Endogenous transportation technology in a cournot differential game with intraindustry trade

We investigate a dynamic Cournot duopoly with intraindustry trade, where firms invest in R&D to reduce the level of iceberg transportation costs. We adopt both open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium concepts, showing that a unique (saddle point) steady state exists in both cases. In the open-loop model, optimal investments and the resulting efficiency of transportation technology are independent of the relative size of the two countries. On the contrary, in the closed-loop case firms’ R&D incentives are driven by the relative size of the two countries. Policy implications are also evaluated.

A Differential Game Described by a Hyperbolic System

An antagonistic differential game of hyperbolic type with a separable linear vector pay-off function is considered. The main result is the description of all ε-Slater saddle points consisting of program strategies, program ε-Slater maximins and minimaxes for each ε ∈ R^N > for this game. To this purpose, the considered differential game is reduced to find the optimal program strategies of two multicriterial problems of hyperbolic type. The application of approximation enables us to relate these problems to a problem of optimal program control, described by a system of ordinary differential equations, with a scalar pay-off function. It is found that the result of this problem is not changed, if the players use positional or program strategies. For the considered differential game, it is interesting that the ε-Slater saddle points are not equivalent and there exist two ε-Slater saddle points for which the values of all components of the vector pay-off function at one of them are greater than the respective components of the other ε-saddle point.

Differential Games of Mixed Type with Control and Stopping Times

We study a zero sum differential game of mixed type where each player uses both control and stopping times. Under certain conditions we show that the value function for this problem exists and is the unique viscosity solution of the corresponding variational inequalities. We also show the existence of saddle point equilibrium for a special case of differential game.

Optimal game theoretic distributed control methodologies in small scale power systems

This dissertation presents the competitive control methodologies for small-scale power system (SSPS). A SSPS is a collection of sources and loads that shares a common network which can be isolated during terrestrial disturbances. Micro-grids, naval ship electric power systems (NSEPS), aircraft power systems and telecommunication system power systems are typical examples of SSPS. The analysis and development of control systems for small-scale power systems (SSPS) lacks a defined slack bus. In addition, a change of a load or source will influence the real time system parameters of the system. Therefore, the control system should provide the required flexibility, to ensure operation as a single aggregated system. In most of the cases of a SSPS the sources and loads must be equipped with power electronic interfaces which can be modeled as a dynamic controllable quantity. The mathematical formulation of the micro-grid is carried out with the help of game theory, optimal control and fundamental theory of electrical power systems. Then the micro-grid can be viewed as a dynamical multi-objective optimization problem with nonlinear objectives and variables. Basically detailed analysis was done with optimal solutions with regards to start up transient modeling, bus selection modeling and level of communication within the micro-grids. In each approach a detail mathematical model is formed to observe the system response. The differential game theoretic approach was also used for modeling and optimization of startup transients. The startup transient controller was implemented with open loop, PI and feedback control methodologies. Then the hardware implementation was carried out to validate the theoretical results. The proposed game theoretic controller shows higher performances over traditional the PI controller during startup. In addition, the optimal transient surface is necessary while implementing the feedback controller for startup transient. Further, the experimental results are in agreement with the theoretical simulation. The bus selection and team communication was modeled with discrete and continuous game theory models. Although players have multiple choices, this controller is capable of choosing the optimum bus. Next the team communication structures are able to optimize the players’ Nash equilibrium point. All mathematical models are based on the local information of the load or source. As a result, these models are the keys to developing accurate distributed controllers.

A control theoretic approach to solve a constrained uplink power dynamic game

This paper addresses an uplink power control dynamic game where we assume that each user battery represents the system state that changes with time following a discrete-time version of a differential game. To overcome the complexity of the analysis of a dynamic game approach we focus on the concept of Dynamic Potential Games showing that the game can be solved as an equivalent Multivariate Optimum Control Problem. The solution of this problem is quite interesting because different users split the activity in time, avoiding higher interferences and providing a long term fairness.

Aircraft pursuit-evasion problems with variable speeds

Aircraft pursuit-evasion encounters in a plane with variable speeds are analysed as a differential game. An engagement-dependent coordinate system confers open-loop optimality on the game. Each aircraft's optimal motion can be represented by extremel trajectory maps which are independent of role, adversary and capture radius. These maps are used in two different ways to construct the feedback solution. Some examples are given to illustrate these features. The paper draws on earlier results and surveys several existing papers on the subject.

Optimal advertisement-innovation mix for maximizing the discounted flow of profit

Due to boom in telecommunications market, there is hectic competition among the cellular handset manufacturers. As cellular manufacturing industry operates in an oligopoly framework, often price-rigidity leads to non-price wars. The handset manufacturing firms indulge in product innovation and also advertise their products in order to achieve their objective of maximizing discounted flow of profit. It is of interest to see what would be the optimal advertisement-innovation mix that would maximize the discounted How of profit for the firms. We used differential game theory to solve this problem. We adopted the open-loop solution methodology. We experimented for various scenarios over a 30 period horizon and derived interesting managerial insights.

