Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.

Preventing the rise of sovereign borrowing costs in the Eurozone: what can the ESM and the ECB achieve? Egmont Paper No. 56, November 2012

This paper focuses on the possible instruments for ‘ex-ante’/’preventive’/’precautionary’ interventions which can be deployed by the ESM and the ECB in order to prevent a debt crisis in a eurozone country. The potential of Eurobonds will also be discussed in this crisis management perspective. The first part of this paper traces the underlying trends of the evolution of interest rates in eurozone countries over the last decades. The second part discusses the principles of a preventive intervention in sovereign bond markets for the purpose of lowering borrowing costs of countries facing refinancing constraints; the limits and main issues of an ex-ante intervention will be underlined. In the third part, the properties of the ESM’s precautionary financial assistance and secondary market support facility will be discussed in details. The ECB preemptive intervention policies and, in particular, the OMT will be analyzed in the fourth part of the paper. The most likely course of action – a combined intervention by the ESM and the ECB – will be discussed in the fifth part. Finally, I will point out the core challenges of introducing Eurobonds as additional instruments to mitigate the rise of borrowing costs in the short term.

ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right? CEPS Working Document No. 397, June 2014

Paul De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis states that member countries of a monetary union such as the eurozone are highly vulnerable to a self-fulfilling mechanism by which the efforts of investors to avoid losses from default can end up triggering the very default they fear. The authors test this hypothesis by applying an eclectic methodology to a time window around Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” (to keep the eurozone on firm footing) pledge on 26 July 2012. This pledge was soon followed by the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme (the prospective and conditional purchase by the European Central Bank of sovereign bonds of eurozone countries having difficulty issuing debt). The principal components of eurozone credit default swap spreads validate this choice of time frame. An event study reveals significant pre announcement contagion emanating from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria. Furthermore, time-series regression confirms frequent clusters of large shocks affecting the credit default swap spreads of the four eurozone countries but solely during the pre-announcement period. The findings of this report support the fragility hypothesis for the eurozone and endorse the Outright Monetary Transactions programme.

So far apart and yet so close: Should the ECB care about inflation differentials? Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2014/10 September 2014

Inflation rates can differ across regions of monetary unions. We show that in the euro area, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, inflation rates have been substantially and persistently different in different regions. Differences were particularly substantial in the euro area. Inflation differences can reflect normal adjustment processes such as price convergence or the Balassa-Samuelson effect, or can reflect the different cyclical position of regions. But they can also be the result of economic distortions resulting from segmented markets or unsustainable demand and credit developments fueled by low real interest rates. In normal times, the European Central Bank cannot influence such developments with its single interest rate instrument. However, unconventional policy measures can have different effects on different countries depending on the chosen instrument, and should be used to reduce fragmentation and ensure the proper transmission of monetary policy. The new macro prudential policy tools are unlikely to be practical in addressing inflation divergences. It is crucial to keep the average inflation rate close to two percent so that inflation differentials are possible without deflation in some parts of the euro area, which in turn might endanger area-wide financial stability and price stability.

The ECB AQR and the EBA Stress Test: What will the numbers tell? CEPS Commentary, 23 October 2014

From the Introduction. With the results of its asset quality review (AQR), to be published on 26 October 2014, the European Central Bank intends to provide clarity on the shape of the 120 banks it will supervise in the eurozone, and it may request a series of follow-up actions before assuming its new set of tasks under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation in November. On the same day, the European Banking Authority (EBA) will also be publishing the results of its stress test, covering 123 banks across 22 European Economic Area (EEA) countries. For the ECB, it will be a matter of setting the standard for its future task, whereas EBA, seeks to restore the confidence it lost in the 2011 stress test and 2012 capital exercise. Both institutions will need to indicate how they will cooperate in the future in these tasks, and through enhanced disclosure, strengthen the confidence in the European banking system.

ECB Banking Supervision and beyond. CEPS Task Force Report, December 2014

With publication of the results of its Comprehensive Assessment at the end of October 2014, the European Central Bank has set the standard for its new mandate as supervisor. But this was only the beginning. The heavy work started in early November, with the day-to-day supervision of the 120 most significant banks in the eurozone under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The centralisation of the supervision in the eurozone will pose a number of challenges for the ECB in the coming months and years ahead. This report analyses these challenges in detail, drawing on the discussions and presentations in the CEPS Task Force on ECB Banking Supervision, and reinforced by extensive research undertaken by the rapporteur. José María Roldán, Presidente, Asociación Española de Banca, served as Chairman of the Task Force.

Case sequence segments for EMU, ECB and Eurozone: A Eurozone country profile and related Euro matters. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

No European country employs a U.S.-style electoral college in presidential elections. Presidents with largely ceremonial functions are elected in some countries by the national parliament or a special assembly (Germany, Italy, Estonia, Turkey and others) or by the people in other countries (Greece, Poland, Slovakia and others). The presidents of Cyprus, Finland, France, Russia and Ukraine -- who have real decision-making power -- are elected directly by the voters. Keep in mind that no two countries are exactly alike in their institutional and electoral arrangements; all of these institutions and electoral systems are capable of being modified and adapted to suit national peculiarities and preferences.

