Predicate-based key exchange

We provide the first description of and security model for authenticated key exchange protocols with predicate-based authentication. In addition to the standard goal of session key security, our security model also provides for credential privacy: a participating party learns nothing more about the other party's credentials than whether they satisfy the given predicate. Our model also encompasses attribute-based key exchange since it is a special case of predicate-based key exchange.---------- We demonstrate how to realize a secure predicate-based key exchange protocol by combining any secure predicate-based signature scheme with the basic Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, providing an efficient and simple solution.

The Performance of Elliptic Curve Based Group Diffie-Hellman Protocols for Secure Group Communication over Ad Hoc Networks

The security of the two party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is currently based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). However, it can also be built upon the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). Most proposed secure group communication schemes employ the DLP-based Diffie-Hellman protocol. This paper proposes the ECDLP-based Diffie-Hellman protocols for secure group communication and evaluates their performance on wireless ad hoc networks. The proposed schemes are compared at the same security level with DLP-based group protocols under different channel conditions. Our experiments and analysis show that the Tree-based Group Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (TGECDH) protocol is the best in overall performance for secure group communication among the four schemes discussed in the paper. Low communication overhead, relatively low computation load and short packets are the main reasons for the good performance of the TGECDH protocol.

Automated proofs for Diffie–Hellman–based key exchanges

We present an automated verification method for security of Diffie–Hellman–based key exchange protocols. The method includes a Hoare-style logic and syntactic checking. The method is applied to protocols in a simplified version of the Bellare–Rogaway–Pointcheval model (2000). The security of the protocol in the complete model can be established automatically by a modular proof technique of Kudla and Paterson (2005).

Implementação e análise de desempenho dos protocolos de criptografia neural e Diffie-Hellman em sistemas RFID utilizando uma plataforma embarcada

RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) identifies object by using the radio frequency which is a non-contact automatic identification technique. This technology has shown its powerful practical value and potential in the field of manufacturing, retailing, logistics and hospital automation. Unfortunately, the key problem that impacts the application of RFID system is the security of the information. Recently, researchers have demonstrated solutions to security threats in RFID technology. Among these solutions are several key management protocols. This master dissertations presents a performance evaluation of Neural Cryptography and Diffie-Hellman protocols in RFID systems. For this, we measure the processing time inherent in these protocols. The tests was developed on FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array) platform with Nios IIr embedded processor. The research methodology is based on the aggregation of knowledge to development of new RFID systems through a comparative analysis between these two protocols. The main contributions of this work are: performance evaluation of protocols (Diffie-Hellman encryption and Neural) on embedded platform and a survey on RFID security threats. According to the results the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is more suitable for RFID systems

Computationally sound automated proofs of cryptographic schemes

Proving security of cryptographic schemes, which normally are short algorithms, has been known to be time-consuming and easy to get wrong. Using computers to analyse their security can help to solve the problem. This thesis focuses on methods of using computers to verify security of such schemes in cryptographic models. The contributions of this thesis to automated security proofs of cryptographic schemes can be divided into two groups: indirect and direct techniques. Regarding indirect ones, we propose a technique to verify the security of public-key-based key exchange protocols. Security of such protocols has been able to be proved automatically using an existing tool, but in a noncryptographic model. We show that under some conditions, security in that non-cryptographic model implies security in a common cryptographic one, the Bellare-Rogaway model [11]. The implication enables one to use that existing tool, which was designed to work with a different type of model, in order to achieve security proofs of public-key-based key exchange protocols in a cryptographic model. For direct techniques, we have two contributions. The first is a tool to verify Diffie-Hellmanbased key exchange protocols. In that work, we design a simple programming language for specifying Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange algorithms. The language has a semantics based on a cryptographic model, the Bellare-Rogaway model [11]. From the semantics, we build a Hoare-style logic which allows us to reason about the security of a key exchange algorithm, specified as a pair of initiator and responder programs. The other contribution to the direct technique line is on automated proofs for computational indistinguishability. Unlike the two other contributions, this one does not treat a fixed class of protocols. We construct a generic formalism which allows one to model the security problem of a variety of classes of cryptographic schemes as the indistinguishability between two pieces of information. We also design and implement an algorithm for solving indistinguishability problems. Compared to the two other works, this one covers significantly more types of schemes, but consequently, it can verify only weaker forms of security.

Towards a provably secure DoS-Resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy

Just Fast Keying (JFK) is a simple, efficient and secure key exchange protocol proposed by Aiello et al. (ACM TISSEC, 2004). JFK is well known for its novel design features, notably its resistance to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Using Meadows’ cost-based framework, we identify a new DoS vulnerability in JFK. The JFK protocol is claimed secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. We show that security of the JFK protocol, when reusing ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys, appears to require the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption in the random oracle model. We propose a new variant of JFK that avoids the identified DoS vulnerability and provides perfect forward secrecy even under the DDH assumption, achieving the full security promised by the JFK protocol.

Post-quantum key exchange for the TLS protocol from the ring learning with errors problem

Lattice-based cryptographic primitives are believed to offer resilience against attacks by quantum computers. We demonstrate the practicality of post-quantum key exchange by constructing cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that provide key exchange based on the ring learning with errors (R-LWE) problem, we accompany these cipher suites with a rigorous proof of security. Our approach ties lattice-based key exchange together with traditional authentication using RSA or elliptic curve digital signatures: the post-quantum key exchange provides forward secrecy against future quantum attackers, while authentication can be provided using RSA keys that are issued by today's commercial certificate authorities, smoothing the path to adoption. Our cryptographically secure implementation, aimed at the 128-bit security level, reveals that the performance price when switching from non-quantum-safe key exchange is not too high. With our R-LWE cipher suites integrated into the Open SSL library and using the Apache web server on a 2-core desktop computer, we could serve 506 RLWE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 HTTPS connections per second for a 10 KiB payload. Compared to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, this means an 8 KiB increased handshake size and a reduction in throughput of only 21%. This demonstrates that provably secure post-quantum key-exchange can already be considered practical.

A public key cryptosystem based on block upper triangular matrices

We propose a public key cryptosystem based on block upper triangular matrices. This system is a variant of the Discrete Logarithm Problem with elements in a finite group, capable of increasing the difficulty of the problem while maintaining the key size. We also propose a key exchange protocol that guarantees that both parties share a secret element of this group and a digital signature scheme that provides data authenticity and integrity.

Password Based Server Aided Key Exchange

We propose a new password-based 3-party protocol with a formal security proof in the standard model. Under reasonable assumptions we show that our new protocol is more efficient than the recent protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval (FC 2005), proven in the random oracle model. We also observe some limitations in the model due to Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval (PKC 2005) for proving security of such protocols.

Universally composable contributory group key exchange

We treat the security of group key exchange (GKE) in the universal composability (UC) framework. Analyzing GKE protocols in the UC framework naturally addresses attacks by malicious insiders. We define an ideal functionality for GKE that captures contributiveness in addition to other desired security goals. We show that an efficient two-round protocol securely realizes the proposed functionality in the random oracle model. As a result, we obtain the most efficient UC-secure contributory GKE protocol known.