International debt deleveraging

I provide a framework for understanding debt deleveraging in a group of financiallyintegrated countries. During an episode of international deleveraging world consumptiondemand is depressed and the world interest rate is low, reflecting a high propensity to save.If exchange rates are allowed to float, deleveraging countries can depreciate their nominalexchange rate to increase production and mitigate the fall in consumption associatedwith debt reduction. The key insight of the paper is that in a monetary union thischannel of adjustment is shut off, and therefore the falls in consumption demand and inthe world interest rate are amplified. Hence, monetary unions are especially prone tohit the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and enter a liquidity trap duringdeleveraging. In a liquidity trap deleveraging gives rise to a union-wide recession, which isparticularly severe in high-debt countries. The model suggests several policy interventionsthat mitigate the negative impact of deleveraging on output in monetary unions.

Adjusting to external imbalances within the EMU, the case of Portugal

From 1995 to 2010 Portugal has accumulated a negative international asset position of 110 percent of GDP. In a developed and aging economy the number is astonishing and any argument to consider it sustainable must rely on extremely favorable forecasts on growth. Portuguese policy options are reduced in number: no autonomous monetary policy, no currency to devaluate, and limited discretion in changing fiscal deficits and government debt. To start the necessary deleveraging a remaining possible policy is a budget-neutral change of the tax structure that increases private saving and net exports. An increase in the VAT and a decrease in the employer’s social security contribution tax can achieve the desired outcome in the short run if they are complemented with wage moderation. To obtain a substantial improvement in competitiveness and a large decrease in consumption, the changes in the tax rates have to be large. While a precise quantitative assessment is difficult, the initial increase in the effective VAT rate needed to allow the social security tax to decrease by 16 percentage points (pp) is approximately 10 pp. Such a large increase in the effective VAT rate could be obtained by raising most of the reduced VAT rates to the new general VAT rate of 23 percent. The empirical analysis shows that over time the suggested tax swap could generate surpluses and improve the trade balance. A temporary version of the suggested tax-swap has the attractiveness to achieve a sharper increase in the private saving rate maintaining the short run gains in competitiveness. Finally, the temporary version of the fiscal devaluation could be the basis for an automatic stabilizer to external imbalances within a monetary union.Portugal has been running large current account deficits every year since 1995. These deficits have accumulated to an astonishing 110 percent of GDP negative external asset position. The sustainability of such a large external position is questionable and must rely on fantastic productivity growth expectations. The recent global financial crisis appears to have anticipated the international investors reality check on those future expectations with the result of a large increase in the cost of external financing. Today the rebalancing of the current account through an increase in national savings and an improvement in competitiveness must be at the top of the Portuguese authorities “to do” list as the cost of a pull out from international investors is of the order of 10% of GDP. The external rebalancing is difficult as the degrees of freedom of the Portuguese authorities are limited in number: they have no autonomous monetary policy, no currency to devaluate, and little discretion in fiscal policy as deficit limits and debt targets are set by the Stability Growth Pact and the postcrisis consensus on medium-term fiscal consolidation. One possibility that remains is to change the fiscal policy mix for a given budget deficit. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of a “fiscal devaluation”1 obtained through a tax swap between employers’ social security contributions and taxes on consumption2. The paper begins by illustrating Portugal’s current account evolution during the euro period. The second section section lays out a model to offer a qualitative assessment of the dynamic outcomes of the the tax swap. I show that the suggested tax swap can in theory achieve the desired outcomes in terms of competitiveness and consumption if complemented with moderation (stickiness) in wages. I also study the effects of a temporary version of the tax swap and show that it achieves a sharper improvement in the current account that accelerate the rebalancing. The third section moves to the empirical analysis and estimates the likely effects of the tax swap for the Portuguese economy. The fourth section concludes.

Portuguese banks and the economic adjustment programme: balance sheet adjustments and impact on profitability

Double Degree. A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics and a Masters Degree in Finance from Louvain School of Management

The effectiveness of the “Processo Especial de Revitalização” as an instrument of corporate restructuring in the context of the current economic crisis

This work project intends to evaluate the effectiveness of the Portuguese Government’s strategy to promote the orderly deleveraging of the corporate sector in the context of the current economic crisis. The recommendations of the Troika and the commitments assumed under the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Government in 2011 required the creation of formal processes to avoid disorderly deleveraging. Conclusions and recommendations were drawn based on past experiences of large-scale corporate restructuring strategies in other countries and on the analysis of financial and statistical data on companies applying for “Programa Especial de Revitalização”.

