Share Repurchases, Dividends, and Executive Options

This paper reports empirical results on the determinants of the authorization decision for share repurchases and dividends in Finland. We use a data set with precise data on share repurchases as well as characteristics for the option programs. Contrary to the U.S., we use a data set where 41% of the options are dividend protected, which allows us to separate between the "option funding" and "substitution / managerial wealth" hypothesis for the choice of the distribution method. We find that foreign ownership is the main determinant for share repurchases in Finland and attribute this relationship to tax factors. We also find evidence in support of both the signaling and agency cost hypotheses for cash distributions, especially in the case of share repurchases. Finally, we find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. When options are dividend protected, the relationship between dividend distributions and the scope of the options program turns to a significantly positive one instead of the negative one documented on U.S. data. This gives some support for the substitution / managerial wealth hypothesis as a determinant for the choice of the distribution method.

The Pricing of American Put Options on Stock with Dividends

Pricing American put options on dividend-paying stocks has largely been ignored in the option pricing literature because the problem is mathematically complex and valuation usually resorts to computationally expensive and impractical pricing applications. This paper computed a simulation study, using two different approximation methods for the valuation of American put options on a stock with known discrete dividend payments. This to find out if there were pricing errors and to find out which could be the most usable method for practical users. The option pricing models used in the study was the dividend approximation by Blomeyer (1986) and the one by Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1988). The study showed that the approximation method by Blomeyer worked satisfactory for most situations, but some errors occur for longer times to the dividend payment, for smaller dividends and for in-the-money options. The approximation method by Barone-Adesi and Whaley worked well for in-the-money options and at-the-money options, but had serious pricing errors for out-of-the-money options. The conclusion of the study is that a combination of the both methods might be preferable to any single model.

International evidence on the payout ratio, earnings, dividends and returns

ap Gwilym, Owain, et al., 'International evidence on the payout ratio, earnings, dividends and returns', Financial Analysts Journal (2006) 62(1) pp.36-53 RAE2008

Substitutes for legal protection: corporate governance and dividends in Victorian Britain

Companies in Victorian Britain operated in a laissez-faire legal environment from the perspective of outside investors, implying that such investors were not protected by the legal system. This article seeks to identify the alternative mechanisms that outside shareholders used to protect themselves by examining the dividend policy and governance of over 800 publicly traded companies at the beginning of the 1880s. We assess the importance of these mechanisms by estimating their impact on Tobin's Q. Our evidence suggests that dividends and well-structured and incentivized boards of directors may have played a role in protecting the interests of outside investors.

Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?: Evidence from an Early and Unregulated Capital Market

Why do firms pay dividends? To answer this question, we use a hand-collected data set of companies traded on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870. As tax rates were effectively zero, the capital market was unregulated, and there were no institutional stockholders, we can rule out these potential determinants ex ante. We find that, even though they were legal, share repurchases were not used by firms to return cash to shareholders. Instead, our evidence provides support for the information–communication explanation for dividends, while providing little support for agency, illiquidity, catering, or behavioral explanations. © The Authors 2013. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of the European Finance Association]. All rights reserved.

Improving health and wellbeing independently of GDP: dividends of greener and prosoical economies

Increases in gross domestic product (GDP) beyond a threshold of basic needs do not lead to further increases in well-being. An explanation is that material consumption (MC) also results in negative health externalities. We assess how these externalities influence six factors critical for well-being: (i) healthy food; (ii) active body; (iii) healthy mind; (iv) community links; (v) contact with nature; and (vi) attachment to possessions. If environmentally sustainable consumption (ESC) were increasingly substituted for MC, thus improving well-being and stocks of natural and social capital, and sustainable behaviours involving non-material consumption (SBs-NMC) became more prevalent, then well-being would increase regardless of levels of GDP. In the UK, the individualised annual health costs of negative consumption externalities (NCEs) currently amount to £62 billion for the National Health Service, and £184 billion for the economy (for mental ill-health, dementia, obesity, physical inactivity, diabetes, loneliness and cardiovascular disease). A dividend is available if substitution by ESC and SBs-NMC could limit the prevalence of these conditions.

