Democratic Deficit in the EU : Towards Parliamentary Democracy?!

Nowadays, the western societies are based on parliamentary democracy. Therefore, weak legislative power of the European Parliament is alleged for the democratic deficit in the EU. How it can be possible that the parliamentary democracy which is practiced on the national level can be achieved beyond the nation-states without diminishing the democracy at the nation-states? If not, how legitimacy can be obtained so that the continued existence and expansion of the EU should be justified? Since expectations for democratization of the EU are still unmet, finding answers to the actual questions is a great appeal. The thesis will explore the fundamental debates and arguments contributing to the democracy in the EU through the parliaments. I will try to reflect to the different ways of thinking and the prospects of establishing parliamentary democracy beyond the nation states.

Análisis de las estrategias de cohesión territorial en la Unión Europea como instrumento para la gobernanza democrática a raíz de las ampliaciones del 2004 y 2007

En la Unión Europea la relación entre el desarrollo e identidad territorial permite fortalecer la gobernanza democrática en el proceso de ampliación en la medida en que las estrategias de cohesión territorial estén acompañadas por mecanismos de cooperación entre el gobierno local y las instituciones supranacionales que permitan la participación activa del ciudadano en dichos procesos.

Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung, Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit Michael Gehler = European integration from a historical experience, A Discussion with Michael Gehler. ZEI Discussion Paper C227, 2015

From 1995 to 1999 Monika Wulf-Mathies served as EU commissioner responsible for regional and cohesion policy. She tells us the story of the EU Commission under President Jacques Santer with regard to the historical development of the preparation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Union Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the EU-Eastern Enlargement. She touches also controversial aspects of the Santer Commission, which led to her collective demission in 1999. According to Wulf-Mathies the increase of EU's democracy deficit is result of an erosion process of the common institutions caused by the nation states which contributed to their weakness. The democratic substance of the union suffers because of the 'summarization' of the EU decision making processes. Monika Wulf-Mathies argues in favor of the community method, which needs revitalization. She proposes European democracy enforcement and transfers of the national budget und economy policies to EU bodies. This eyewitness talk offers an actual EU analysis as well as an assessment of the Santer Commission.

Federalism and democracy. The case of minority nations: a federalist deficit

In this chapter, after pointing out the different logics that lie behind the familiar ideas of democracy and federalism, I have dealt with the case of plurinational federal democracies. Having put forward a double criterion of an empirical nature with which to differentiate between the existence of minority nations within plurinational democracies (section 2), I suggest three theoretical criteria for the political accommodation of these democracies. In the following section, I show the agonistic nature of the normative discussion of the political accommodation of this kind of democracies, which bring monist and pluralist versions of the demos of the polity into conflict (section 3.1), as well as a number of conclusions which are the result of a comparative study of 19 federal and regional democracies using four analytical axes: the uninational/plurinational axis; the unitarianism-federalism axis; the centralisation-decentralisation axis; and the symmetry-asymmetry axis (section 3.2). This analysis reveals shortcomings in the constitutional recognition of national pluralism in federal and regional cases with a large number of federated units/regions with political autonomy; a lower degree of constitutional federalism and a greater asymmetry in the federated entities or regions of plurinational democracies. It also reveals difficulties to establish clear formulas in these democracies in order to encourage a “federalism of trust” based on the participation and protection of national minorities in the shared government of plurinational federations/regional states. Actually, there is a federal deficit in this kind polities according to normative liberal-democratic patterns and to what comparative analysis show. Finally, this chapter advocates the need for a greater normative and institutional refinement in plurinational federal democracies. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to introduce a deeper form of “ethical” pluralism -which displays normative agonistic trends, as well as a more “confederal/asymmetrical” perspective, congruent with the national pluralism of these kind of polities.

The European Union’s Democratic Deficit and Options for EU Democracy in the 21st Century. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No. 22, August 2014

The European Union (EU) is widely acknowledged as a successful example of economic and political integration of nation states today – a slate of democratic institutions such as the European Parliament have also been developed and European citizens now possess extensive political and civil rights by virtue of the introduction of European citizenship. Nevertheless, the EU is said to suffer from a so called “democratic deficit” even as it seeks deeper and closer integration. Decades of institutional design and elite closed-door decisions has taken its toll on the inclusion and integration of European citizens in social and political life, with widening socio-economic inequalities and the resurgence of extreme-right parties during in the wake of the debt crisis in the Eurozone. This paper attempts to evaluate the democratic development of the EU through the use of a process-oriented approach, and concludes at the end with discussions on the various options that the EU and its citizens can take to reform democratic processes and institutions in Europe.

Moving the EU from a Laggard to a Leader in Democracy Assistance: The Potential Role of the European Endowment for Democracy. CEPS Policy Brief No. 273, 15 June 2012

In their assessment of the proposed European Endowment for Democracy (EED), Hrant Kostanyan and Magdalena Nasieniak conclude that an instrument along the lines currently envisaged could and should take on the challenge to make the EU a truly committed, pro-active and effective leader of democracy assistance. A flexible and fast-track path of assessing needs and granting funds could become the most visible results of the EU’s assistance in this area, delivering almost immediate tangible results. They argue that the EED therefore needs to become an instrument free of nationally-driven decisions, European ‘turf wars’ and cumbersome bureaucracy.

Romanian politics: struggling with the grass roots and digging for democracy. EPIN Commentary No. 11, 29 August 2012

Romania was on a good trajectory to meet the European standards in democracy. This process began before the country’s accession to the EU in 2007 and has continued since thanks to the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The recent political turmoil has put in danger this trajectory. 2012 will continue to remain a very difficult year for Romania, economically and politically, especially in light of the referendum’s result invalidating the suspension of the President and the upcoming parliamentary elections due to take place at the end of this year. Now is time to restore the process of strengthening Romania’s democratic institutions and rule of law. There are important roles to be played in this process both by the Romanian political class and the European institutions.

