Motivation and perception factors influence buying home behaviour in Dilly, East Timor

Demand of low cost housing increased from 1995 to 1997 which is shown by the number of housing loan approval. In order to develop the most suitable marketing plan, developer needs to know some factors which influenced to the decision making process of buying house. This research used a residential development in PT Delta Comoro Permai, Dilly as a case study. A survey to homeowners has been done to evaluate the motivation and perception factors in buying home behaviour. The survey has been done on the 3rd August to 29th August 1998. In this study, four main components have been examined. Physical and linkage are not as important as environment and utilities for the homebuyer. Moreover, the result is consistent with developer’s motto ‘clean, secure, aesthetic, healthy and prosperity’. This study provides further recommendation in the environment and utilities components for the new development in the future.

Processes of feelings in a society with a violent past : A qualitative study of the communication for Societal healing in the Truth Commissions in East Timor, Sri Lanka and Ghana between 2002-2011

The research investigates in what extent and how communication for meeting feelings is provided in Truth Commission work. It examines if and in what way feelings are addressed in the communication officially published by the Truth Commissions in East Timor, Ghana and Sri Lanka, occurring between 2002-2011. The research is also looking at the healing processes in a time perspective to find out if there is a communication for Societal healing to be continued in a longer term. My conclusion is that two cases of three in my research, the TRCs in Ghana and East Timor, have communication clearly directed to meet feelings caused by the war. One of the three cases (East Timor) has a communication with a clear ambition to heal over a longer period, to continue after the existence of the Truth Commission. The research suggests that communication with a clear ambition to reach out widely in the society, a communication directed to meet and process feelings over a longer period, can make Societal healing more effective. It also concludes that, in the future, Societal healing, as a field in conflict resolution, will be more based on representational media than today, provided through web communication.

The political economy of cross-border relations : the TNI and East Timor

Within a framework of formally increasingly cordial bilateral relations, the Indonesian military, the TNI, was engaging in and allowing extensive cross-border trade and smuggling while pursuing a policy of limited cross-border destabilization of East Timor. This seemingly contradictory policy, run from the TNI's 'strategic command centre' in Atambua, West Timor, met the TNI's continuing need to fund its own activities (and those of its proxies) through both legal and illegal means, to provide leverage for the coming talks about the formal demarcation of the border, and to provide a foothold to longer-term irredentist claims to the former occupied province and now independent state.

East Timor : beyond independence

The chapters in this book examine the major themes of development, borders and security, politics and justice, resource and land management, education, and language policy. Though the country was initially lauded as a case study in successful state-building, the crisis of 2006 demonstrated that East Timor had more in common with other post-colonial, post-conflict societies than some of thse earlier optimistic assessments suggested. East Timor continues to attract the interest and attention of governments, scholars, development institutions and aid workers as a society rebuilding itself after almost a quarter of a century of profound trauma, and the consecutive eras of colonialism. Covering the era from the independence referendum in August 1999 to the political crisis in 2006, and future prospects and challenges, this book is an invaluable resource for understanding the challenges facing the first new nation of the 21st century.

