A qualified defense of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan under international humanitarian law

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, international law has had to grapple with the fundamental challenges that large-scale violence carried out by non-State actors poses to the traditional inter- State orientation of international law. Questions related to the “adequacy” and “effectiveness” of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law related to the use of force have been particularly pronounced. This paper focuses on the international humanitarian law implications of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan. A highly-advanced modality of modern warfare, armed drones highlight the possibilities, problems, prospects and pitfalls of high-tech warfare. How is the battlefield to be defined and delineated geographically and temporally? Who can be targeted, and by whom? Ultimately, this paper concludes that American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan are not unlawful as such under international humanitarian law, though, like any tactical decision in the context of asymmetric warfare, they should be continuously and closely monitored according to the dictates of law with sensitivity to facts on the ground.

Análisis de las relaciones bilaterales entre Pakistán y Estados Unidos en materia de seguridad (Periodo 2007 - 2010)

Después de los ataques del 11 de septiembre de 2001, Pakistán se ha convertido en uno de los principales aliados de Estados Unidos para combatir las fuerzas terroristas de Al-Qaeda y los talibán en el centro y sur de Asia. La alianza bilateral no ha manifestado resultados determinantes para aliviar los problemas de seguridad en Pakistán, por el contrario, la yihad islámica se ha fortalecido en su población y los ataques terroristas que atentan contra la población civil y el aparato estatal se vuelven cada vez mas frecuentes, en razón de lo anterior, los grupos insurgentes en Pakistán han fortalecido su capacidad operativa y expandido su escenario de influencia.

Unsuccessful attacks dominate a drone-preying wasp's hunting performance near stingless bee nests

Bee males (drones) of stingless bees tend to congregate near entrances of conspecific nests, where they wait for virgin queens that initiate their nuptial flight. We observed that the Neotropical solitary wasp Trachypus boharti (Hymenoptera, Cabronidae) specifically preys on males of the stingless bee Scaptotrigona postica (Hymenoptera, Apidae); these wasps captured up to 50 males per day near the entrance of a single hive. Over 90% of the wasp attacks were unsuccessful; such erroneous attacks often involved conspecific wasps and worker bees. After the capture of non-male prey, wasps almost immediately released these individuals unharmed and continued hunting. A simple behavioral experiment showed that at short distances wasps were not specifically attracted to S. postica males nor were they repelled by workers of the same species. Likely, short-range prey detection near the bees' nest is achieved mainly by vision whereas close-range prey recognition is based principally on chemical and/or mechanical cues. We argue that the dependence on the wasp's visual perception during attack and the crowded and dynamic hunting conditions caused wasps to make many preying attempts that failed. Two wasp-density-related factors, wasp-prey distance and wasp-wasp encounters, may account for the fact that the highest male capture and unsuccessful wasp bee encounter rates occurred at intermediate wasp numbers.

Modelling Denial of Service Attacks on JFK with Meadow's Cost-Based Framework

We present the first detailed application of Meadows’s cost-based modelling framework to the analysis of JFK, an Internet key agreement protocol. The analysis identifies two denial of service attacks against the protocol that are possible when an attacker is willing to reveal the source IP address. The first attack was identified through direct application of a cost-based modelling framework, while the second was only identified after considering coordinated attackers. Finally, we demonstrate how the inclusion of client puzzles in the protocol can improve denial of service resistance against both identified attacks.

Experiences in Passively Detecting Session Hijacking Attacks in IEEE 802.11 Networks

Current IEEE 802.11 wireless networks are vulnerable to session hijacking attacks as the existing standards fail to address the lack of authentication of management frames and network card addresses, and rely on loosely coupled state machines. Even the new WLAN security standard - IEEE 802.11i does not address these issues. In our previous work, we proposed two new techniques for improving detection of session hijacking attacks that are passive, computationally inexpensive, reliable, and have minimal impact on network performance. These techniques utilise unspoofable characteristics from the MAC protocol and the physical layer to enhance confidence in the intrusion detection process. This paper extends our earlier work and explores usability, robustness and accuracy of these intrusion detection techniques by applying them to eight distinct test scenarios. A correlation engine has also been introduced to maintain the false positives and false negatives at a manageable level. We also explore the process of selecting optimum thresholds for both detection techniques. For the purposes of our experiments, Snort-Wireless open source wireless intrusion detection system was extended to implement these new techniques and the correlation engine. Absence of any false negatives and low number of false positives in all eight test scenarios successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the correlation engine and the accuracy of the detection techniques.

Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols

A key exchange protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a secret session key over a public network. Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for the case of GKE protocols. We first model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure even against outsider KCI attacks. The attacks on these protocols demonstrate the necessity of considering KCI resilience for GKE protocols. Finally, we give a new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol under the revised model assuming random oracles.