Considerações prévias: distinctions between academic and intellectual goals for young children

Lilian Katz refere-se à crescente tendência nos Estados Unidos de introduzir objetivos de caráter “académico” nos programas destinados a crianças pequenas, em alternativa a programas centrados simplesmente no jogo espontâneo. Katz propõe uma terceira alternativa que desenvolva as competências de caráter intelectual nas crianças, de modo a estimular o desenvolvimento das suas mentes e as suas sensibilidades morais e estéticas. Katz propõe a introdução do trabalho de projeto com crianças desde os primeiros anos.

Distinctions between promastigotes of Leishmania species developing in the digestive tract of laboratory reared Lutzomyia longipalpis

Female Lutzomya longipalpis were exposed to infection by three different species/strains of Leishmania. When the insects were dissected four days after exposure, stained preparations were made of the flagellates contained in the digestive tract. Using traditional morphometric methods, L. amazonensis, L. guyanensis and an unnamed species of the mexicana complex could be distinguished from one another.

De la dignité de la vie à la dignité de la personne humaine : quelques distinctions dans le débat sur les techniques génétiques

Dans les discussions sur les biotechnologies, l’argument de la dignité humaine conduit souvent à l’impasse. Le philosophe et sociologue allemand, Jürgen Habermas, craint que le débat, qui s’est ouvert récemment autour de la recherche sur les embryons, les diagnostics prénatal et préimplantatoire, et le clonage, se polarise, de nouveau comme c’était déjà le cas, en Allemand et dans les autres pays occidentaux, au sujet de l’avortement. La seule façon de sortir de cette polarisation – et c’est là un des apports importants de Habermas – est de distinguer nettement la dignité humaine, d’une part et d’autre part, la dignité de la vie humaine. D’un point de vue éthique et juridique, l’argument de la dignité humaine ne saurait nécessairement s’étendre au fœtus ou embryon. Car, la dignité humaine est liée à la symétrie qui détermine la relation liant les membres d’une communauté morale. Elle n’est pas un fait naturel, une propriété qu’on a par nature comme l’intelligence ou le fait d’avoir les yeux bleus. Au contraire, la dignité humaine désigne cette «inviolabilité» qui ne peut avoir de sens que dans les relations interpersonnelles de reconnaissance mutuelle et dans un rapport d’égal à égal des personnes entre elles. Néanmoins, le fœtus ou l’embryon peut, d’une certaine manière, échapper à notre contrôle et disposition en référence à la dignité que nous devons à la vie de l’espèce humaine. De ce point de vue, nos conceptions modernes de la vie anté-personnelle et la façon dont nous voulons nous comporter par rapport à cette vie forment, pour ainsi dire, un environnement éthique stabilisant de l’espèce pour la morale rationnelle des sujets de droits moraux.

Neural mechanisms of visual object priming: evidence for perceptual and semantic distinctions in fusiform cortex

Previous functional imaging studies have shown that facilitated processing of a visual object on repeated, relative to initial, presentation (i.e., repetition priming) is associated with reductions in neural activity in multiple regions, including fusiforin/lateral occipital cortex. Moreover, activity reductions have been found, at diminished levels, when a different exemplar of an object is presented on repetition. In one previous study, the magnitude of diminished priming across exemplars was greater in the right relative to the left fusiform, suggesting greater exemplar specificity in the right. Another previous study, however, observed fusiform lateralization modulated by object viewpoint, but not object exemplar. The present fMRI study sought to determine whether the result of differential fusiform responses for perceptually different exemplars could be replicated. Furthermore, the role of the left fusiform cortex in object recognition was investigated via the inclusion of a lexical/semantic manipulation. Right fusiform cortex showed a significantly greater effect of exemplar change than left fusiform, replicating the previous result of exemplar-specific fusiform lateralization. Right fusiform and lateral occipital cortex were not differentially engaged by the lexical/semantic manipulation, suggesting that their role in visual object recognition is predominantly in the. C visual discrimination of specific objects. Activation in left fusiform cortex, but not left lateral occipital cortex, was modulated by both exemplar change and lexical/semantic manipulation, with further analysis suggesting a posterior-to-anterior progression between regions involved in processing visuoperceptual and lexical/semantic information about objects. The results are consistent with the view that the right fusiform plays a greater role in processing specific visual form information about objects, whereas the left fusiform is also involved in lexical/semantic processing. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

Artificial Equations, Artificial Distinctions: Language that Poisons the Waters of Ethnic Relations

“It is my contention at this point that when race relations on campuses get better, it is in spite of, not because of, the proliferation of jargon-based rhetoric about diversity.”

Experimenting and modeling: sharp distinctions, integration or just a mess?

At first sight, experimenting and modeling form two distinct modes of scientific inquiry. This spurs philosophical debates about how the distinction should be drawn (e.g. Morgan 2005, Winsberg 2009, Parker 2009). But much scientific practice casts serious doubts on the idea that the distinction makes much sense. There are two worries. First, the practices of modeling and experimenting are often intertwined in intricate ways because much modeling involves experimenting, and the interpretation of many experiments relies upon models. Second, there are borderline cases that seem to blur the distinction between experiment and model (if there is any). My talk tries to defend the philosophical project of distinguishing models from experiment and to advance the related philosophical debate. I begin with providing a minimalist framework of conceptualizing experimenting and modeling and their mutual relationships. The methods are conceptualized as different types of activities that are characterized by a primary goal, respectively. The minimalist framwork, which should be uncontroversial, suffices to accommodate the first worry. I address the second worry by suggesting several ways how to conceptualize the distinction in a more flexible way. I make a concrete suggestion of how the distinction may be drawn. I use examples from the history of science to argue my case. The talk concentrates and models and experiments, but I will comment on simulations too.