The EU’s Paradoxical Efforts at Tracking the Financing of Terrorism: From criticism to imitation of dataveillance. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 56, August 2013

In July 2011, the European Commission published a Communication aimed at setting out different options for establishing a European terrorist finance tracking system (TFTS). The Communication followed the adoption of the EU-US agreement on the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) in 2010. The agreement concluded various series of national, European and transatlantic negotiations after the disclosure through public media of the US TFTP in 2006. This paper takes stock of the wide range of controversies surrounding this security-focused programme with dataveillance capabilities. After stressing the impact of the US TFTP on international relations, the paper argues that the EU-US agreement primarily has the effect of shifting information-sharing practices from the justice/judicial/penal/criminal investigation framework into the security/intelligence/administrative/prevention context as the main rationale. The paper then questions the TFTP-related conception of mass intelligence through large-scale databases and transnational communication of bulk data in the name of targeted surveillance. Following an examination of the project creating an EU system equivalent to the TFTP, the paper emphasises the fundamental paradox of transatlantic security matters, in which European criticism of American programmes tends to be ultimately translated into EU imitation of US dataveillance practices.

Privacy, dataveillance, and crime prevention

Whether privacy is an adequate legal safeguard against intrusive government or private sector activity remains open for further exploration. The criminal law has always imposed limits on the ability of police to enter private premises and seize property associated with criminal activity, while preserving the rights of “mass private” property owners and their agents to selectively exclude people from entering or remaining on their premises. The appropriate balance between these issues and “the right to be let alone” is often determined by judicial rulings in individual cases. However, the balance between a claimant’s personal rights to be free from undue surveillance and the broader public interest in preventing crime or promoting safety is not always clear. New forms of personal data collection and dissemination through ICTs reconfigure the balance between private and public knowledge (Australian Law Reform Commission 2008), while social network analysis is increasingly deployed by law enforcement agencies to detect and prevent crime. Our ongoing research interrogates how the concept of privacy can be reconciled with the growing use of dataveillance, data mining, and social network analysis to prevent crime and antisocial behavior.

A social ecological model of ICT cooption : surveillance creep in the information age

A model for ICT cooption is introduced using the example of ’surveillance creep’ which is the phenomenon of increasing dataveillance as the result of the introduction of seemingly benign, useful and convenient technological artefacts. The model identifies and discusses five main components of ICT artefact development and deployment: design, properties, affordances, appropriation and agent interests and locates them in a complex interrelated social ecology. The model provides a way to empirically examine how and why technology favours particular social or organisational outcomes.

ID scanners and uberveillance in the night-time economy: crime prevention or invasion of privacy?

ID scanners are promoted as an effective solution to the problems of anti-social behavior and violence in many urban nighttime economies. However, the acceptance of this and other forms of computerized surveillance to prevent crime and anti-social behavior is based on several unproven assumptions. After outlining what ID scanners are and how they are becoming a normalized precondition of entry into one Australian nighttime economy, this chapter demonstrates how technology is commonly viewed as the key to preventing crime despite recognition of various problems associated with its adoption. The implications of technological determinism amongst policy makers, police, and crime prevention theories are then critically assessed in light of several issues that key informants talking about the value of ID scanners fail to mention when applauding their success. Notably, the broad, ill-defined, and confused notion of “privacy” is analyzed as a questionable legal remedy for the growing problems of überveillance.

The Problematic of Privacy in the Namespace

In the twenty-first century, the issue of privacy--particularly the privacy of individuals with regard to their personal information and effects--has become highly contested terrain, producing a crisis that affects both national and global social formations. This crisis, or problematic, characterizes a particular historical conjuncture I term the namespace. Using cultural studies and the theory of articulation, I map the emergent ways that the namespace articulates economic, juridical, political, cultural, and technological forces, materials, practices and protocols. The cohesive articulation of the namespace requires that privacy be reframed in ways that make its diminution seem natural and inevitable. In the popular media, privacy is often depicted as the price we pay as citizens and consumers for security and convenience, respectively. This discursive ideological shift supports and underwrites the interests of state and corporate actors who leverage the ubiquitous network of digitally connected devices to engender a new regime of informational surveillance, or dataveillance. The widespread practice of dataveillance represents a strengthening of the hegemonic relations between these actors--each shares an interest in promoting an emerging surveillance society, a burgeoning security politics, and a growing information economy--that further empowers them to capture and store the personal information of citizens/consumers. In characterizing these shifts and the resulting crisis, I also identify points of articulation vulnerable to rearticulation and suggest strategies for transforming the namespace in ways that might empower stronger protections for privacy and related civil rights.