Experiência-vivência. Dilthey e as humanidades: um olhar retrospectivo

A partir do momento em que os métodos das Ciências Naturais e a dimensão da percepção fossem excluídos das Ciências Humanas, estariam criadas as condições para que, na opinião de Dilthey, toda e qualquer forma de interpretação - e sobretudo a interpretação literária e psicológica - pudesse em última análise pôr a descoberto [...] a imediatez da vivência. [...] O preço que as Ciências Humanas tiveram de pagar por este passo está à vista: foi a perda de toda e qualquer forma não-cartesiana de referência ao Mundo, de toda e qualquer forma de relação com o Mundo que não fosse baseada na experiência.

Del historicismo a la hermeneutica:La recepción de Dilthey

El análisis de la recepción de la obra de Dilthey en la hermenéutica gadamerianapermite no sólo el acercamiento a la obra de estos dos autores, sino también esbozar elmapa de los problemas teóricos que caracterizan la transición del siglo XIX al XX, mapa enel que destaca la cuestión relativa a la relación de la filosofía con su historia. El objetivode este ensayo es clarificar qué tipo de presencia tiene Dilthey en la obra de Gadamer, paraquien no es un interlocutor más: la propuesta hermenéutica es una respuesta a los problemasque Dilthey plantea; en esta propuesta, el reconocimiento de Heidegger como referentefundamental se lleva a cabo en un campo de intereses compartido con Dilthey queproporciona elementos necesarios para hacer de la conciencia histórica "conciencia de lahistoria efectual".

Del historicismo a la hermeneutica:La recepción de Dilthey

El análisis de la recepción de la obra de Dilthey en la hermenéutica gadamerianapermite no sólo el acercamiento a la obra de estos dos autores, sino también esbozar elmapa de los problemas teóricos que caracterizan la transición del siglo XIX al XX, mapa enel que destaca la cuestión relativa a la relación de la filosofía con su historia. El objetivode este ensayo es clarificar qué tipo de presencia tiene Dilthey en la obra de Gadamer, paraquien no es un interlocutor más: la propuesta hermenéutica es una respuesta a los problemasque Dilthey plantea; en esta propuesta, el reconocimiento de Heidegger como referentefundamental se lleva a cabo en un campo de intereses compartido con Dilthey queproporciona elementos necesarios para hacer de la conciencia histórica "conciencia de lahistoria efectual".

Dilthey: conceito de vivência e os limites da compreensão nas ciências do espírito

O propósito sistemático-filosófico da crítica diltheiana da razão histórica traduz-se na busca de apoio do conhecimento objetivo para sua apreensão intuitiva da vida. O presente artigo busca mostrar não só aspectos da trajetória teórica do autor, mas também suas dificuldades e limites.

Consciência histórica e hermenêutica: considerações de gadamer acerca da teoria da história de Dilthey

O propósito deste artigo é explicitar o modo como Gadamer reformula a hermenêutica diltheiana (desenvolvida sobre o conceito moderno de vida utilizado como fundamento da noção de auto-consciência histórica), ao formular um novo modo de compreender a razão e a existência humanas, tomando como ponto de partida a experiência concreta da finitude da vida humana.

Dilthey: hermenêutica da vida e universalidade pedagógica

Dilthey apontou primeiro a psicologia e depois a hermenêutica como tendo papel fundamental para sua filosofia da vida, cujo principal objetivo prático é desenvolver a pedagogia ou teoria geral da educação. A pedagogia necessita da ajuda da ética para estabelecer seus fins e da psicologia para indicar seus meios. Este texto tem por objetivo mostrar a relação entre hermenêutica da vida e pedagogia, para Dilthey. A filosofia da vida do autor, ao adotar procedimento hermenêutico, exercita a compreensão ou busca de significado das criações humanas histórico-sociais por um tipo especial de relação entre as partes e o todo. É justamente dentro desse balanço hermenêutico que propomos apagar qualquer vestígio de ruptura, brecha ou contradição entre a busca de princípios universais da ação humana e a impossibilidade de construção da tarefa humana moral, por meio de princípios universais. Só em 1890 Dilthey deu início às conhecidas conferências sobre ética, na Universidade de Berlim. Tais conferências, publicadas em 1958 por Herman Nohl, no volume X das Obras Completas, apontam as diretrizes do caminho que deverá consolidar a ética formativa ou social, enquanto solução histórica para o alcance de princípios universais de orientação para a conduta humana. Essa trajetória efetiva-se graças ao exercício distintivamente humano da autorreflexão. Por meio dela, é possível cumprir nosso destino de manifestar, exteriorizar no tempo a energia do espírito absoluto que nos é imanente. Diante desse panorama, este texto procura sublinhar como é possível que tal pedagogia possa respeitar sua tarefa universal de orientar historicamente o desenvolvimento das novas gerações, sem dirigir o processo por meio de fins rígida e fixamente estabelecidos.