Is the Basel III Leverage Ratio countercyclical? A study for Portuguese banks

This work analyses how the leverage ratio behaves through the cycle, vis-à-vis other capital ratios. For a sample of the largest Portuguese banks, the Basel III leverage ratio is indeed countercyclical. This result is relevant from a regulatory perspective, since the introduction of a limit on the leverage ratio will function as a restriction in the banks’ balance sheet size, reducing the economic costs associated with the excessive growth of leverage in periods of economic expansion followed by aggressive deleveraging in the downturn. However, one cannot exclude that restrictions on banks’ leverage incentivize its transference to less regulated intermediaries.

Basel III: The impact of new capital requirements on profitability of Portuguese Banks

This empirical study aims to explore the impact of increased capital ratio requirements, on the ROE of the Portuguese banking sector. The paper employs both a quantitative- and qualitative approach, with the qualitative approach as the main method of research. The method adopted to conduct the qualitative research was semi structured elite interviews with banking executives. Higher capital requirements decrease the ROE of banks in Portugal, but huge impairments charges, macroeconomic factors and increased costs of deposits are clearly the dominant reasons for the reduced levels of ROE the past years. Among the measures taken to increase capital ratios, reduction of RWAs and non-core assets have been the main focus, but the issuance of CoCos is regarded as the most expensive measure due to high interest payments. However, the CoCos will not have any effect on the ROE in the long term. It is difficult to draw any conclusions on the impact of more equity in the balance sheet on the ROE of Portuguese banks, as many banks currently don’t generate enough money to pay back on shareholders´ investments.

Estado situacional de los modelos basados en agentes y su impacto en la investigación organizacional

En un mundo hiperconectado, dinámico y cargado de incertidumbre como el actual, los métodos y modelos analíticos convencionales están mostrando sus limitaciones. Las organizaciones requieren, por tanto, herramientas útiles que empleen tecnología de información y modelos de simulación computacional como mecanismos para la toma de decisiones y la resolución de problemas. Una de las más recientes, potentes y prometedoras es el modelamiento y la simulación basados en agentes (MSBA). Muchas organizaciones, incluidas empresas consultoras, emplean esta técnica para comprender fenómenos, hacer evaluación de estrategias y resolver problemas de diversa índole. Pese a ello, no existe (hasta donde conocemos) un estado situacional acerca del MSBA y su aplicación a la investigación organizacional. Cabe anotar, además, que por su novedad no es un tema suficientemente difundido y trabajado en Latinoamérica. En consecuencia, este proyecto pretende elaborar un estado situacional sobre el MSBA y su impacto sobre la investigación organizacional.

Household Debt in Europe’s Periphery: The dangers of a prolonged recession. ECRI Commentary No. 12, 22 November 2012

The second-dip recession in Europe’s periphery has created a poisonous mix, which risks threatening further the financial system and the economy. Against this background, this ECRI Commentary argues that time matters in the household deleveraging cycle and that a swift recovery is one of its most vital parts. The paper also assesses the extent to which self-feeding phenomena related to household debt have already materialised and evaluates the risks for countries that have so far been spared their full effects. It also offers a theoretical policy response towards a more sustainable household credit sector and overall economic recovery.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.

