Monetary equilibrium with decentralized trade and learning

This paper analyzes the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning is decentralized. We show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information transmission in the economy. Our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money. It also provides an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is only a recent development.

Information learning and the stability of fiat money

We analyze the stability of monetary regimes in a decentralized economy where fiat money is endogenously created, information about its value is imperfect, and agents only learn from their personal trading experiences. We show that in poorly informed economies, monetary stability depends heavily on the government's commitment to the long run value of money, whereas in economies where agents gather information more easily, monetary stability can be an endogenous outcome. We generate a dynamics on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual colIapse of overissued paper money. Moreover, our results provide an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is a very recent development.

Decentralized detector generation in cooperative intrusion detection system

We consider Cooperative Intrusion Detection System (CIDS) which is a distributed AIS-based (Artificial Immune System) IDS where nodes collaborate over a peer-to-peer overlay network. The AIS uses the negative selection algorithm for the selection of detectors (e.g., vectors of features such as CPU utilization, memory usage and network activity). For better detection performance, selection of all possible detectors for a node is desirable but it may not be feasible due to storage and computational overheads. Limiting the number of detectors on the other hand comes with the danger of missing attacks. We present a scheme for the controlled and decentralized division of detector sets where each IDS is assigned to a region of the feature space. We investigate the trade-off between scalability and robustness of detector sets. We address the problem of self-organization in CIDS so that each node generates a distinct set of the detectors to maximize the coverage of the feature space while pairs of nodes exchange their detector sets to provide a controlled level of redundancy. Our contribution is twofold. First, we use Symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design, Generalized Quadrangles and Ramanujan Expander Graph based deterministic techniques from combinatorial design theory and graph theory to decide how many and which detectors are exchanged between which pair of IDS nodes. Second, we use a classical epidemic model (SIR model) to show how properties from deterministic techniques can help us to reduce the attack spread rate.

Oscillations in a decentralized economic network

The study of exchange markets dates back to LeonWalras's general equilibrium theory. Since then the economic market has been studied for its' equilibrium properties, fairness of allocations of private and public goods, and even the psychological incentives of participants. This paper studies the dynamics of an exchange economy built on a network of markets where consumers trade with suppliers to optimize utility. Viewing the market in as a decentralized network we study the system from the usual control theory point of view, evaluating the system's dynamic performance, stability and robustness. It is shown that certain consumer demand dynamics can lead to oscillations while others can converge to optimal allocations. © 2011 IFAC.

The "Fair trade nation": market-oriented development in devolved European regions

Scholars have largely ignored the roles played by government and public sector institutions in the fair trade movement. This article addresses the knowledge gap through examining government involvement in fair trade networks in the context of European devolution and the localization of international development action. Proposing a relational view of fair trade networks, and considering the Fair Trade Nation as a social category for development, it highlights how power sources outside the centralized nation-state permit a political community to associate itself with fair trade. Research from Wales demonstrates that government acts in a leadership role rather than as regulator, conferring political voice and finance while enhancing its international credentials and contributing to the politics of nation-building. Our conclusion is cautious; campaigners celebrate political commitment to fair trade embodied within the category of the Fair Trade Nation, but evidence suggests that government reliance on the market as a vehicle for decentralized development action is limited by how the Fair Trade Nation is currently executed.

Firms?: heterogeneity, organizations, power and trade

This paper develops a theory which investigates the two-way relationship between the internaI organization of the firm and market competition.We introduce heterogenous firms with internal hierarchies in a Knlgman (1980) monopolistic competition model of trade. The model simultanously determines firms' organizational choices anel heterogeneity across firms in size and proeluctivity.Ve show that intenlational trade, market size and the toughness of competition in international markets incluce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to a reorganization of firms towards more decentralized corporate hierarchies.We show further that trade triggers produetivity growth through inter-firm reallocations towards more produetive firms in whieh CEOs have power in firms. At the same time, however trade- induced organizational changes towards fiattened corporate hierarchies lead to a softening of lnternat.ional competition which may contribute a eountervailing negative effect on seetoral productivity.

On Managing Stochastic Decentralized Projects

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

United we stand: A call for collective cooperation of SME's when they trade globally using internet technology

This paper examines the potential for cluster associations to act globally, enabled by information computer technology (ICT). In particular, it explores the relationship between cooperation and organizational structures and systems of action in developing an ICT capability. The slow up-take of ICT and the problems involved is also becoming of increased interest to policymakers. This paper outlines how, through the use of cluster associations based on co-operation and effective structures and systems, this can be maximized. The proposition introduced in this paper argues that cluster associations with low power-dependence and decentralized structures are better able to provide the necessary support that such SMEs require to utilize the technology