Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection

Nesta dissertação, consideram-se trocas em mercados descentralizados com seleção adversa. Diferentemente da literatura até o momento, supomos que vendedores informados (e não compradores desinformados) fazem ofertas take-it-or-leave-it, de forma que sinalização através de preços é possível. Estabelecemos uma caracterização parcial do conjunto de equilíbrio, encontramos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de um equilíbrio e mostramos que todo equilíbrio apresenta sinalização se o problema de seleção adversa for suficientemente severo. Além disso, provamos o resultado surpreendente que o maior bem-estar atingido em equilíbrio é invariante às fricções do mercado. Também apresentamos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de equilíbrios separantes, que caracterizamos completamente. Mostramos que o conjunto de payoffs associados a equilíbrios separantes é invariante às fricções. Concluímos com uma caracterização completa do conjunto de equilíbrio com apenas dois tipos, e comparamos nossos resultados com os de Moreno e Wooders (2010), que analisam o caso em que compradores têm todo o poder de mercado. Nossos resultados mostram que sinalização através dos preços tem um impacto não trivial tanto nos resultados do mercado quanto no bem-estar.

Aplicações de modelos de procura para bens duráveis de baixa liquidez

I use Search models to study decentralized markets of durable goods. I explore the concept of market liquidity of Lippman and McCall (1986) and show that the theory of optimal search is useful to address the following issues: What governs the time required to make a transaction on these markets? What is the relationship between the price of goods and the time required to make transactions? Why is optimal to wait to make a transaction in markets where individuals discount future utility? What is the socially optima search level? Two specifications are used, the traditional model of job search and a version of Krainer and LeRoy (2001) model.

Markets and microstructure

This document contains three papers examining the microstructure of financial interaction in development and market settings. I first examine the industrial organization of financial exchanges, specifically limit order markets. In this section, I perform a case study of Google stock surrounding a surprising earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009, uncovering parameters that describe information flows and liquidity provision. I then explore the disbursement process for community-driven development projects. This section is game theoretic in nature, using a novel three-player ultimatum structure. I finally develop econometric tools to simulate equilibrium and identify equilibrium models in limit order markets.

In chapter two, I estimate an equilibrium model using limit order data, finding parameters that describe information and liquidity preferences for trading. As a case study, I estimate the model for Google stock surrounding an unexpected good-news earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009. I find a substantial decrease in asymmetric information prior to the earnings announcement. I also simulate counterfactual dealer markets and find empirical evidence that limit order markets perform more efficiently than do their dealer market counterparts.

In chapter three, I examine Community-Driven Development. Community-Driven Development is considered a tool empowering communities to develop their own aid projects. While evidence has been mixed as to the effectiveness of CDD in achieving disbursement to intended beneficiaries, the literature maintains that local elites generally take control of most programs. I present a three player ultimatum game which describes a potential decentralized aid procurement process. Players successively split a dollar in aid money, and the final player--the targeted community member--decides between whistle blowing or not. Despite the elite capture present in my model, I find conditions under which money reaches targeted recipients. My results describe a perverse possibility in the decentralized aid process which could make detection of elite capture more difficult than previously considered. These processes may reconcile recent empirical work claiming effectiveness of the decentralized aid process with case studies which claim otherwise.

In chapter four, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means to estimate model parameters in the case study in chapter two. I describe the liquidity supplier problem and equilibrium among those suppliers. I then outline the analytical forms for computing certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader. Following this, I describe a recursive algorithm which facilitates computing equilibrium in supply curves. Finally, I outline implementation of the Method of Simulated Moments in this context, focusing on Indirect Inference and formulating the pseudo model.

Oscillations in a decentralized economic network

The study of exchange markets dates back to LeonWalras's general equilibrium theory. Since then the economic market has been studied for its' equilibrium properties, fairness of allocations of private and public goods, and even the psychological incentives of participants. This paper studies the dynamics of an exchange economy built on a network of markets where consumers trade with suppliers to optimize utility. Viewing the market in as a decentralized network we study the system from the usual control theory point of view, evaluating the system's dynamic performance, stability and robustness. It is shown that certain consumer demand dynamics can lead to oscillations while others can converge to optimal allocations. © 2011 IFAC.

Managing multiple markets: big firms and PFI contracts

The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is frequently portrayed as a vehicle for change for the UK construction sector. Significant change in the working practices of construction companies is predicted as new business models based on whole-life value creation emerge. This paper shifts the focus of discussion from projected ideals and possible developments to the current situation. More specifically, it focuses on the challenges that large firms participating in both PFI and traditional markets face. The analysis focuses on the relations between business units and on day-to-day challenges to greater long-term commitment, through life-service provision and increased integration between construction and service provision. The paper offers insights into the effects of PFI on construction practice and their implications for theorizing on organizational and strategic change. It suggests abandoning a simplistic model of the centralized, homogenous firm and instead capturing the dynamics of decentralized, large firms working in multiple markets on a variety of projects. This would assist in the provision of more realistic and fruitful models of how to realize the PFI vision.

Decentralized AC power flow for real-time multi-TSO power system operation

This paper adjusts decentralized OPF optimization to the AC power flow problem in power systems with interconnected areas operated by diferent transmission system operators (TSO). The proposed methodology allows finding the operation point of a particular area without explicit knowledge of network data of the other interconnected areas, being only necessary to exchange border information related to the tie-lines between areas. The methodology is based on the decomposition of the first-order optimality conditions of the AC power flow, which is formulated as a nonlinear programming problem. To allow better visualization of the concept of independent operation of each TSO, an artificial neural network have been used for computing border information of the interconnected TSOs. A multi-area Power Flow tool can be seen as a basic building block able to address a large number of problems under a multi-TSO competitive market philosophy. The IEEE RTS-96 power system is used in order to show the operation and effectiveness of the decentralized AC Power Flow. ©2010 IEEE.

Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets

This paper examines how preference correlation and intercorrelation combine to influence the length of a decentralized matching market's path to stability. In simulated experiments, marriage markets with various preference specifications begin at an arbitrary matching of couples and proceed toward stability via the random mechanism proposed by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). The results of these experiments reveal that fundamental preference characteristics are critical in predicting how long the market will take to reach a stable matching. In particular, intercorrelation and correlation are shown to have an exponential impact on the number of blocking pairs that must be randomly satisfied before stability is attained. The magnitude of the impact is dramatically different, however, depending on whether preferences are positively or negatively intercorrelated.