Capital flows to Latin America: first quarter 2004

Includes bibliography

Europe's growth problem (and what to do about it). Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/03, April 2013

The issue: The European Union's pre-crisis growth performance was disappointing enough, but the performance has been even more dismal since the onset of the crisis. Weak growth is undermining private and public deleveraging,and is fuelling continued banking fragility. Persistently high unemployment is eroding skills, discouraging labour market participation and undermining the EU’s long-term growth potential. Low overall growth is making it much tougher for the hard-hit economies in southern Europe to recover competitiveness and regain control of their public finances. Stagnation would reduce the attractiveness of Europe for investment. Under these conditions, Europe's social models are bound to prove unsustainable. Policy Challenge: The European Union's weak long-term growth potential and unsatisfactory recovery from the crisis represent a major policy challenge. Over and above the structural reform agenda, which vitally important, bold policy action is needed. The priority is to get bank credit going. Banking problems need to be assessed properly and bank resolution and recapitalisation should be pursued. Second, fostering the reallocation of factors to the most productive firms and the sectors that contribute to aggregate rebalancing is vital. Addressing intra-euro area competitiveness divergence is essential to support growth in southern Europe. Third, the speed of fiscal adjustment needs to be appropriate and EU funds should be front loaded to countries in deep recession, while the European Investment Bank should increase investment.

Sovereign debt and its restructuring framework in the Euro area. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/05, August 2013

To compensate for the inflexibility of fixed exchange rates, the euro area needs flexibility through a system of orderly debt restructuring. With virtually no room for macroeconomic manoeuvring since the crisis onset, fiscal austerity has been the main instrument for achieving reductions in public debt levels; but because austerity also weakens growth, public debt ratios have barely budged. Austerity has also implied continued high private debt ratios. And these debt burdens have perpetuated economic stasis. Economic theory,history, and the recent experience all call for a principled debt restructuring mechanism as an integral element of the euro area’s design. Sovereign debt should be recognised as equity (a residual claim on the sovereign), operationalised by the automatic lowering of the debt burden upon the breach of contractually-specified thresholds. Making debt more equity-like is also the way forward for speedy private deleveraging. This debt-equity swap principle is a needed shock absorber for the future but will also serve as the principle to deal with the overhang of ‘legacy’ debt.

The Sovereign Debt Crisis: Placing a curb on growth (updated edition). CEPS Paperbacks. September 2013

This book provides an update to the major 2012 study by the same authors on the dual role of the public sector as the provider of the ultimate riskless asset and, at the same time, the source of a potential major systemic risk. In this second edition, Brender and his colleagues concentrate again on the tension between the need for the public sector to sustain demand in the face of a deleveraging private sector and the longer-term challenges of sustainability for fiscal policy in the major developed economies of the US, Japan and the euro area. In short, their principal thesis is that sovereign debt is in crisis. This crisis is apparent in the euro area, but it is also real, if at present only latent, in the US and Japan. The book shows how this process has evolved in these three big developed economies – and how their policy choices impact on global financial markets.

Defining Europe's Capital Markets Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/12, 13 November 2014

The new European Commission has signalled that it will work to create a ‘capital markets union’. This is understood as an agenda to expand the non-bank part of Europe’s financial system, which is currently underdeveloped. The aim in the short term is to unlock credit provision as banks are deleveraging, and in the longer term, to favour a more diverse, competitive and resilient financial system. Direct regulation of individual non-bank market segments (such as securitisation, private placements or private equity) might be useful at the margin, but will not per se lead to significant capital markets development or the rebalancing of Europe’s financial system away from the current dominance by banks. To reach these goals, the capital markets union agenda must be broadened to address the framework conditions for the development of individual market segments. Six possible areas for policy initiative are, in increasing order of potential impact and political difficulty: regulation of securities and specific forms of intermediation; prudential regulation, especially of insurance companies and pension funds; regulation of accounting, auditing and financial transparency requirements that apply to companies that seek external finance; a supervisory framework for financial infrastructure firms, such as central counterparties, that supports market integration; partial harmonisation and improvement of insolvency and corporate restructuring frameworks;and partial harmonisation or convergence of tax policies that specifically affect financial investment.

Latvia and Greece: Less is more. CEPS Hi-level Brief, 12 February 2014

Despite considerable differences, there were also many similarities in economic performance between Latvia and Greece before their respective adjustment crises. After the immediate crisis, however, economic activity rebounded sharply in Latvia but continued to contract in Greece. This paper argues that this difference was due primarily to developments in credit. In Latvia credit growth fell sharply, and the economy was deleveraging aggressively by 2009. When the pace of deleveraging started to stabilise, the rebound in the credit impulse caused domestic demand growth to recover. Real GDP has increased about 20% since reaching its trough in the third quarter of 2009.