Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Which Inequality? The Inequality of Endowments Versus the Inequality of Rewards

Society often allocates valuable resources - such as prestigious positions, salaries, or marriage partners - via tournament-like institutions. In such situations, inequality affects incentives to compete and hence has a direct effect on equilibrium choices and hence material outcomes. We introduce a new distinction between inequality in initial endowments (e.g. ability, inherited wealth) and inequality of what one can obtain as rewards (e.g. prestigious positions, money). We show that these two types of inequality have opposing effects on equilibrium behavior and wellbeing. Greater inequality of rewards tends to hurt most people — both the middle class and the poor, — who are forced into greater effort. In contrast, greater inequality of endowments tends to benefit the middle class. Thus, which type of inequality is considered hugely affects the correctness of our intuitions about the implications of inequality.

City companies charities. Report of the Educational Endowments Committee. February, 1881.

"The charities described ... are exclusively those under the trust of the guilds or companies of the city of London."

The London and Southampton railway companion, containing a complete description of every thing worthy of attention on the line; of the gentlemen's seats, villas, towns, and villages; an account of the churches, endowments, livings, patrons; and of the various packs of hounds and angling stations near the line; with guides to Southampton and Isle of Wight.

Mode of access: Internet.

The hand; its mechanism and vital endowments, as evincing design.

Mode of access: Internet.

Our widows and orphans endowments. A study. Dedicated to the members of the I.O.B.B.,

Errata slip inserted.

A topographical and historical account of the parish of St. Mary-le-Bone, comprising a copious description of its public buildings, antiquities, schools, charitable endowments, sources of public amusement, &c. with biographical notices of eminent persons. Illustrated with six views and a map.

Mode of access: Internet.

The hand : its mechanism and vital endowments, as evincing design /

Binder's title: Bell on the hand.

The great schools of England: an account of the foundation, endowments,

Mode of access: Internet.

Fundamental by-laws and tables of rates, for reversionary annuities, annuities and endowments,

Reprinted, 1876.

Comparative labor market performance of visaed and non-visaed migrants: Pacific islanders in Sydney

Using survey data for Tongan and Samoan migrants in Sydney the effects of visa restrictions on labor market performance of migrants are assessed. Univariate analysis suggests a positive association between unemployment and the unrestricted entry of Samoan step-migrants from New Zealand. A probit model of the determinants of unemployment is estimated with controls for human capital and demographic variables. While human capital endowments are important, visa restrictions do not have a significant effect on either group's employability. Implications for policy are discussed highlighting the complementarities between host country immigration policies and foreign aid programs.

Genetic and environmental contributions to educational attainment in Australia

The genetic and environmental contributions to educational attainment in Australia are examined using a multiple regression model drawn from the medical research literature. Data from a large sample of Australian twins are analysed. The findings indicate that at least as much as 50 percent and perhaps as much as 65 percent of the variance in educational attainments can be attributed to genetic endowments. It is suggested that only around 25 percent of the variance in educational attainments may be due to environmental factors, though this contribution is shown to be around 40 percent when adjustments for measurement error and assortative mating are made. The high fraction of the observed variation in educational attainments due to genetic differences is consistent with results reported by Heath et al. (Heath, A.C., Berg, K., Eaves, L.J., Solaas, M.H., Corey, L.A., Sundet, J., Magnus, P., Nance, W.E., 1985. Education policy and the heritability of educational attainment. Nature 314(6013), 734-736.), Tambs et al. (Tambs, K., Sundet, J.M., Magnus, P., Berg, K., 1989. Genetic and environmental contributions to the covariance between occupational status, educational attainment and IQ: a study of twins. Behavior Genetics 19(2), 209-222.), Vogler and Fulker (Vogler, G.P., Fulker, D.W., 1983. Familial resemblance for educational attainment. Behavior Generics 13(4), 341-354.) and Behrman and Taubman (Behrman, J., Taubman, P., 1989. Is schooling mostly in the genes? Nature-nurture decomposition using data on relatives. Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1425-1446.), suggesting that the finding is robust. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."