The EEAS and the Eastern Partnership: let the blame game stop. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2012

In the first year and a half of its existence, the EEAS and its head have become the target of extensive criticism for the shortcomings of EU foreign policy; shortcomings that in fact date back to the creation of the European Union. The EU’s diplomatic service has been blamed variously for ‘lacking clarity,’ ‘acting too slowly’ and ‘being unable to bridge the institutional divide’. In this Commentary author Hrant Kostanyan argues that the EEAS’ discretionary power in the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework is restricted by the decision-making procedures between a wide range of stakeholders: the member states and the partner countries, as well as by the EU institutions, international organisations and the Civil Society Forum. Since this decision-making process places a substantial number of brakes on the discretionary power of the EEAS, any responsible analysis or critique of the service should take these constraints into consideration. Ultimately, the EEAS is only able to craft EU foreign policy insofar as it is allowed to do so.

Eastern partnership migrants in Germany: outcomes, potentials and challenges

Despite the ongoing dialogue on facilitating mobility between the European Union and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, very little is known about the magnitude and characteristics of migration from these countries. We find that EaP migrants experience worse labor market outcomes than other migrant groups, but current and potential migrants hold qualifications in those areas were skill shortages are expected. Therefore, the monitoring and supervision of EaP integration will be consequential in order to understand how much of the current brain waste is driven by poor assessment of foreign qualifications, and to unleash the potential of migration for the German economy.

Putin’s grand design to destroy the EU’s Eastern Partnership and replace it with a disastrous neighbourhood policy of his own. CEPS Commentary, 17 September 2013

This new Commentary by Michael Emerson and Hrant Kostanyan shows how the pressure exerted by President Putin on Armenia to withdraw from the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement it had negotiated with the EU and to join the Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia customs union is but the most recent in a long series of ongoing moves by Russia to destroy the Eastern Partnership. In their view, the message to be hammered home to those unsure of the economic arguments is that you do not have to have an exclusive customs union to enjoy deep integration for goods, services, people and capital, and of course even less for hard security relationships. High-quality free trade agreements are the logical instrument for those who want excellent relations with more than one big neighbour.

A post-mortem of the Vilnius Summit: Not yet a ‘Thessaloniki moment’ for the Eastern Partnership. CEPS Commentary, 3 December 2013

In assessing the third Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit at Vilnius on November 28-29th, this CEPS Commentary concludes that the event fell far short of its initial ambition to define the geopolitical finalité of EU-EaP relations by projecting a path towards future accession to the EU for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

The Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership four years on: Progress, challenges and prospects. CEPS Special Report, January 2014

Established in 2009, during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum supports the development of civil society organisations from the EU-28 and the six Partnership countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After four years of operation, the Secretariat of the Forum’s Steering Committee commissioned CEPS to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of its programme. This report singles out the institutionalisation and socialisation inculcated among its members as the Forum’s greatest accomplishment. In contrast to its internal developments, it argues that the external policy successes of the Forum remain modest. This report is the first attempt to conduct an in-depth assessment of the Forum's Annual Assembly, the Steering Committee and its Secretariat, the Working Groups and National Platforms. Ten actionable recommendations are put forward aimed at improving the Civil Society Forum’s standing and performance.

The Impact of Visa Liberalisation in Eastern Partnership Countries, Russia and Turkey on Trans-Border Mobility. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 63, March 2014

Schengen Visa liberalisation in the Eastern Partnership countries, Russia and Turkey has proven to have a huge transformative potential across the justice, liberty and security policies of the countries where it has been deployed. Far-reaching technical reforms in the fields of document security, irregular migration and border management, public order security and fundamental rights have to be implemented so that visa-free travel can be allowed. Evidence provided by visa applications data reveals that visa liberalisation is a logical step, provided that the technical reforms are adopted and implemented. This study analyses the current state of play of the implementation of the EU visa policy instruments and assesses the positive impact of visa-free travel on trans-border mobility according to current visa application statistics.

Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

Visegrad development aid in the Eastern Partnership Region. OSW Report, February 2014

The international development cooperation systems of the Visegrad countries are all rather new, in most cases only about a decade old. They are still undergoing reforms and the countries are striving to strengthen their own profiles as development donors in the world by gradually increasing their bilateral ODA. Although their resources are limited and were further cut due to the financial and economic crisis, the bilateral ODA ratio of the Visegrad countries as a group spent in the EaP region gradually increased after 2009. Given that the individual systems are still developing and the countries are focusing on creating their own brand, it is highly unlikely that in the near future it would be in their interest to set up a common development fund – either for the EaP region or in general. Instead of creating new institutions, however, a rationalization of the current cooperation systems and a consolidation of existing resources is feasible and should be considered.

The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas. Gazprom and CNPC strike a deal on gas supplies to China. OSW COMMENTARY No. 139, 2014-06-16

The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).

Germany and the Eastern Partnership. OSW Commentary No. 37, 2010-06-17

Germany perceives the Eastern Partnership as an initiative that is conducive to German interests, but at the same time as one that could undermine them. Berlin would like the Eastern Partnership to be an instrument that brings the partner countries closer to the EU economically but not politically. Germany has opted for a tightening of the economic cooperation with the partner countries, by signing deals on deep free trade areas and harmonising part of the legislation of these countries with the acquis communautaire. On the other hand, Germany does not want the Eastern Partnership to evolve and turn into an initiative that offers the partner countries prospects of membership and antagonises Russia. Therefore Germany is trying to counteract any elements of the Eastern Partnership that would help it develop in the aforementioned direction. Moreover, Germany has set its own bilateral cooperation with partner countries in the east above the joint projects of the Eastern Partnership. In doing so, Berlin’s guiding principle is that German money allocated for the projects on development cooperation in the east should bring political and economic benefits first of all to Germany.

Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies on the Development of the Eastern Partnership. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 6, October 2014

Many scholars now argue that the Treaty of Lisbon has removed the role and influence of the rotating Council Presidency in the domain of the European Union’s foreign affairs. This paper will, however, go beyond a superficial, treaty-based analysis of the influence of the post-Lisbon rotating Council Presidency and instead look at two primary, residual, informal Presidential roles, namely agenda-shaping and brokering. It will examine the extent to which these informal roles allowed the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies of July to December 2011 and 2013 respectively to influence the development of the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the Eastern Partnership. The paper will argue that the considerable influence of these rotating Presidencies defied the logic of the Lisbon Treaty, suggesting that the ‘golden age’ of this six-month position, whereby individual Member States pursue foreign policy issues of significant domestic interest at the European level, has not yet passed.