The pursuit-evasion problem of two aircraft in a horizontal plane

The pursuit-evasion problem of two aircraft in a horizontal plane is modelled as a zerosum differential game with capture time as payoff. The aircraft are modelled as point masses with thrust and bank angle controls. The games of kind and degree for this differential game are solved.

An integrated estimation/guidance approach for seeker-less interceptors

This paper addresses the problem of intercepting highly maneuverable threats using seeker-less interceptors that operate in the command guidance mode. These systems are more prone to estimation errors than standard seeker-based systems. In this paper, an integrated estimation/guidance (IEG) algorithm, which combines interactive multiple model (IMM) estimator with differential game guidance law (DGL), is proposed for seeker-less interception. In this interception scenario, the target performs an evasive bang-bang maneuver, while the sensor has noisy measurements and the interceptor is subject to acceleration bound. The IMM serves as a basis for the synthesis of efficient filters for tracking maneuvering targets and reducing estimation errors. The proposed game-based guidance law for two-dimensional interception, later extended to three-dimensional interception scenarios, is used to improve the endgame performance of the command-guided seeker-less interceptor. The IMM scheme and an optimal selection of filters, to cater to various maneuvers that are expected during the endgame, are also described. Furthermore, a chatter removal algorithm is introduced, thus modifying the differential game guidance law (modified DGL). A comparison between modified DGL guidance law and conventional proportional navigation guidance law demonstrates significant improvement in miss distance in a pursuer-evader scenario. Simulation results are also presented for varying flight path angle errors. A numerical study is provided which demonstrates the performance of the combined interactive multiple model with game-based guidance law (IMM/DGL). Simulation study is also carried out for combined IMM and modified DGL (IMM/modified DGL) which exhibits the superior performance and viability of the algorithm reducing the chattering phenomenon. The results are illustrated by an extensive Monte Carlo simulation study in the presence of estimation errors.

Robust Dynamic Pricing Over Infinite Horizon in The Presence of Model Uncertainty( 2* Journal)

This paper studies a problem of dynamic pricing faced by a retailer with limited inventory, uncertain about the demand rate model, aiming to maximize expected discounted revenue over an infinite time horizon. The retailer doubts his demand model which is generated by historical data and views it as an approximation. Uncertainty in the demand rate model is represented by a notion of generalized relative entropy process, and the robust pricing problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game. The pricing policy is obtained through the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation. The existence and uniqueness of the solution of the HJI equation is shown and a verification theorem is proved to show that the solution of the HJI equation is indeed the value function of the pricing problem. The results are illustrated by an example with exponential nominal demand rate.

Essais en économie de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles sous incertitude

Cette thèse comprend trois essais en économie de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles sous incertitude. Le premier essai propose un modèle de jeu différentiel qui analyse la pollution globale à travers la quête à l’hégémonie politique entre pays. Le second essai utilise des données boursières pour estimer une version stochastique de la règle de Hotelling et ainsi inférer sur le rôle des ressources naturelles non renouvelables dans la diversification du risque. Le troisième essai montre comment la prise en compte des perspectives futures modifie la règle de Hotelling dans un contexte de diversification du risque.