Randomized observation periods for the compound Poisson risk model: Dividends

In the framework of the classical compound Poisson process in collective risk theory, we study a modification of the horizontal dividend barrier strategy by introducing random observation times at which dividends can be paid and ruin can be observed. This model contains both the continuous-time and the discrete-time risk model as a limit and represents a certain type of bridge between them which still enables the explicit calculation of moments of total discounted dividend payments until ruin. Numerical illustrations for several sets of parameters are given and the effect of random observation times on the performance of the dividend strategy is studied.

A note on moments of dividends

We reconsider a formula for arbitrary moments of expected discounted dividend payments in a spectrally negative L,vy risk model that was obtained in Renaud and Zhou (2007, [4]) and in Kyprianou and Palmowski (2007, [3]) and extend the result to stationary Markov processes that are skip-free upwards.

Do dividends signal more earnings?

Signaling models have contributed to the corporate finance literature by formalizing "the informational content of dividends" hypothesis. However, these models are under criticism of empirical literature, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predicitions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim thaht the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The models developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show thaht signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.

Bank dividends and signaling to information-sensitive depositors

Esta tese investiga se a composição do endividamento dos bancos afeta sua política de dividendos. Identificou-se que investidores sensíveis a informações (investidores institucionais) são alvos de sinalização através de dividendos por parte dos bancos. Utilizando uma base de dados exclusiva de bancos brasileiros, foi possível identificar vários tipos de credores, especificamente, investidores institucionais, empresas não financeiras e pessoas físicas, que são alvos potenciais de sinalização por dividendos. Adicionalmente, a existência de vários bancos de capital fechado, controlados e geridos por um pequeno grupo de acionistas, em que a sinalização direcionada a acionistas é implausível, permite inferir que bancos que utilizam mais fundos de investidores sensíveis a informações (institucionais) pagam mais dividendos, controlando por diversas características. Durante a crise financeira, este comportamento foi ainda mais pronunciado. Esta relação reforça o papel dos dividendos como uma forma custosa e crível de comunicar sobre a qualidade dos ativos dos bancos. A hipótese de que os dividendos podem ser utilizados como uma forma de expropriação dos depositantes por parte dos acionistas é refutada, uma vez que, se fosse esse o caso, observar-se-ia esse maiores dividendos em bancos com depositantes menos sensíveis a informação. Além disso, foi verificada uma relação negativa entre o pagamento de dividendos e o custo de captação (juros pagos em certificados de depósito bancário) e uma relação positiva de dividendos com o tamanho e com os lucros passados, e que os bancos de capital fechado pagam mais dividendos do que os de capital aberto, uma descoberta que também se alinha com a ideia de que os depositantes seriam os alvos da sinalização por dividendos. Finalmente, encontrou-se também uma relação negativa entre dividendos e adequação de capital do bancos, o que indica que pressões regulatórias podem induzir os bancos a pagar menos dividendos e que o pagamento de dividendos é negativamente relacionado com o crescimento da carteira de crédito, o que é consistente com a ideia de que os bancos com maiores oportunidades de investimento retêm seus lucros para aumentar seu patrimônio líquido e sua capacidade de conceder crédito.

Predictable dividends and returns

The conventional wisdom is that the aggregate stock price is predictable by the lagged pricedividend ratio, and that aggregate dividends follow approximately a random-walk. Contrary to this belief, this paper finds that variation in the aggregate dividends and price-dividend ratio is related to changes in expected dividend growth. The inclusion of labor income in a cointegrated vector autoregression with prices and dividends allows the identification of predictable variation in dividends. Most of the variation in the price-dividend ratio is due to changes in expected returns, but this paper shows that part of variation is related to transitory dividend growth shocks. Moreover, most of the variation in dividend growth can be attributed to these temporary changes in dividends. I also show that the price-dividend ratio (or dividend yield) can be constructed as the sum of two distinct, but correlated, variables that separately predict dividend growth and returns. One of these components, which could be called the expected return state variable, predicts returns better than the price-dividend ratio does.

Do dividends signal more earnings? a theoretical analysis

The signaling models have contributed to the literature of corporate finance by the formalization of "the informational content of dividends hypothesis". However, these models are under criticism of empirical works, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predictions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim that the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The mo deIs developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show that signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.