Window-dressing in German interwar balance sheets

German accounting rules value assets and liabilities asymmetricallyand thus lead to grossly distorted balance sheets. In the interwardebate on a reform of disclosure regulation, financial expertsconsidered the (undisclosed) tax balance sheet, which had to bedrawn up separately for the corporate tax assessment, as a paradigmfor adequate financial disclosure. However, due to tax secrecy thaywere barred from analyzing tax documents. Using archival evidence,we analyze tax balance sheets from which the reliability of disclosedbalance sheets of the interwar period can be assessed. It emergesthat companies overstated their profits in the middand late 1920s,but grossly understated them in the Nazi economy.

Regulation and disclosure about financial instruments: Evidence on financial reporting in the Portuguese banking sector

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Liquidity, institutional ownership and regulation fair disclosure

There is a body of academic literature addressing two issues of importance for leveling the playing field for all classes of investors: 1) the impact of institutional investors on liquidity; and 2) the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on institutional investors and liquidity. Our study addresses both issues with the purpose of attaining a better understanding and explanation of this relationship. We classify institutional ownership according to Bushee's (1998, 2001) methodology; transient institutions, dedicated institutions and quasi-indexers. Our results indicate that while transient institutions and quasi-indexers have a positive impact on liquidity, dedicated institutional ownership is negatively associated with liquidity. This result is consistent with prior theoretical studies. We also find that the effectiveness ofthe Regulation Fair Disclosure in improving liquidity is limited to firms with higher transient institutional ownership, whereas quasi-indexed institutions have not been significantly affected by the regulations. In fact, the liquidity of firms is lower for firms with higher dedicated institutional holdings, which is evidence of the "chilling effect".

Strengthening the supervision and regulation of the depository institutions : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, on reform federal deposit insurance, protect the deposit insurance funds, and improve supervision and regulation of and disclosure relating to federally insured depository institutions ....

"February 26, 1991 ... April 23, 1991"--Vol. 1. "April 25, 1991 ... November 25, 1991"--Vol. 2.

Financial reporting and inventory disclosure in the extractive industry

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Financial reporting and inventory disclosure in the extractive industry

Companies in the Extractive Industry (E.I) have some particularities and special regulation that provides an interesting study of inventory and reporting in their financial statements. The theme thus chosen here, aims to make a comparison of the various methods of reporting inventories (recognition, measurement, presentation and disclosures) as well as the different accounting regulations in place. Moreover, inventories are a current asset which represents a large per cent of total assets. Another is that it also provides an opportunity for analysis of the different regulations in place for disclosures; the different standards implemented- IAS, US GAAP and/or regional standards.

Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15

Determinants of Corporate Disclosure : A Multicountry, Multilevel Model

Abstract The complexity of the current business world is making corporate disclosure more and more important for information users. These users, including investors, financial analysts, and government authorities rely on the disclosed information to make their investment decisions, analyze and recommend shares, and to draft regulation policies. Moreover, the globalization of capital markets has raised difficulties for information users in understanding the differences incorporate disclosure across countries and across firms. Using a sample of 797 firms from 34 countries, this thesis advances the literature on disclosure by illustrating comprehensively the disclosure determinants originating at firm systems and national systems based on the multilevel latent variable approach. Under this approach, the overall variation associated with the firm-specific variables is decomposed into two parts, the within-country and the between-country part. Accordingly, the model estimates the latent association between corporate disclosure and information demand at two levels, the within-country and the between-country level. The results indicate that the variables originating from corporate systems are hierarchically correlated with those from the country environment. The information demand factor indicated by the number of exchanges listed and the number of analyst recommendations can significantly explain the variation of corporate disclosure for both "within" and "between" countries. The exogenous influences of firm fundamentals-firm size and performance-are exerted indirectly through the information demand factor. Specifically, if the between-country variation in firm variables is taken into account, only the variables of legal systems and economic growth keep significance in explaining the disclosure differences across countries. These findings strongly support the hypothesis that disclosure is a response to both corporate systems and national systems, but the influence of the latter on disclosure reflected significantly through that of the former. In addition, the results based on ADR (American Depositary Receipt) firms suggest that the globalization of capital markets is harmonizing the disclosure behavior of cross-boundary listed firms, but it cannot entirely eliminate the national features in disclosure and other firm-specific characteristics.