Essais sur des questions internationales en économie des ressources naturelles

Cette thèse s'articule autour de trois essais portant sur des questions internationales en économie des ressources naturelles. Le premier essai examine la production et l'échange des ressources non-renouvelables dans un modèle spatial et souligne le rôle de la superficie des pays et du coût des transports dans la détermination du sens de l'échange. Le deuxième essai considère le tarif d'extraction de la rente de rareté liée aux ressources naturelles non-renouvelables avec le modèle spatial développé dans premier essai. Le cadre spatial (plus général) permet de représenter des pays qui sont à la fois importateurs et producteurs de la ressource, ce qui n'est pas possible dans les modèles traditionnels de commerce international où les pays sont traités comme des points (sans dimension). Le troisième essai aborde la question des droits de propriétés sur les zones maritimes et examine l'allocation d'une population de pêcheurs entre les activités productives et non-productives dans une communauté côtière. Le premier chapitre propose un modèle spatial de commerce international des ressources non-renouvelables. Le cadre spatial considère explicitement la différence de taille géographique (superficie) entre les pays et permet ainsi de tenir compte du fait que les gisements naturels et leurs utilisateurs soient dispersés dans l'espace, même à l'intérieur d'un pays. En utilisant un modèle spatial à la Hotelling, nous examinons l'évolution dans le temps du sens de l'échange entre deux pays (ou régions) qui diffèrent du point de vue de leur technologie de production, de leur superficie et de leur dotation en gisement d'une ressource naturelle non-renouvelable. Le chapitre met en évidence le rôle de la taille géographique dans la détermination du sens de l'échange, à côté des explications traditionnelles que sont l'avantage comparatif et les dotations des facteurs. Notre analyse est fondamentalement différente des autres contributions dans la littérature sur le commerce international des ressources naturelles parce qu'elle souligne l'importance de la taille géographique et du coût de transport par rapport à d'autres facteurs dans la détermination des flux de ressource à l'équilibre. Le coût unitaire de transport joue un rôle capital pour déterminer si la différence de superficie entre les pays influence le sens de l'échange à l'équilibre plus que les autres facteurs. Le chapitre discute aussi du caractère régional des échanges qui a été observé pour certaines ressources telles que le minerai de fer et la bauxite. Le chapitre deux aborde la question de la répartition de la rente de rareté liée aux ressources naturelles non-renouvelables entre les pays producteurs et les pays consommateurs. Cette question a été abordée dans la littérature sous une hypothèse quelque peu restrictive. En effet, dans la plupart des travaux portant sur ce sujet le pays importateur est automatiquement considéré comme dépourvu de gisement et donc non producteur de la ressource. Pourtant la réalité est qu'il existe des ressources pour lesquelles un pays est à la fois producteur et importateur. Le cadre d'analyse de ce second essai est le modèle spatial développé dans le premier essai, qui permet justement qu'un pays puisse être à la fois importateur et producteur de la ressource. Le pays importateur détermine alors simultanément le tarif optimal et le taux d'extraction de son propre stock. Nous montrons que le tarif optimal croît au taux d'intérêt et de ce fait, ne crée aucune distorsion sur le sentier d'extraction de la ressource. Le tarif optimal permet de récupérer toute la rente lorsque le pays exportateur ne consomme pas la ressource. Néanmoins, la possibilité pour le pays exportateur de consommer une partie de son stock limite la capacité du pays importateur à récupérer la rente chez le pays exportateur. La présence de gisements de la ressource dans le pays importateur réduit la rente du pays exportateur et de ce fait renforce la capacité du pays importateur à récupérer la rente chez le pays exportateur. Le tarif initial est une fonction décroissante du stock de ressource dans le pays importateur. Cet essai aborde également la question de la cohérence dynamique du tarif obtenu avec la stratégie en boucle ouverte. Le troisième chapitre examine un problème d'allocation de l'effort entre les activités productives (par exemple la pêche) et les activités non productives (par exemple la piraterie maritime) dans une population de pêcheurs. La répartition de la population entre les activités de pêche et la piraterie est déterminée de façon endogène comme une conséquence du choix d'occupation. Nous établissons l'existence d'une multiplicité d'équilibres et mettons en évidence la possibilité d'une trappe de piraterie, c'est-à-dire un équilibre stable où une partie de la population est engagée dans les actes de piraterie. Le modèle permet d'expliquer l'augmentation significative des attaques de piraterie dans le Golfe d'Aden au cours des dernières années. Le chapitre discute aussi des différents mécanismes pour combattre la piraterie et souligne le rôle crucial des droits de propriété.

Dynamic advertising under vertical product differentiation

We investigate a dynamic advertising model where product quality is endogenous. In the differential game between single-product firms, there exists a parameter range where the low-quality firm uses a more efficient advertising technology and earns higher profits than the rival. Moreover, we show that equilibrium qualities are the same under duopoly, multiproduct monopoly, and social planning, the only distortion being concerned with the output levels.

Inter-firm knowledge diffusion, market power, and welfare

We propose an infinite-horizon quantity-setting differential game with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to analyze the optimal management decisions affecting the evolution of the stock of know-how, and, in turn, the dynamics of productive efficiency. Specifically, we study the long run impact of inter-firm knowledge diffusion on market power, i.e. the ability of a firm to raise the price above the marginal cost, and welfare. We consider two types of processes through which knowledge is acquired: (i) passive learning, or learning-by-doing, where managers do not actively invest in information and (ii) active learning, or learning-by-investing, where managers acquire new and additional information through specific investments in human capital. We show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion reduces market power; under (ii), knowledge diffusion reduces market power as long as learning spillovers are sufficiently important. From a welfare viewpoint, we also show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion is always welfare-enhancing; under (ii), weak spillovers are required in order for knowledge diffusion to be welfare-enhancing.

Essays in Environmental Economics

This dissertation comprises four essays on the topic of environmental economics and industrial organization. In the first essay, we develop a two-country world differential game model with a polluting firm in each country to investigate the equilibrium of the game between firms when they decide to trade or not and to see under which conditions social welfare coincides with the market equilibrium. In the second essay, we built a model where firms strategically choose whether to participate in an auction/lottery to attain pollution permits, or instead invest in green R&D, to show that, somewhat counterintuitively, a desirable side effect of the auction is in fact that of fostering environmental R&D in an admissible range of the model parameters. The third essay investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries when pollution spillovers are asymmetric to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using pollution taxes and tariffs under trade liberalization. The fouth essay studies the profitability of exogenous output constraint in a differential game model with price dynamics under the feedback strategies.