The effect of national governance codes on firm disclosure practices : evidence from analyst earnings forecasts

This study examines whether voluntary national governance codes have a significant effect on company disclosure practices. Two direct effects of the codes are expected: 1) an overall improvement in company disclosure practices, which is greater when the codes have a greater emphasis on disclosure; and 2) a leveling out of disclosure practices across companies (i.e., larger improvements in companies that were previously poorer disclosers) due to the codes new comply-or-explain requirements. The codes are also expected to have an indirect effect on disclosure practices through their effect on company governance practices. The results show that the introduction of the codes in eight East Asian countries has been associated with lower analyst forecast error and a leveling out of disclosure practices across companies. The codes are also found to have an indirect effect on company disclosure practices through their effect on board independence. This study shows that a regulatory approach to improving disclosure practices is not always necessary. Voluntary national governance codes are found to have both a significant direct effect and a significant indirect effect on company disclosure practices. In addition, the results indicate that analysts in Asia do react to changes in disclosure practices, so there is an incentive for small companies and family-owned companies to further improve their disclosure practices.

The role of the audit committee and institutional investors in constraining earnings management : evidence from Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong

Using data from 2004 to 2008, we find that an audit committee is an important monitoring mechanism as audit committee independence, expertise and size are associated with reduced levels of abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management. This study also attempts to discern when the monitoring role of the audit committee is more salient for the firm. We find that ownership concentration and the presence of government officials on the audit committee are important determinants of the negative association between audit committee characteristics and earnings management. In contrast, we find no significant associations between the audit committee and abnormal accruals for Chinese firms listed only on the Chinese domestic Stock Exchanges. The paper contributes to the corporate governance literature in a transitional economy. Identifying the role of audit committees of firms listed on markets other than the domicile market demonstrates the importance of considering the institutional setting in governance research.

Can an effective audit committee help to mitigate earnings management in Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong?

This paper attempts to determine whether the adoption of recommended corporate governance practices by Chinese firms is associated with less earnings management proxied by abnormal accruals. We examine the role of the audit committee and ownership concentration in preventing earnings management using Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong. The results of this preliminary analysis show that the frequency of audit committee meetings is associated with reduced levels of abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management. We conclude that audit committee activity is an important factor in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management. In contrast, we find that the size of the audit committee is associated with increased levels of abnormal accruals and suggest that increasing the size of the audit committee creates information asymmetry between the audit committee and management that reduces the monitoring capacity of the audit committee. We do not find any association between audit committee independence, financial and industry experience, or ownership concentration and abnormal accruals.

Public regulatory reform and management earnings forecasts in a low private litigation environment

We examine the impact of continuous disclosure regulatory reform on the likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts issued in New Zealand’s low private litigation environment. Using a sample of 720 earnings forecasts issued by 94 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange before and after the reform (1999–2005), we provide strong evidence of significant changes in forecasting behaviour in the post-reform period. Specifically, firms were more likely to issue earnings forecasts to pre-empt earnings announcements and, in contrast to findings in other legal settings, those earnings forecasts exhibited higher frequency and improved qualitative characteristics (better precision and accuracy). An important implication of our findings is that public regulatory reforms may have a greater benefit in a low private litigation environment and thus add to the global debate about the effectiveness of alternative public regulatory reforms of corporate requirements.

A longitudinal study of corporate earnings guidance in Australia’s continuous disclosure environment

Since the introduction of a statutory‐backed continuous disclosure regime (CDR) in 1994, regulatory reforms have significantly increased litigation risk in Australia for failure to disclose material information or for false and misleading disclosure. However, there is almost no empirical research on the impact of the reforms on corporate disclosure behaviour. Motivated by the absence of research and using management earnings forecasts (MEFs) as a disclosure proxy, this study examines (1) why managers issue earnings forecasts, (2) what firm‐specific factors influence MEF characteristics, and (3) how MEF behaviour changes as litigation risk increases. Based on theories in information economics, a theoretical framework for MEF behaviour is formulated which includes antecedent influencing factors related to firms‟ internal and external environments. Applying this framework, hypotheses are developed and tested using multivariate models and a large sample of hand-collected MEFs (7,213) issued by top 500 ASX-listed companies over the 1994 to 2008 period. The results reveal strong support for the hypotheses. First, MEFs are issued to reduce information asymmetry, litigation risk and signal superior performance. Second, firms with better financial performance, smaller earnings changes, and lower operating uncertainty provide better quality MEFs. Third, forecast frequency and quality (accuracy, timeliness and precision) noticeably improve as litigation risk increases. However, managers appear to be still reluctant to disclose earnings forecasts when there are large earnings changes, and an asymmetric treatment of news type continues to prevail (a good news bias). Thus, the findings generally provide support for the effectiveness of the CDR regulatory reforms in improving disclosure behaviour and will be valuable to market participants and corporate regulators in understanding the implications of management forecasting decisions and areas for further improvement.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

The impact of regulatory reforms on the earnings forecasting behaviour of IPO firms

