998 resultados para Defence sector
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Journal of Cleaner Production, nº 17, p. 36-52
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Journal of Environmental Management, nº 82 p. 410–432
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It is time for the EU member states to start collectively supervising non-EU FDI in Europe’s defence industries and infrastructures. This should be a prudent element of the nascent EDTIB and a way to maintain European security by encouraging greater coordination between the national supervisory frameworks.
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Progress in Industrial Ecology, An International Journal, nº 4(5), p. 363-381
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Summary. Financing research and development programmes have never been more expensive in Europe. Defence budgets are on the wane, international competition is fierce and high-end technologies are increasingly expensive. Europe’s defence-industrial base is under significant strain, and options are needed to fund elements of a sector that is still crucial to Europe’s security and industry. This Policy Brief argues that the European Investment Bank could play a much greater role in Europe’s defence sector. As a public-private institution the Bank could serve as a life-line to defence R&D, dual-use projects and support for SMEs, especially where regional clusters are involved.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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The European Neighbourhood Policy’s birth has taken place in parallel with the renewed momentum of the European Security and Defence Policy, which has launched 14 operations since 2003. Both policies’ instruments have converged in the neighbouring area covered by ENP: Georgia, in the East and the Palestinian Territories in the South. In both cases, the Security Sector Reform strategies have been the main focus for ESDP and an important objective for ENP. In this paper, two objectives are pursued: first, to assess the EU’s involvement in both cases in SSR terms; and second, to analyse whether the convergence of ESDP operations with a broader EU neighbourhood policy implies that the former has become an instrument for the a EU external action.
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The aim of this paper is to discuss the circumstances in which the process of competition between ports takes place in Spain − circumstances arising from the way the port system is currently set up and from the regulations governing it. The importance of this matter lies both in the fact that intensified competition between ports is the way to set about boosting the efficiency of the Spanish port sector and in the relevance of this business to the economies of the regions in which the ports are located. It is precisely for this reason that the reform instituted in 1992 aimed to combine balanced development of the national port system with the defence of the interests of autonomous regions. To this end the current regulatory framework provides for the possibility of port authorities drawing up their own competitive strategies, but makes their implementation conditional upon approval of their business plan by the Spanish state port authority. The latter body coordinates the national port system to ensure the guidelines set by the central government authorities are followed in the field of transport. However, the scale of the differences which exist among both the size of facilities and their relevant markets on the one hand, and the financial and economic circumstances of each of them on the other, suggest that each port authority's needs must be very different. Consequently, their competitive strategies must also be very different. It is therefore valid to ask whether coping with this diversity calls for different guidelines to regulate their freedom of action. Key words: Competition, regulation, port sector JEL classification numbers: L1, L5, L9
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The present study is focused on the analysis of the three main governmental measures occurred in 2000-2006 in Russian defense industry: the creation of the holding structures, the establishing of the state monopoly in arms export, and creation of the United Aviation Construction Corporation (Ob¿edinennaya Aviastroitel¿naya Corporatziya), which was initiated by the President and Government of Russian Federation in 2006. The last project assumes the consolidation and joining of all producers of civil and military aviation into one united corporation in order to save the technological and productive potential of the sector after serious crisis in 1990-s. On the other hand, this project can be considered as one of the measures to establish state control and hierarchy in the defense industry. The current project tries to analyze the necessity and the possible impacts of restructuring processes. In order to perform such analysis, I need to observe the evolution of the sector, which involves the description of the restructuring and reforming of the industry since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The current situation in aviation sector was shaped by number of reforms performed by Government of Russian Federation, which I describe in phases: conversion, privatization, decentralization, followed by evident desire of the state to establish control over some companies. Later on, I am trying to understand the reasons lying behind all reforms of 2000-2006 and the integration of the industry. I also try to predict which impacts on the companies it will have. The last part presents the main conclusions of the paper.
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Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.