Does All Fit One Size? An evaluation of the ECB policy response to changing economic conditions in the Euro area member states. ACES Cases No. 2008.1

This paper empirically investigates the extent to which the European Central Bank has responded to evolving economic conditions in its member states as opposed to the euro area as a whole. Based on a forward-looking Taylor rule-type policy reaction function, we conduct counterfactual exercises that compare the monetary policy behavior of the ECB with two alternative hypothetical scenarios: (1) were the euro member states to make individual policy decisions, and (2) were the ECB to respond to the economic conditions of individual members. The results reflect the extent of heterogeneity among the national economies in the monetary union and indicate that the ECB's monetary policy rates have been particularly close to the "counterfactual" interest rates of its largest euro members, as well as of countries with similar economic conditions, which includes Germany, Austria, Belgium and France.

Time for the ECB to bite the bullet. CEPS Commentary, 19 January 2015

This Commentary summarises the main reasons why the ECB can no longer delay launching a massive bond-buying programme, also including sovereigns of eurozone member countries, and why such interventions will indeed be effective in raising inflation, thus restoring the ECB’s credibility and spurring economic activity. A credible programme must continue either until an explicit inflation target has been achieved or the ECB balance sheet has reached the €2 trillion target already announced by the ECB’s Governing Council. Regardless of how such interventions will be undertaken, they will reduce interest-rate spreads between eurozone markets, but it is nevertheless important that the ECB designs its operations so as to avoid any implication of direct support or deficit financing facilitation for the eurozone’s most indebted countries. Finally, some kind of guarantee against first losses by the ECB on its sovereign bonds may be appropriate, while entrusting open market operations to each national central bank for their own sovereigns could threaten the very survival of monetary union.

Changing Banking Supervision in the Eurozone: the ECB as a Policy Entrepreneur. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 38, December 2014

In 2012, the European Union adopted a transformational change to its banking policy for the Eurozone. It dropped the model of decentralized supervision and regulatory competition between countries, and replaced it with a single supervisor and harmonization. Transferring banking supervision to the ECB also alters the existing constitutional order. The policy process leading to this transformational change was rapid and highly political, which was different compared to earlier incremental changes to banking policy. Kingdon's model, whereby policy entrepreneurs seize opportunities at times when the independent streams of solutions, problems and politics converge, partly explains this transformation. The study of EU banking policy suggests, however, that the multiple streams framework should pay more attention to the way in which entrepreneurs engineer fluctuations within the streams and thereby contribute to creating opportunities for change. This paper identifies the ECB as an effective entrepreneur which also played an active role in political bargaining.

What signal from the Fed? Should the ECB ease further? CEPS Commentary, 18 September 2015

The Federal Reserve left rates unchanged at its closely-watched meeting on September 17th, although many had argued that the real economy data, especially on the labour market, would have justified an exit (from the zero interest policy). In this CEPS Commentary, Daniel Gros observes that no similar decision on exit is in sight in the euro area, despite the fact that some have argued that the ECB should consider further easing measures (pushing the deposit rate deeper into negative territory or increasing the size of its asset purchase programme). He asks, in fact, whether further easing measures should be even discussed at this point.

Countries under Adjustment Programmes: What role for the ECB? CEPS Special Report No. 124, December 2015

Providing ‘technical assistance/advice’ on programmes for countries under financial stress is well within the mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Being fully part of the Troika, however, is a different role. Formally the ECB does not participate in the ‘decision-making’ on programmes (decisions are taken by the Finance Ministers – and the IMF). However, the ECB is part of the ‘decision-shaping’ process. These two roles have often been confused. The ECB should interpret its formal role in future ESM (European Stability Mechanism) programmes as narrowly as possible. Providing advice but avoid taking part in the operational work of programme surveillance. The ECB should de facto leave the Troika. At any rate, future incidents like the Italian or Spanish letters will be superseded by the OMTs (outright monetary transactions) and an Irish-type situation would be shaped by the legal framework of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the potential funding from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). An additional issue for the ECB is internal coherence: Its six-member Executive Board manages the participation in the Troika, monetary policy is decided by the Governing Council and banking supervision is under the Supervisory Board, separated in principle by Chinese walls from the (rest of the) ECB.

Greece is solvent but illiquid. What should the ECB do? CEPS Commentary, 15 June 2015

There is one feature of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece that is widely misunderstood, namely the effective debt burden of the country’s government. Since the start of the crisis, its sovereign debt has been subjected to several restructuring efforts

The global crisis and unconventional monetary policy : ECB versus Fed

In the aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis, which broke-out in 2007, the major central banks started implementing so-called unconventional monetary policy measures. Following a fundamentally qualitative methodology, the aim of this paper is to compare the unconventional measures adopted by the ECB and the Fed, assessing their characteristics and also their impacts on the economy.