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to jointly assess the impact of regulatory reform for corporate fundraising in Australia (CLERP Act 1999) and the relaxation of ASX admission rules in 1999, on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts in initial public offer (IPO) prospectuses. The relaxation of ASX listing rules permitted a new category of new economy firms (commitments test entities (CTEs))to list without a prior history of profitability, while the CLERP Act (introduced in 2000) was accompanied by tighter disclosure obligations and stronger enforcement action by the corporate regulator (ASIC). Design/methodology/approach – All IPO earnings forecasts in prospectuses lodged between 1998 and 2003 are examined to assess the pre- and post-CLERP Act impact. Based on active ASIC enforcement action in the post-reform period, IPO firms are hypothesised to provide more accurate forecasts, particularly CTE firms, which are less likely to have a reasonable basis for forecasting. Research models are developed to empirically test the impact of the reforms on CTE and non-CTE IPO firms. Findings – The new regulatory environment has had a positive impact on management forecasting behaviour. In the post-CLERP Act period, the accuracy of prospectus forecasts and their revisions significantly improved and, as expected, the results are primarily driven by CTE firms. However, the majority of prospectus forecasts continue to be materially inaccurate. Originality/value – The results highlight the need to control for both the changing nature of listed firms and the level of enforcement action when examining responses to regulatory changes to corporate fundraising activities.

Impact of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 on initial public offering prospectus earnings forecasts

Commencing 13 March 2000, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) introduced changes to the regulation of corporate fundraising in Australia. In particular, it effected a reduction in the litigation risk associated with initial public offering prospectus disclosure.We find that the change is associated with a reduction in forecast frequency and an increase in forecast value relevance, but not with forecast error or bias. These results confirm previous findings that changes in litigation risk affect the level but not the quality of disclosure. They also suggest that the reforms’ objectives of reducing fundraising costs while improving investor protection, have been achieved.

Were regulatory changes in reporting "abnormal items" justified? : evidence of intra-period classificatory earnings management practices in Australia

Purpose Managers generally have discretion in determining how components of earnings are presented in financial statements in distinguishing between ‘normal’ earnings and items classified as unusual, special, significant, exceptional or abnormal. Prior research has found that such intra-period classificatory choice is used as a form of earnings management. Prior to 2001, Australian accounting standards mandated that unusually large items of revenue and expense be classified as ‘abnormal items’ for financial reporting, but this classification was removed from accounting standards from 2001. This move by the regulators was partly in response to concerns that the abnormal classification was being used opportunistically to manage reported pre-abnormal earnings. This study extends the earnings management literature by examining the reporting of abnormal items for evidence of intra-period classificatory earnings management in the unique Australian setting. Design/methodology/approach This study investigates associations between reporting of abnormal items and incentives in the form of analyst following and the earnings benchmarks of analysts’ forecasts, earnings levels, and earnings changes, for a sample of Australian top-500 firms for the seven-year period from 1994 to 2000. Findings The findings suggest there are systematic differences between firms reporting abnormal items and those with no abnormal items. Results show evidence that, on average, firms shifted expense items from pre-abnormal earnings to bottom line net income through reclassification as abnormal losses. Originality/value These findings suggest that the standard setters were justified in removing the ‘abnormal’ classification from the accounting standard. However, it cannot be assumed that all firms acted opportunistically in the classification of items as abnormal. With the removal of the standardised classification of items outside normal operations as ‘abnormal’, firms lost the opportunity to use such disclosures as a signalling device, with the consequential effect of limiting the scope of effectively communicating information about the nature of items presented in financial reports.

Ownership structure and concentration and the timeliness of corporate earnings : Malaysian evidence

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags in Malaysia. Based on a sample of 1,276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, the results show that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags. Specifically, closely-held firms are more timely in their price discovery and have shorter reporting lags, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a financial institution. Government-owned firms have longer reporting lags, as expected, but we find no evidence that family-owned firms have significantly different timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags than other firms. Additional analysis shows that prior to the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, firms were more timely in their price discovery but longer in their reporting lag.

Gender-diverse boards and properties of analyst earnings forecasts

Using a sample of 2,200 US listed firm year observations (2001-2007)this study shows a positive (negative) relation between female participation in corporate boards and analysts' earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion), after controlling for earnings quality, corporate governance, audit quality, stock price informativeness and potential endogeneity. Our findings are important as they suggest that board diversity adds to the transparency and accuracy of financial reports such that earnings expectations are likely to be more accurate for these firms.

Earnings management and the role of the audit committee: an investigation of the influence of cross-listing and government officials on the audit committee

This paper extends research on the corporate governance practices of transitional economies by examining whether the ability of the audit committee to constrain earnings management in Chinese firms is associated with the listing environment and the presence of government officials on the audit committee. Despite considerable regulatory reforms by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, there remain incentives for Chinese firms to manage earnings. However, government initiatives to encourage domestic firms to cross-list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are accompanied by improved governance. We find that the expertise and independence of the audit committee for cross-listed (CL) Chinese firms are associated with lower abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management. Both domestic only listed firms and CL Chinese firms appoint government officials as independent members on the audit committee. However, due to the political connection between government officials and the controlling shareholder (the State), these appointments can severely mitigate audit committee independence. Subsequently, we find a significant and positive association between audit committee independence and experience and earnings management when there are government officials on the audit committee.