for the national interest. The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia had the potential to damage the relationship, but equally communist successes in 1975 in Indo-China raised Australia's regional security concerns. During the Cold War, the linking of communism to nationalism was driving the decision-making processes of the Australian policy-makers striving to come to grips with the strategic realities of a changing region. Because of this, did the constraints of world politics dominated by Cold War realities combined with domestic political disruption have anything to do with Australia's response? Certainly, Australia itself was experiencing a constitutional crisis in late 1975. The Senate had blocked supply and the Labor Government did not have the funds to govern. The Governor-General by dismissing the Labor Government finally resolved the impasse. What were the reactions of the two men charged with the responsibility of forming the caretaker government toward Indonesia's military action? And, could the crisis have prevented the Australian government from making a different response to the invasion? Importantly, and in terms of economic security, did the knowledge of oil and gas deposits thought to exist in the Timor Sea influence Australia's foreign policy? The search for oil and gas requires a stable political environment in which to operate. Therefore for exploration to continue in the Timor Sea Australia must have had a preferred political option and thoughts of with whom they preferred to negotiate. What was the extent of each government's cooperation and intervention in the oil and gas industry and could any involvement have influenced the Australian political elites’ attitude toward the prospect of an independent East Timor? Australia's subsequent de jure recognition that East Timor was part of Indonesia paved the way for the Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty signing in 1989. The signing underpinned Australia's acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The outcome of the analysis of the issues that shaped Australia's foreign policy toward East Timor showed that the political elite became locked into an integration model, which was defended by successive governments. Moreover, they formed an almost reflexive defence of Indonesia both at the domestic and international level.

A framework for assessing social policy inclusion proposals

This document outlines a framework that could be used by government agencies in assessing policy interventions aimed at achieving social outcomes from government construction contracts. The framework represents a rational interpretation of the information gathered during the multi-outcomes construction policies project. The multi-outcomes project focused on the costs and benefits of using public construction contracts to promote the achievement of training and employment and public art objectives. The origin of the policy framework in a cost-benefit appraisal of current policy interventions is evidenced by its emphasis on sensitivity to policy commitment and project circumstances (especially project size and scope).The quantitative and qualitative analysis conducted in the multi-outcomes project highlighted, first, that in the absence of strong industry commitment to policy objectives, policy interventions typically result in high levels of avoidance activity, substantial administrative costs and very few benefits. Thus, for policy action on, for example, training or local employment to be successful compliance issues must be adequately addressed. Currently it appears that pre-qualification schemes (similar to the Priority Access Scheme) and schemes that rely on measuring, for example, the training investments of contractors within particular projects do not achieve high levels of compliance and involve significant administrative costs. Thus, an alternative is suggested in the policy framework developed here: a levy on each public construction project – set as a proportion of the total project costs. Although a full evaluation of this policy alternative was beyond the scope of the multi-outcomes construction policies project, it appears to offer the potential to minimize the transaction costs on contractors whilst enabling the creation of a training agency dedicated to improving the supply of skilled construction labour. A recommendation is thus made that this policy alternative be fully researched and evaluated. As noted above, the outcomes of the multi-outcomes research project also highlighted the need for sensitivity to project circumstances in the development and implementation of polices for public construction projects. Ideally a policy framework would have the flexibility to respond to circumstances where contractors share a commitment to the policy objectives and are able to identify measurable social outcomes from the particular government projects they are involved in. This would involve a project-by-project negotiation of goals and performance measures. It is likely to only be practical for large, longer term projects.

Motivation and perception factors influence buying home behaviour in Dilly, East Timor

Demand of low cost housing increased from 1995 to 1997 which is shown by the number of housing loan approval. In order to develop the most suitable marketing plan, developer needs to know some factors which influenced to the decision making process of buying house. This research used a residential development in PT Delta Comoro Permai, Dilly as a case study. A survey to homeowners has been done to evaluate the motivation and perception factors in buying home behaviour. The survey has been done on the 3rd August to 29th August 1998. In this study, four main components have been examined. Physical and linkage are not as important as environment and utilities for the homebuyer. Moreover, the result is consistent with developer’s motto ‘clean, secure, aesthetic, healthy and prosperity’. This study provides further recommendation in the environment and utilities components for the new development in the future.

Disrupting the new orthodoxy : emergency intervention and Indigenous social policy

This article develops a critical analysis of the ideological framework that informed the Australian Federal government’s 2007 intervention into Northern Territory Indigenous communities (ostensibly to address the problem of child sexual abuse). Continued by recently elected Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, the NT ‘emergency response’ has aroused considerable public debate and scholarly inquiry. In addressing what amounts to a broad bi-partisan approach to Indigenous issues we highlight the way in which Indigenous communities are problematised and therefore subject to interventionist regimes that override differentiated Indigenous voices and intensify an internalised sense of rage occasioned by disempowering interventionist projects. We further argue that in rushing through the emergency legislation and suspending parts of the Racial Discrimination Act, the Howard and Rudd governments have in various ways perpetuated racialised and neo-colonial forms of intervention that override the rights of Indigenous people. Such policy approaches require critical understanding on the part of professions involved most directly in community practice, particularly when it comes to mounting effective opposition campaigns. The article offers a contribution to this end.