Dollarization and the relationship between EMBI and fundamentals Latin American countries

This paper presents empirical evidence on the interrelationship that exists between the evolution of the Emerging Markets Bonds Index (EMBI) and some macroeconomic variables in seven Latin American countries; two of them (Ecuador and Panama), full dollarized. We make use of a Cointegrated Vector framework to analyze the short run effects from 2001 to 2009. The results suggest that EMBI is more stable in dollarized countries and that its evolution influences economic activity in non-dollarized economies; suggesting that investors confidence might be higher in dollarized countries where real and financial economic evolution are less tied than in non-dollarized ones.

Dollarization and the relationship between EMBI and fundamentals Latin American countries

This paper presents empirical evidence on the interrelationship that exists between the evolution of the Emerging Markets Bonds Index (EMBI) and some macroeconomic variables in seven Latin American countries; two of them (Ecuador and Panama), full dollarized. We make use of a Cointegrated Vector framework to analyze the short run effects from 2001 to 2009. The results suggest that EMBI is more stable in dollarized countries and that its evolution influences economic activity in non-dollarized economies; suggesting that investors confidence might be higher in dollarized countries where real and financial economic evolution are less tied than in non-dollarized ones.

Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

Argentine convertibility: is it a relevant precedent for the dollarization process in Ecuador?

Includes bibliography

The political economy of Mexico's dollarization debate

Includes bibliography

The monetary crisis, dollarization and the exchange rate

Includes bibliography

Bankruptcy Costs, Liability Dollarization, and Vulnerability to Sudden Stops

Emerging market countries that have improved institutions and attained intermediate levels of institutional quality have experienced severe financial crises following capital flow reversals. However, there is also evidence that countries with strong institutions and deep capital markets are less affected by external shocks. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors. ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy recovery rates and the output loss following sudden stops. We provide empirical evidence that this non-linear relationship exists.

An Assessment of the Case for Monetary Union or Official Dollarization in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela

We use a data set covering the whole period of Argentina's currency board and most of that spanned by the Mercosur trade agreement to examine the case for either a Latin American monetary union or monetary union with the USA (through official dollarization). Our econometric evidence using VAR techniques indicates that macroeconomic shocks are still so highly asymmetric in Latin America and between Latin American countries and the USA as to make monetary union or official dollarization somewhat doubtful policies.

Liability dollarization and fear of floating

This paper explores the idea that fear of floating can be justified as an optimal discretionary monetary policy in a dollarized emerging economy. Specifically, I consider a small open economy in which intermediate goods importers borrow in foreign currency and face a credit constraint. In this economy, exchange rate depreciation not only worsens importers' net-worth but also increases the financing amount in domestic currency, therefore exaggerating their borrowing finance premium. Besides, because of high exchange rate pass-through into import prices, fluctuations in the exchange rate also have strong impacts on domestic prices and production. These effects, together, magnify the macroeconomic consequences of the floating exchange rate policy in response to external shocks. The paper shows that the floating exchange rate regime is dominated by the fixed exchange rate regime in the role of cushioning shocks and in welfare terms.

Deposit dollarization in Myanmar

Myanmar has peculiar conditions of deposit dollarization that were shaped by administrative controls. On the one hand, restrictive controls encouraged the accumulation of foreign currency deposits (FCD). On the other hand, foreign currency loans (FCL) were not practiced officially; therefore, FCD was not utilized for credit. Given the adverse effects and persistence of dollarization in other dollarized economies and the recent recovery of local currency deposits in Myanmar, this paper opts for the prohibition of FCL and offers policy measures for de-dollarization.

Inflation, currency substitution and dollarization: The case of Argentina

This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades.^ First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers.^ Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other.^ Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments' inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies.^ We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones.^ We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process.^ Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions. ^

Inflation, currency substitution, and dollarization : the case of Argentina

This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades. First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers. Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other. Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies. We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones. We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process. Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions.

Exchange rate pressure in Angola

The objective of this work is to develop an operational tool to analyze exchange rate pressure in the context of Angola. The Angolan economy exhibits a number of relevant characteristics: a closed financial account, a partially controlled current account, a highly dollarized economy and exports (oil) price determined in World markets. These features have a direct effect on the demand of foreign currency and motivate their inclusion in the specification of a model for Angola. The model provides the rational for a measure of an exchange market rate pressure (EMP) index that contains exports changes, imports changes, the foreign interest rate and inflation and the change in foreign reserves corrected for a measure dollarization. The empirical performance new measure is comparable (slightly better) to the performance of the EMP indexes obtained in Eichengreen Rose and Wyplosz (1994) and Klassen and Jager (2011).

Pass-through in dollarized countries: should Ecuador abandon the U.S. Dollar?

In this article we examine the convenience of dollarization for Ecuador today. As Ecuador is strongly integrated financially and commercially with the United States, the exchange rate pass-through should be zero. However, we sustain that rising rates of imports from trade partners other than the United States and subsequent real effective exchange rate depreciations are causing the pass-through to move away from zero. Here, in the framework of the Vector Error Correction Model, we analyse the impulse response function and variance decomposition of the inflation variable. We show that the developing economy of Ecuador is importing inflation from its main trading partners, most of them emerging countries with appreciated currencies. We argue that if Ecuador recovered both its monetary and exchange rate instruments it would be able to fight against inflation. We believe such an analysis could be extended to other countries with pegged exchange rate regimes.