北极Gakkel超慢速扩张脊大洋橄榄岩的地球化学特征及其意义

Gakkel Ridge in Arctic Ocean is the ulstraslow spreading ridge in the world with a full spreading rate decreasing from 14 mm/yr in the western end to 7mm/yr in the eastern end. To study the histories of partial melting and melt referilization occurred in the oceanic mantle beneath Gakkel Ridge, both extremely fresh and altered abyssal peridotites from two dredge hauls (PS66-238 and HLY0102-D70) have been selected in this research. Major and trace element data of the residual minerals suggest that all samples have been refertilized by late enriched melts after low to moderate degrees (3-12%) of partial melting in the stability field of spinel, whereas some samples also inherited signatures of partial melting in stability field of garnet. Os isotopic compositions of Gakkel samples have not been significantly affected by late processes, e.g., seawater alteration and melt refertilzaiton. Samples from both dredge hauls have similar range of 187Os/188Os, from strongly unradiogenic (~0.114) in the harzburgites to approximating the inferred values of PUM (primitive upper mantle) in some lherzolites (~0.129). Inherited ancient depletion events in the harzburgites with Re-depletion age up to 2 billion years are unrelevant to the recent genesis of MORB (mid-ocean ridge basalts) beneath Gakkel Ridge. Comparisons of highly siderophile elements (HSEs) between the fresh and altered samples suggested both Pd and Re were affected and thus are mobile during seawater alteration, whereas the other HSEs (i.e., Os, Ir, Ru an Pt) are stable. The fractionated HSEs patterns in the harzburgites suggest both PPGEs (Pt and Pd) and Re can be fractionated from IPGEs (Os, Ir and Ru) at low degree of partial melting, which might be due to physical dredging of sulfide melts by silicate melts rather than equilibrium partitioning between residues and silicate melts. Inferred HSEs budget of the PUM confirm the previous study that both Ru/Ir and Pd/Ir are suprachondritic in the PUM. Some modifications of late-veneer hypothesis are required in light of the unique PUM composition. HSEs and Os isotopic compositions of Gakkel abyssal peridotites indicate the oceanic mantle is highly heterogeneous within a scale of one dredge haul (<5 km). Both depleted and fertile mantle domains are likely to be mechanically juxtaposed in the asthenosphere in a state of ‘plum pudding’. Widely distribution of ancient depleted components in the asthenosphere suggests that DMM (depleted MORB mantle) should not be synonymous with the MORB source. The later is just the fertile part of the former, i.e., the depleted components in the DMM do not or contribute little to the genesis of MORB.

Acute flare induced by the calcific tendonitis of the rotator cuff: inhibition of IL-1 a potential therapeutic target?

Introduction: Calcific tendonitis of rotator cuff is observed on plainradiographs in 10% of adults, but remains asymptomatic in half thesecases. Sometimes, these calcifications induce acute flares withmassive inflammation similar to gout or CPPD crisis. Analgesics/anti-inflammatory medications are usually not sufficient to controlssymptoms in these situations. Local steroid infiltration with or withoutremoval of the calcific deposition with a needle aspiration may beuseful. A new approach could be IL-1 inhibitors. Indeed, basic calciumphosphate crystals are capable of stimulating the release of activeIL-1β in vitro. These crystals trigger IL-1β release, in an analogousmanner to MSU crystals in acute gout, suggesting that IL-1β blockademay be clinically useful.Case presentation: This report describes a 70-year old woman withacute rest pain of the right shoulder since 48 hours. On examination,we found massive limitations of active and passive movements. Thepatient evaluated, on the visual scale, her symptoms at 10/10 the nightand 5/10 the day. The radiography and showed a rounded, 8 mmcalcification in the subscapularis tendon. The ultrasound aspectrevealed a heterogeneous calcification partially non solid, surroundedby massive inflammation on Doppler. C-reactive protein anderythrocyte sedimentation rate were high (74 mg/ml, 54 mm/hour).The patient received subcutaneous injections of anakinra: 100 mgdaily for 3 days (D1-D3). We evaluated the patient in our consult at dayD1, D2, D3, D7, D16 and by phone at D70.This treatment rapidly relieved the inflammatory symptoms (within afew hours with no relapse). The mobility of the shoulder, the biologicsparameters improved and the size of the calcification as well thedegree of inflammation regressed on ultrasound after 3 days.Conclusion: This is the first report of a woman with an acute flareinduced by calcific tendonitis who received anakinra. IL-1 inhibitionmay be a therapeutic target in calcific tendonitis. To analyse thisresponse more precisely and elaborate definitive conclusions, aprospective pilot study is on-going in our ambulatory institute.

Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies.

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

The Measurement of Diversity

The notion of diversity is an issue that is of relevance in several contexts. For example, the biodiversity of a given ecological environment and the diversity of the options available to a decision maker have attracted some attention in recent research. This paper provides an axiomatic approach to the measurement of diversity. We characterize two nested classes of ordinal measures of diversity and an important member of these classes. We prove that the latter special case is equivalent to a diversity ordering proposed by Weitzman.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments

In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements. i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space os a one-dimensional continuum, such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2n strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corrollary, we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave. When the policy space is multi-dimensional, we establish Arrow's impossibility theorem. Among others, we show that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Efficient Priority Rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource- monotonicity with two-agent consistent con ict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.