Hayek the Schmittian: contextualising Cristi's account of Hayek's decisionism in the age of global wealth inequality

That capitalism, in all its variants, produces material inequality is beyond dispute.What is less clear, however, is not only whether Hayek’s ‘equality of opportunities’is immune to the inegalitarian trend, but also whether liberalism itself is the occultsource of this outcome. This paper delves into this by offering a post-nationalcontextualisation and partial critique of Renato Cristi’s 1984 and 1998scholarship on Hayek’s decisionism. The aim is to investigate the relationshipbetween liberal thought and wealth inequality in light of the global-order projectand crisis in democratic decision-making procedures. This will uncover a clearzone of interaction between Hayek’s notion of legal liberty and Schmitt’ssovereignty that was not spotted by Cristi and that will shed new light on thedehumanising and inegalitarian essence of the universalisation of liberalism andits notion of ‘civilised economy’.

Carl Schmitt et la critique de l’universalisme libéral

Ce mémoire porte sur la pensée politique du juriste allemand Carl Schmitt, plus précisément sur sa critique de l’universalisme libéral. Sur la base d’une analyse de ses principaux textes, nous démontrons que la pertinence de cet auteur controversé réside dans le défi renouvelé que présente son antinormativisme pour la pensée politique contemporaine. Nous soutenons qu’il y a chez Schmitt un souci constant de rattacher le droit à l’ordre concret, qu’il soit institué ou reçu. Nous démontrons ensuite comment l’antinormativisme se prolonge en droit international dans la critique de l’universalisme, entendu comme l’ambition de penser le politique à partir de l’humanité comme sujet unique. D’une perspective décisionniste, l’universalisme masque des intérêts impérialistes qu’il convient de dénoncer ; d’une perspective institutionnaliste, l’universalisme néglige l’ordre spatial concret sur lequel repose le droit international. Nous affirmons que Schmitt démontre l’importance de préserver l’autonomie de la science juridique envers la morale et la technique.

The Aristotelian spoudaios as ethical exemplar in Finnis’s natural law theory

One provocative but frequently overlooked feature of John Finnis’s natural law theory is its appeal to the normative role of the Aristotelian spoudaios (the mature person of practical reasonableness). Finnis’s account of the basic requirements of practical reasonableness and defense of the methodological device of “focal meaning” both have recourse to Aristotle’s claim that, in ethics and politics, things should be judged in terms of how they appear to the mature practically reasonable person. The current paper examines the normative role played by the spoudaios within Finnis’s natural law theory and provides a defense of that role against the objection that it lacks justificatory force because it is dependent upon circular reasoning. Section one contextualizes Finnis’s use of the spoudaios by considering its Aristotelian origins and also sketches some reasons for its demise in subsequent moral theory. This serves as the basis for an assessment in section two of whether Finnis’s employment of the spoudaios as an ethical exemplar conflates explanation and justification, and therefore culminates in decisionism. The conclusion of the paper is that Finnis’s recourse to the spoudaios is not viciously circular, because it is grounded in the reflexive and dialogical mode of justification proper to ethical enquiry.

Imago veritas falsa: for a (post-)Schmittian decisionist theory of law, legal reasoning, and judging

For decades, while approaching the ‘normativism/pragmatism’ divide and discussing the legitimacy of (and opportunity for) the judge to act as a ‘social engineer’, socio-legal scholars have tried to ascertain whether the jurist should also consider the impact of his/her activity on society at large, and if so, why and to what extent. The present contribution understands instead the law in terms of a structurally incomplete image (imago veritas falsa) which always needs the decisive intervention of the legal interpreter to exercise its performative instances. In particular, by adopting an unconventional theoretico-philosophical approach that transcends the classic boundaries of foundationalist metaphysics as expressed by the dichotomy of Western logic, this paper argues for the necessity of a tertium comparationis capable of explaining that the real essence of law, legal reasoning, and judging is neither that of normativism, nor of pragmatism, but rather of (post-)Schmittian decisionism.

On a neglected argument in French philosophy: Sceptical humanism in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus

This paper wants to draw out a common argument in three great philosophers and littérateurs in modern French thought: Michel de Montaigne, Voltaire, and Albert Camus. The argument makes metaphysical and theological scepticism the first premise for a universalistic political ethics, as per Voltaire's: "it is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error." The argument, it seems to me, presents an interestingly overlooked, deeply important and powerful contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity. On one hand, theological and post-structuralist critics of "humanism" usually take the latter to depend either on an essentialist philosophical anthropology, or a progressive philosophy of history. The former, it is argued, is philosophically contestable and ethically contentious (since however we define the human "essence," we are bound to exclude some "others"). The latter, for better or worse, is a continuation of theological eschatology by another name. So both, if not "modernity" per se, should somehow be rejected. But an ethical universalism - like that we find in Montaigne, Bayle, Voltaire, or Camus - which does not claim familiarity with metaphysical or eschatological truths, but humbly confesses our epistemic finitude, seeing in this the basis for ethical solidarity, eludes these charges. On the other hand, philosophical scepticism plays a large role in the post-structuralist criticisms of modern institutions and ideas in ways which have been widely taken to license forms of ethics which problematically identify responsibility, with taking a stand unjustifiable by recourse to universalizable reasons. But, in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus, our ignorance concerning the highest or final truths does not close off, but rather opens up, a new descriptive sensitivity to the foibles and complexities of human experience: a sensitivity reflected amply, and often hilariously, in their literary productions. As such, a critical agnosticism concerning claims about things "in the heavens and beneath the earth" does not, for such a "sceptical humanism," necessitate decisionism or nihilism. Instead, it demands a redoubled ethical sensitivity to the complexities and plurality of political life which sees the dignity of "really-existing" others, whatever their metaphysical creeds, as an inalienable first datum of ethical conduct and reflection. After tracking these arguments in Montaigne, Voltaire, and Camus, the essay closes by reflecting on, and contesting, one more powerful theological argument against modern agnosticism's allegedly deleterious effects on ethical culture: that acknowledging ignorance concerning the highest things robs us of the basis for awe or wonder, the wellspring of human beings' highest ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual achievements.