Financial stress and sovereign debt composition

"Published online: 19 Oct 2015"

Debt for nature: a swap whose time has gone?

Includes bibliography

The financial leverage of large Portuguese Firms in the European context

The Financial Leverage of Large Portuguese Firms in the European Context This paper studies the leverage, cost of debt servicing ability and structure of debt maturity of large Portuguese firms, over the pre-crisis (2006-2009) and post-crisis (2010-2013) periods through a comparative analysis with other European peers. We document that large Portuguese firms have been reducing their leverage since the end of 2009. We find that this decrease in leverage is not a consequence higher Equity levels but rather a result of asset’s downsizing. We also document that Portuguese firms are still more leveraged than their European peers, even though this difference has decreased over time. High corporate debt levels are transversal across industries.

Insostenibilidad del pago de la deuda externa desde el punto de vista económico, social y ambiental (Tema Central)

La autora sostiene que, dadas las condiciones usualmente impuestas por los países industrializados acreedores, el pago de la deuda externa es inviable para el Ecuador. Si se consideran aspectos económicos, sociales yambientales, se puede apreciar que el actual servicio de la deuda genera una balanza de pagos insostenible, deterioro de la capacidad productiva local. aumento de la precariedad del mercado laboral, incremento de la extrema pobreza y una presión insoportable sobre los recursos naturales. Mediante un análisis de ciertos indicadores selectos, la autora establece las relaciones existentes entre el ajuste para servir a la deuda, el deterioro de las condiciones de vida, el impacto en la agricultura y los recursos naturales y la dinámica de los procesos migratorios.

Investing better in order to invest more. Finance and management of education in Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

The Cost of Servicing Greece’s Debt: A Sisyphean task? CEPS Commentary, 4 February 2015

Following the victory of Syriza in the Greek elections on January 25th, policy-makers, economists and concerned EU citizens are scrambling to understand the causes, modalities and consequences of a possible Greek default in order to anticipate and prepare for what is likely to unfold in the coming weeks and months. The debate on the sustainability of Greek public finances has often been characterised by a lack of clarity and even a certain degree of confusion. This brief note focuses first on the cost that Greece faces in servicing its debt and then asks whether this is a manageable or a Sisyphean task. It concludes by reflecting on the political implications of the new government’s announced intentions and whether these are being taken into account in the current debate over debt restructuring.

Debt Maturity: Is Long-Term Debt Optimal?

We model and calibrate the arguments in favor and against short-term and long-term debt. These arguments broadly include: maturity premium, sustainability, and service smoothing. We use a dynamic-equilibrium model with tax distortions and government outlays uncertainty, and model maturity as the fraction of debt that needs to be rolled over every period. In the model, the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. We then calibrate our artificial economy and solve for the optimal debt maturity for Brazil as an example of a developing country and the US as an example of a mature economy. We obtain that the calibrated costs from defaulting on long-term debt more than offset costs associated with short-term debt. Therefore, short-term debt implies higher welfare levels.

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign`s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Nominal versus indexed debt: A quantitative horse race

The main arguments in favor and against nominal and indexed debts are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion, government outlays uncertainty, and contingent-debt service. Our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment. Thus, the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates. We obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions. We further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing (volatile) countries. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A servicing strategy for items sold under warranty

When repairable items sold under warranty fail, the rectification action taken by the manufacturer can be either a repair or a replacement, In this paper a new repair-replacement strategy is proposed for the manufacturer when the items are sold with a non-renewing free replacement warranty policy. The strategy involves splitting the warranty period into two intervals where only repairs are carried out, separated by a third interval with at most one replacement.

Effects and determinants of household debt in Portugal

As the amount of debt has gradually increased, particularly in recent years, Portugal is currently one of the European countries exhibiting one of the highest levels of overall indebtedness, including in both sovereign and private sectors. Indeed, this condition is the outcome of increasing levels of debt assumed not only by the government, but also by companies and families, being the later mostly due to mortgage loans and due charges. This paper focuses on the study of borrowing by Portuguese households. The research has been made in respect to the notion of debt, the consequences of recent developments in debt, among other factors. In order to analyse the factors that are most associated with debt, a study was developed using two multiple regression models, one using a longer time series and another shorter, evaluating the effect of several variables, such as consumption, savings, unemployment, inflation and interest rates, in order to check whether they could be associated with a higher level of debt.

Stabilization constraints from different-average public debt levels in a Monetary Union with country-size asymmetry

In the sequence of the recent financial and economic crisis, the recent public debt accumulation is expected to hamper considerably business cycle stabilization, by enlarging the budgetary consequences of the shocks. This paper analyses how the average level of public debt in a monetary union shapes optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary stabilization policies and affects stabilization welfare. We use a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model, where a benevolent central bank and the fiscal authorities play discretionary policy games under different union-average debt-constrained scenarios. We find that high debt levels shift monetary policy assignment from inflation to debt stabilization, making cooperation welfare superior to noncooperation. Moreover, when average debt is too high, welfare moves directly (inversely) with debt-to-output ratios for the union and the large country (small country) under cooperation. However, under non-cooperation, higher average debt levels benefit only the large country.