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FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service
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Despite global trends towards military reform characterized by processes of professionalization and democratization, militaries in Southeast Asia have continued to play prominent roles in domestic politics since 11 September. This suggests that wider patterns of global military reform have not had as great an impact on the control, capacity and cooperative functions of armed forces in Southeast Asia as they may have elsewhere. In order to explore why the security sector reform agenda has had so little impact in the region, we investigate recent patterns of civil-military relations in Southeast Asia by focusing on the experiences of four of the region's militaries: Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. We argue that the security sector reform agenda is informed by a predominantly North American approach to civil-military relations based on a number of core assumptions that do not reflect Southeast Asian experiences. Hence, we ask whether the reform agenda itself could be modified to better suit the Southeast Asian context. We suggest that although the regional military sector has not reformed along a 'Western' path it is nonetheless possible to see other types of, and potential for, reform.
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The aim of this thesis is to examine the specific contextual factors affecting the applicability and development of the planning, programming, budgeting system (P.P.B.S.) as a systems approach to public sector budgeting. The concept of P.P.B.S. as a systems approach to public sector budgeting will first be developed and the preliminary hypothesis that general contextual factors may be classified under political, structural and cognitive headings will be put forward. This preliminary hypothesis will be developed and refined using American and early British experience. The refined hypothesis will then be tested in detail in the case of the English health and personal social services (H.P.S.S.), The reasons for this focus are that it is the most recent, the sole remaining, and the most significant example in British central government outside of defence, and is fairly representative of non-defence government programme areas. The method of data collection relies on the examination of unpublished and difficult to obtain central government, health and local authority documents, and interviews with senior civil servants and public officials. The conclusion will be that the political constraints on, or factors affecting P.P.B.S., vary with product characteristics and cultural imperatives on pluralistic decision-making; that structural constraints vary with the degree of coincidence of programme and organisation structure and with the degree of controllability of the organisation; and finally, that cognitive constraints vary according to product characteristics, organisational responsibilities, and analytical effort.
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The protection of cyberspace has become one of the highest security priorities of governments worldwide. The EU is not an exception in this context, given its rapidly developing cyber security policy. Since the 1990s, we could observe the creation of three broad areas of policy interest: cyber-crime, critical information infrastructures and cyber-defence. One of the main trends transversal to these areas is the importance that the private sector has come to assume within them. In particular in the area of critical information infrastructure protection, the private sector is seen as a key stakeholder, given that it currently operates most infrastructures in this area. As a result of this operative capacity, the private sector has come to be understood as the expert in network and information systems security, whose knowledge is crucial for the regulation of the field. Adopting a Regulatory Capitalism framework, complemented by insights from Network Governance, we can identify the shifting role of the private sector in this field from one of a victim in need of protection in the first phase, to a commercial actor bearing responsibility for ensuring network resilience in the second, to an active policy shaper in the third, participating in the regulation of NIS by providing technical expertise. By drawing insights from the above-mentioned frameworks, we can better understand how private actors are involved in shaping regulatory responses, as well as why they have been incorporated into these regulatory networks.
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In our previous study, we have found that 5-cyclopropyl-2-[1-(2-fluoro-benzyl)-1H-pyrazolo[3,4-b]pyridine-3-yl]-pyrimidin-4-ylamine (BAY 41-2272), a guanylate cyclase agonist, activates human monocytes and the THP-1 cell line to produce the superoxide anion, increasing in vitro microbicidal activity, suggesting that this drug can be used to modulate immune functioning in primary immunodeficiency patients. In the present work, we investigated the potential of the in vivo administration of BAY 41-2272 for the treatment of Candida albicans and Staphylococcus aureus infections introduced via intraperitoneal and subcutaneous inoculation. We found that intraperitoneal treatment with BAY 41-2272 markedly increased macrophage-dependent cell influx to the peritoneum in addition to macrophage functions, such as spreading, zymosan particle phagocytosis and nitric oxide and phorbol myristate acetate-stimulated hydrogen peroxide production. Treatment with BAY 41-2272 was highly effective in reducing the death rate due to intraperitoneal inoculation of C. albicans, but not S. aureus. However, we found that in vitro stimulation of peritoneal macrophages with BAY 41-2272 markedly increased microbicidal activities against both pathogens. Our results show that the prevention of death by the treatment of C. albicans-infected mice with BAY 41-2272 might occur primarily by the modulation of the host immune response through macrophage activation.