Mandatory and voluntary information disclosure and the effects on financial analysts: evidence from China

Purpose – This paper aims to make a comparison, different from existing literature solely focusing on voluntary earnings forecasts and ex post earnings surprise, between the effects of mandatory earnings surprise warnings and voluntary information disclosure issued by management teams on financial analysts in terms of the number of followings and the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses panel data analysis with fixed effects on data collected from Chinese public firms between 2006 and 2010. It uses an exogenous regulation enforcement to minimise the endogeneity problem. Findings – This paper finds that financial analysts are less likely to follow firms which mandatorily issue earnings surprise warnings ex ante than those voluntarily issue earnings forecasts. Moreover, ex post, they issue less accurate and more dispersed forecasts on former firms. The results support Brown et al.’s (2009) finding in the USA and suggest that the earnings surprise warnings affect information asymmetries. Practical implications – This paper justifies the mandatory earnings surprise warnings policy issued by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission in 2006. Originality/value – Mandatory earnings surprise is a unique practical regulation for publicly listed firms in China. This paper, for the first time, provides empirical evaluation on the effectiveness of a mandatory information disclosure policy in China. Consistent with existing literature on information disclosure by public firms in other countries, this paper finds that, in China, voluntary information disclosure captures more private information than mandatory information disclosure on corporate earnings ability.

Disclosure da utilização de derivativos por companhias abertas não-financeiras brasileiras

A pesquisa avaliou o grau de disclosure da utilização de derivativos, por companhias abertas não-financeiras brasileiras. Dez "dimensões" dessa utilização foram analisadas, à luz principalmente do que dispõe a regulamentação americana sobre a matéria. Os resultados mostram que, em comparação com o que esta exige, o grau de disclosure da utilização de derivativos pelas empresas brasileiras deixa muito a desejar; nesse mister, as empresas com participação de capital estrangeiro não apresentam práticas de disclosure superiores às empresas simplesmente domésticas.

Essays on incentives, procurement and regulation

Esta tese é composta de três artigos. No primeiro artigo, "Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard", é considerado um problema de principal-agente sob a presença simultânea dos problemas de risco moral e seleção adversa, em que a dimensão de seleção adversa se dá sobre as distribuições de probabilidade condicionais as ações do agente. No segundo artigo, "Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection" é analisada a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas sob a presença de seleção adversa. No terceiro artigo, "Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure", por sua vez, é considerado o problema da regulação de firmas de capital aberto, onde as firmas possuem incentivos para mandar sinais opostos para o regulador e o mercado.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

The EU Risk Retention Regulation

This chapter examines the new legal concept of risk retention under EU law for asset-backed securities.

De Relatie tussen Angst- en Stemmingsklachten en Self-disclosure: het Effect van Emotie-inhibitie en Mindfulness

Angst- en stemmingsklachten worden geassocieerd met verminderde self-disclosure. Met self-disclosure wordt zelfonthulling van ervaren emoties bedoeld. Dit speelt een rol bij zelfacceptatie en zelfinzicht, en is belangrijk bij gesprekstherapie. Deze studie onderzocht of emotie-inhibitie de negatieve relatie tussen angst- en stemmingsklachten en self-diclosure verklaart, en of de relatie gunstig te beïnvloeden is door mindfulness. Het effect van mindfulness op deze relatie was nog niet eerder onderzocht. Deelnemers waren 99 vrouwen van 24 t/m 74 jaar (M = 44.60, SD = 10.55) en 26 mannen van 26 t/m 77 jaar (M = 48.27, SD = 12.68), afkomstig uit de normale Nederlands populatie. Het onderzoeksontwerp betrof een cross-sectioneel online vragenlijstonderzoek, waarbij gebruik gemaakt werd van de Symptom Checklist (Arrindel & Ettema, 1986), Emotional Self-Disclosure Scale (Snell, Miller, & Belk, 1988), Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) en Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire – Short Form (Bohlmeijer, Ten Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof, & Baer, 2011). Resultaten tonen, conform bestaande literatuur, dat angst- en stemmingsklachten negatief samenhangen met self-disclosure. Emotie-inhibitie heeft echter géén mediatie-effect en mindfulness heeft géén moderatie-effect op de negatieve relatie tussen angst- en stemmingsklachten en self-disclosure. Mindfulness heeft wel mediatie-effect op deze relatie. Mindfulness hangt hierbij positief samen met self-disclosure. De relevantie van de bevindingen is vooral praktisch: om mensen met angst- en stemmingsklachten te stimuleren over hun emoties te praten zou mindfulness aangewend kunnen worden.