The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU: Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism. CEPS Paperbacks. November 2013

This study examines the protection of fundamental rights, democracy and rule of law in the European Union, and the challenges that arise in reflecting on ways to strengthen EU competences in these contested terrains. It provides a ‘state of play’ and critical account of EU-level policy and legal mechanisms assessing the relationship between rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in the member states of the Union. The cross-cutting challenges affecting their uses, effective implementation and practical operability constitute a central point of the analysis. The study argues that the relationship between rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights is co-constitutive. Any future rule of law-related policy discussion in the EU should start from an understanding of the triangular relationship between these dimensions from the perspective of ‘democratic rule of law with fundamental rights’, i.e. the legally based rule of a democratic state that delivers fundamental rights. The three criteria are inherently and indivisibly interconnected, and interdependent on each of the others, and they cannot be separated without inflicting profound damage to the whole and changing its essential shape and configuration.

Quality of Democracy in Quadruple Helix Structures: The Quality of Democracy in the United States and in Austria, Challenges and Opportunities for Development. ACES Working Papers, 2012

This contribution focuses on analyzing the quality of democracy of the United States (U.S.) and of Austria by using a comparative approach. Even though comparisons are not the only possible or legitimate method of research, this analysis is based on the opinion that comparisons provide crucial analytical perspectives and learning opportunities. Following is the proposition, put directly forward: national political systems (political systems) are comprehensively understood only by using an international comparative approach. International comparisons (of country-based systems) are common (see the status of comparative politics, for example in Sodaro, 2004). Comparisons do not have to be based necessarily on national systems alone, but can also be carried out using “within”-comparisons inside (or beyond) sub-units or regional sub-national systems, for instance the individual provinces in the case of Austria (Campbell, 2007, p. 382).

The sense and nonsense of Eurozone level Democracy. Egmont Paper No. 70, October 2014

The democratic functioning of the EU is frequently called into question. Increasingly, the focus of this criticism is the perceived lack of legitimacy in eurozone policymaking. The eurozone has gained a firmer grip on national policymaking in recent years, but has not adapted its democratic structure to reflect this. To tackle this problem, European and national policymakers have committed to improving the eurozone’s legitimacy and accountability. One of the rare concrete proposals by policymakers is the institution of parliamentary control that deals specifically with eurozone matters. This Egmont Paper examines whether it would be beneficial to have eurozone level democracy. This is defined as parliamentary scrutiny of, by and for the eurozone. It would deal with issues that solely concern the eurozone, and decisions would be made solely by parliamentarians from the eurozone.

Democracy Promotion and the EU, US Formulas: Photo Opportunities or Potential. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 5, May 2014

Why do we think more of the United States (US) than the European Union (EU) in discussing Afghani or Iraqi democratization, and EU more than US when it is East European? Should not democratization be the same? A comparative study asks what democracy has historically meant in the two regions, how democratization has been spelled out, why instruments utilized differ, and democracy within global leadership contexts. Neither treats democracy as a vital interest, but differences abound: (a) While the US shifted from relative bottom-up to top-down democracy, the EU added bottom-up to its top-down approach; (b) the US interprets democracy as the ends of other policy interests, the EU treats it as the means to other goals; and (c) flexible US instruments contrast with rigid EU counterparts. Among the implications: (a) the 4-stage US approach reaches globally wider than EU’s multi-dimensional counterpart, but EU’s regional approach sinks deeper than the US’s; (b) human rights find better EU than US anchors; (c) whereas the US approach makes intergovernmental actions the sine qua non of democratization, EU’s intergovernmental, transnational, and supranational admixture promotes quid pro quo dynamics and incremental growth; and (d) competitive democratization patterns creates lock-ins for both recipient and supplier countries.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

Social Democracy, Globalization and Governance: Why is there no European Left Program in the EU? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.6, April 2000

This paper addresses globalization and governance in the EU by attempting to generate some plausible hypotheses that might explain the policy choices of the 12 out of 15 European democratic left governments. With all of the discussion in recent years of a democratic deficit, and then need to maintain a "social Europe," why have these governments not produced more explicit left-wing policies? It suggests three possible hypotheses to account for this apparently mysterious outcome. Hypothesis #1: They want to but they can't. Hypothesis #2: They don't want to because they aren't really left anymore. Hypothesis #3: They could, but they all are suffering from a fundamental failure of imagination. The paper explores each of these hypotheses in two ways. First it examines the initial years of the Schröder government in Germany apparently, pursuing each of these three hypotheses and different times during this period. Then it looks more systematically and comparatively and each of the three hypotheses by including analysis both of Germany and several other EU member states. The larger goal of this work is to provoke discussion and research on what role left political movements can actually play. Is it even reasonable to expect such a group of nation states to develop innovative forms of cross-national governance? Or are new and/or revised forms of representation and governance beyond traditional nation-state models.

An EU mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 91/April 2016 Thursday, 21 April 2016

The European Union is founded on a set of common principles of democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union. Whereas future Member States are vetted for their compliance with these values before they accede to the Union, no similar method exists to supervise adherence to these foundational principles after accession. EU history proved that this ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ was far from theoretical. EU Member State governments’ adherence to foundational EU values cannot be taken for granted. Violations may happen in individual cases, or in a systemic way, which may go as far as overthrowing the rule of law. Against this background the European Parliament initiated a Legislative Own-Initiative Report on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and proposed among others a Scoreboard on the basis of common and objective indicators by which foundational values can be measured. This Research Paper assesses the need and possibilities for the establishment of an EU Scoreboard, as well as its related social, economic, legal and political ‘costs and benefits’.