Australia and East Timor : elitism, pragmatism and the national interest

For over two decades the issue of East Timor's right to self-determination has been a ‘prickly’ issue in Australian foreign policy. The invasion by Indonesian forces in 1975 was expected, as Australian policy-makers had been well informed of the events leading up to the punitive action being taken. Indeed, prior discussions involving the future of the territory were held between the Australian Prime Minister and the Indonesian President in 1974. In response to the events unfolding in the territory the Australian Labor Government at the time was presented with two policy options for dealing with the issue. The Department of Defence recommended the recognition of an independent East Timor; whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs proposed that Australia disengage itself as far as possible from the issue. The decision had ramifications for future policy considerations especially with changes in government. With the Department of Foreign Affairs option being the prevailing policy what were the essential ingredients that give explanation for the government's choice? It is important to note the existence of the continuity and cyclical nature of attitudes by Labor governments toward Indonesia before and after the invasion. To do so requires an analysis of the influence ‘Doc’ Evatt had in shaping any possible Labor tradition in foreign policy articulation. The support given by Evatt for the decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) gave rise to the development of a special relationship-so defined. Evidence of the effect Evatt had on future Labor governments may be found in the opinions of Gough Whitlam. In 1975 when he was Prime Minister, Whitlam felt the East Timor issue was merely the finalisation of Indonesia's decolonisation honouring Evatt's long held anti-colonialist tradition existing in the Australian Labor Party. The early predisposition toward Indonesia's cohesiveness surfaced again in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of later years. It did not vary a great deal with changes in government The on-going commitment to preserving and strengthening the bilateral relationship meant Indonesia's territorial integrity became the focus of the Australian political elites’ regional foreign policy determinations. The actions taken by policy-makers served to promote the desire for a stable region ahead of independence claims of the East Timorese. From a realist perspective, the security dilemma for Australian policy-makers was how to best promote regional order and stability in the South East Asian region. The desire for regional cohesiveness and stability continues to drive Australian political elites to promote policies that gives a priority to the territorial integrity of regional states. Indonesia, in spite of its diversity, was only ever thought of as a cohesive unitary state and changes to its construct have rarely been countenanced. Australia's political elite justifications for this stance vacillate between strategic and economic considerations, ideological (anti-colonialism) to one of being a pragmatic response to international politics. The political elite argues the projection of power into the region is in Australia’s national interest. The policies from one government to the next necessarily see the national interest as being an apparent fixed feature of foreign policy. The persistent fear of invasion from the north traditionally motivated Australia's political elite to adopt a strategic realist policy that sought to ‘shore up’ the stability, strength and unity of Indonesia. The national interest was deemed to be at risk if support for East Timorese independence was given. The national interest though can involve more than just the security issue, and the political elite when dealing with East Timor assumed that they were acting in the common good. Questions that need to be addressed include determining what is the national interest in this context? What is the effect of a government invoking the national interest in debates over issues in foreign policy? And, who should participate in the debate? In an effort to answer these questions an analysis of how the ex-foreign affairs mandarin Richard Woolcott defines the national interest becomes crucial. Clearly, conflict in East Timor did have implications for the national interest. The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia had the potential to damage the relationship, but equally communist successes in 1975 in Indo-China raised Australia's regional security concerns. During the Cold War, the linking of communism to nationalism was driving the decision-making processes of the Australian policy-makers striving to come to grips with the strategic realities of a changing region. Because of this, did the constraints of world politics dominated by Cold War realities combined with domestic political disruption have anything to do with Australia's response? Certainly, Australia itself was experiencing a constitutional crisis in late 1975. The Senate had blocked supply and the Labor Government did not have the funds to govern. The Governor-General by dismissing the Labor Government finally resolved the impasse. What were the reactions of the two men charged with the responsibility of forming the caretaker government toward Indonesia's military action? And, could the crisis have prevented the Australian government from making a different response to the invasion? Importantly, and in terms of economic security, did the knowledge of oil and gas deposits thought to exist in the Timor Sea influence Australia's foreign policy? The search for oil and gas requires a stable political environment in which to operate. Therefore for exploration to continue in the Timor Sea Australia must have had a preferred political option and thoughts of with whom they preferred to negotiate. What was the extent of each government's cooperation and intervention in the oil and gas industry and could any involvement have influenced the Australian political elites’ attitude toward the prospect of an independent East Timor? Australia's subsequent de jure recognition that East Timor was part of Indonesia paved the way for the Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty signing in 1989. The signing underpinned Australia's acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The outcome of the analysis of the issues that shaped Australia's foreign policy toward East Timor showed that the political elite became locked into an integration model, which was defended by successive governments. Moreover, they formed an almost reflexive defence of Indonesia both at the domestic and international level.

East Timor : the price of liberty

This book is based on extensive research and regaulr visits to East Timor since 1995. It considers the trials that the people of East Timor have undergone in their long struggle for independence, and issues that have arisen out of independence. This account places East Timor within the context of other post-colonial states, noting the problems that most of them have faced in coming to grips with their new-found freedoms, and how they have managed, or mismanaged, such freedoms. It also traces the themes and issues within the independence movement, noting how these have contibuted to post-independence outcomes, in particular the poltiical tensions that almost saw East Timor collapse as a viable state in 2006. The books concludes with an assessment of the 2007 elections which, depsite some post-election violence, saw the consolidation of democratic processes in East Timor, and which marked it as having a brighter future in this one critical respect.

East Timor in 2008 : year of reconstruction

The article discusses reconstruction of East Timor in 2008 after the near-fatal shooting of President Jose Ramos-Horta and the death of his rival Major Alfredo Reinado. It notes near state collapse following the desertion of soldiers in 2006 and returning displaced persons to their homes in the aftermath.

Institution building problems in East Timor, 1999-2002

Institution building in East Timor from 1999 to 2002 was undermined by numerous ineffective practices. These ineffective practices were partly due to international organizations' conflicting priorities, including donors' preference for short program timelines, some individuals' preference for "the easy path", and UNTAET'S preoccupation with maintaining security and administering the territory.