Gadamer's transformation of hermeneutics : from Dilthey to Heidegger

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show how Gadamer's hermeneutics synthesizes the insights of both Heidegger and Dilthey in order to introduce a new hermeneutics. Gadamer's hermeneutics is based not only on the priority of ontology, as Heidegger insists, and neither is it only a product of life which can be objectively understood through study and rigorous method, as Dilthey suggests. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is the bringing together of ontology in terms of history. By this synthesis Gadamer not only places himself within the context of a Lebensphilosophie, but also shows that it is within language that Being can be disclosed according to a lived context. Throughout this paper the philosophies ofDilthey and Heidegger are explicated within a historical context as to bring out how, and why, Gadamer sees the need to surpass these philosophies. Through Gadamer's philosophy of play and the game, language, the dialogical model, application, and the fusion of horizons we can see how Gadamer's critique and questioning of these two philosophy leads to his new hermeneutics. Special attention is paid to the role in which these two contrasting philosophies were used to complement each other in the product of Gadamer' s philosophical hermeneutics as it is presented in his major work Truth andMethod. For Gadamer, the task of understanding is never complete. Therefore, his hermeneutics remains a dynamic structure with which we can always question the past and our traditions. This paper seeks to show his philosophical movements within these questions

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Dilthey: The hermeneutics of life and the universal aspirations of pedagogy

Dilthey claimed that first psychology and then hermeneutics played the foundational role for his philosophy of life, whose main practical goal is to develop a pedagogy or theory of education. Pedagogy needs help from h ethics to establish its ends, and from psychology to indicate it means. This paper intends to show the relationship between Dilthey's hermeneutics of life and his pedagogy. Dilthey's philosophy of life, in so far it adopts the hermeneutical procedure, engages in the understanding of or the search for the meaning of human socio-historical creations, by adopting a special type of relationship between parts and whole. It is exactly within this hermeneutical balance that we propose to extinguish any indication of a rupture, breach, or contradiction between the quest for universal principles of human behavior and :Dilthey's defense of the impossibility of constructing human moral tasks by means of universal principles. Dilthey began his ethics lectures at the University of Berlin in 1890. These lectures, published in 1958 by Herman Nohl in volume X of Dilthey's collected works, indicate the direction of the trajectory by which formative or social ethics are consolidated as a historical solution for reaching universal principles that can guide human purposes. This trajectory is a result of the distinctively human exercise of self-reflection, by means of which we can fulfill our destiny of manifesting and exteriorizing in time the immanent energy of the absolute spirit. We wish to show that it is possible that such a pedagogy can respect its universal task of orienting the historical development of the younger generation without directing this process by means of fixed and rigid aims.

Dilthey: hermenêutica da vida e universalidade pedagógica

Dilthey apontou primeiro a psicologia e depois a hermenêutica como tendo papel fundamental para sua filosofia da vida, cujo principal objetivo prático é desenvolver a pedagogia ou teoria geral da educação. A pedagogia necessita da ajuda da ética para estabelecer seus fins e da psicologia para indicar seus meios. Este texto tem por objetivo mostrar a relação entre hermenêutica da vida e pedagogia, para Dilthey. A filosofia da vida do autor, ao adotar procedimento hermenêutico, exercita a compreensão ou busca de significado das criações humanas histórico-sociais por um tipo especial de relação entre as partes e o todo. É justamente dentro desse balanço hermenêutico que propomos apagar qualquer vestígio de ruptura, brecha ou contradição entre a busca de princípios universais da ação humana e a impossibilidade de construção da tarefa humana moral, por meio de princípios universais. Só em 1890 Dilthey deu início às conhecidas conferências sobre ética, na Universidade de Berlim. Tais conferências, publicadas em 1958 por Herman Nohl, no volume X das Obras Completas, apontam as diretrizes do caminho que deverá consolidar a ética formativa ou social, enquanto solução histórica para o alcance de princípios universais de orientação para a conduta humana. Essa trajetória efetiva-se graças ao exercício distintivamente humano da autorreflexão. Por meio dela, é possível cumprir nosso destino de manifestar, exteriorizar no tempo a energia do espírito absoluto que nos é imanente. Diante desse panorama, este texto procura sublinhar como é possível que tal pedagogia possa respeitar sua tarefa universal de orientar historicamente o desenvolvimento das novas gerações, sem dirigir o processo por meio de fins rígida e fixamente estabelecidos.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 636 - "The Relation between Philosophy and Sociology in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey" und "Autoritärer Staat" (p. IX 12.1-7-IX 13.1-7)

"The Relation between Psychology and Sociology in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey" (GS 4, S. 352-370), veröffentlicht in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science VIII, 1939/40, S. 430-443, Vortragstext englische Fassung, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 18 Blatt, deutsche Fassung, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 20 Blatt; Vorlage zur Eröffnung der Vortragsveranstaltung, Typoskript, 1 Blatt; Über das Verhältnis Diltheys zu Max Weber; über die Widersprüche bei Dilthey; zur Logik geisteswissenschaftlichen Verstehens (= Vorarbeiten zum Vortrag? Vorbereitungen zu Diskussionsbeiträgen?), a) englische Fassung, Typoskript, 5 Blatt, b) deutsche Fassung, Typoskript, 6 Blatt; N.N.: handschriftliche Notiz für die Diskussion, 1 Blatt; Exzerpte zum Werk Wilhelm Diltheys, Typoskripte, 12 Blatt; Zitate aus Schriften Wilhelm Diltheys, Typoskripte, 12 Blatt; Deutsche Übersetzung des Aufsatzes von Kurt Jürgen Huch und Alfred Schmidt, mit dem Titel: "Der Zusammenhang zwischen Psychologie und Soziologie im Werk Wilhelm Diltheys", veröffentlicht in: Max Horkheimer, "Kritische Theorie", Bd. II, 1968, S.273-291, Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 29 Blatt; "Autoritärer Staat" (GS 5, S. 293-319), Aufsatz, datiert: Frühjahr 1940, veröffentlicht als vervielfältigtes Typoskript in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis", herausgegeben vom Institut für Sozialforschung, Los Angeles 1942, S. 123-161;

Francisco Romero. Tres lecciones sobre Guillermo Dilthey en su Centenario

Fil: Torchia Estrada, Juan Carlos.