Turkey's boycott of the Cyprus EU presidency: context, meaning and its consequences. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 9, September 2012

In 2011 Turkish officials began indicating their intention to suspend all contact with Cyprus’s presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), slated for the second half of 2012, given the issues surrounding the unresolved Cyprus conflict. This came as the latest development in a long and arduous path of Turkey’s application for EU membership that began in 1987. This paper provides the context – the Cyprus conflict, Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and the Cyprus reunification talks – in understanding the reasons and consequences of Ankara’s boycott of the Cyprus presidency. The article also considers the evolving nature and the role of the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, especially after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and how this may have played into Turkey’s calculations in calling for the boycott.

Cyprus presidency and Turkey's relations with the European Union. OSW Commentary No. 82, 2012-06-26

Turkey’s intention to boycott Cyprus presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2012 is a logical consequence of Ankara’s policy of not recognising the Republic of Cyprus. The boycott will have a negative but limited impact on Turkey-EU relations, and will not in practice significantly affect their intensity in the second half-year. The so-called positive agenda, a new co-operation mechanism between the EU and Turkey, offers a provisional way for the two sides to circumvent the formal obstacle for mutual contacts created by the Cyprus conflict. In itself, however, the launch of the positive agenda is not a breakthrough for Turkey’s integration with the EU. Any such breakthrough is unlikely to occur until progress is made in regulating the Cyprus conflict, and some member states change their attitude towards Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Non-apologies and prolonged silences in post-conflict settings: The case of post-colonial Cyprus

Despite the growing use of apologies in post-conflict settings, cases of non-apology remain unaddressed and continue to puzzle scholars. This article focuses on the absence of apology by non-state and anti-state actors by examining the case of the Cypriot armed group EOKA, which has refused to offer an apology to the civilian victims of its ‘anti-colonial’ struggle (1955–1959). Using field data and parliamentary debates, and drawing on comparisons, this article analyses the factors that contributed to a lack of apology. It is argued that the inherited timelessness of Greek nationalism, and the impression of a perpetual need for defence, set up textbook conditions for the development of a hegemonic discourse and prevented an apology for human rights violations.

Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus

Both ethnic communities in Cyprus have maintained strong political and cultural ties with Greece and Turkey, respectively, and at some point of their twentieth century history, each has aspired to become part of either the former or the latter. Yet the way this relationship has been imagined has differed across time, space, and class. Both communities have adapted their identities to prevailing ideological waves as well as political opportunities, domestic alliances, and interests. The article evaluates different responses to ethnic nationalism, highlighting important intra-ethnic differentiations within each Cypriot community usually expressed in the positions of political parties, intellectuals, and the press. While the current literature identifies two major poles of identity in the island, "motherland nationalism" and "Cypriotism," the article suggests that the major focus of identity of Cypriots is identification with their respective ethnic communities in the form of Greek Cypriotism or Turkish Cypriotism. In fact, contentious politics in Cyprus from the ENOSIS/TAKSIM struggle to the April 2004 referendum demonstrate the interplay of external constraints and collective self-identification processes leading to the formation of these identities. The article concludes by identifying the implications of identity shifts for deeply divided societies and conflict resolution in general.

Ethnic conflicts and international politics : an analysis of the communal regional, and global dimensions of the Cyprus problem

The thesis assesses the impact of international factors on relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots during and after the Cold War. Through an analysis of the Cyprus problem it explores both why external actors intervene in communal conflicts and how they influence relations between ethnic groups in plural societies. The analytical framework employed throughout the study draws on contributions of International Relations theorists and students of ethnic conflict. The thesis argues that, as in the global political system, relations between ethnic groups in unranked communal systems are anarchic; that is, actors within the system do not recognize a sovereign political authority. In bipolar communal systems dominated by two relatively equal groups, the struggle for security and power often leads to appeals for assistance from external actors. The framework notes that neighboring states and Great Powers may heed calls for assistance, or intervene without a prior request, if it is in their interest to do so. The convergence of regional and global interests in communal affairs exacerbates ethnic conflicts and precludes the development of effective political institutions. The impact of external intervention in ethnic conflicts has the potential to alter the basis of communal relations. The Cyprus problem is examined both during and after the Cold War in order to gauge how global and regional actors and the structure of their respective systems have affected relations between ethnic groups in Cyprus. The thesis argues that Cyprus's descent into civil war in 1963 was due in part to the entrenchment of external interests in the Republic's constitution. The study also notes that power politics involving the United States, Soviet Union, Greece and Turkey continued to affect the development of communal relations throughout the 1960s, 70s, and, 80s. External intervention culminated in July and August 1974, after a Greek sponsored coup was answered by Turkey's invasion and partition of Cyprus. The forced expulsion of Greek Cypriots from the island's northern territories led to the establishment of ethnically homogeneous zones, thus altering the context of communal relations dramatically. The study also examines the role of the United Nations in Cyprus, noting that its failure to settle the dispute was due in large part to a lack of cooperation from Turkey, and the United States' and Soviet Union's acceptance of the status quo following the 1974 invasion and partition of the island. The thesis argues that the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era has made a solution to the dispute unlikely for the time being. Barring any dramatic changes in relations between communal and regional antagonists, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots will continue to develop along the lines established in July/August 1974. The thesis concludes by affirming the validity of its core hypotheses through a brief survey of recent works touching on international politics and ethnic conflict. Questions requiring further research are noted as are elements of the study that require further refinement.

Can the European Union build a bridge over troubled waters? An analysis of the politicised and depoliticised legal approach between the European Union and Cyprus

The Cyprus dispute accurately portrays the evolution of the conflict from ‘warfare to lawfare’ enriched in politics; this research has proven that the Cyprus problem has been and will continue to be one of the most judicialised disputes across the globe. Notwithstanding the ‘normalisation’ of affairs between the two ethno-religious groups on the island since the division in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus’ (RoC) European Union (EU) membership in 2004 failed to catalyse reunification and terminate the legal, political and economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. So the question is; why is it that the powerful legal order of the EU continuously fails to tame the tiny troublesome island of Cyprus? This is a thesis on the interrelationship of the EU legal order and the Cyprus problem. A literal and depoliticised interpretation of EU law has been maintained throughout the EU’s dealings with Cyprus, hence, pre-accession and post-accession. The research has brought to light that this literal interpretation of EU law vis-à-vis Cyprus has in actual fact deepened the division on the island. Pessimists outnumber optimists so far as resolving this problem is concerned, and rightly so if you look back over the last forty years of failed attempts to do just that, a diplomatic combat zone scattered with the bones of numerous mediators. This thesis will discuss how the decisions of the EU institutions, its Member States and specifically of the European Court of Justice, despite conforming to the EU legal order, have managed to disregard the principle of equality on the divided island and thus prevent the promised upgrade of the status of the Turkish Cypriot community since 2004. Indeed, whether a positive or negative reading of the Union’s position towards the Cyprus problem is adopted, the case remains valid for an organisation based on the rule of law to maintain legitimacy, democracy, clarity and equality to the decisions of its institutions. Overall, the aim of this research is to establish a link between the lack of success of the Union to build a bridge over troubled waters and the right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot community. The only way left for the EU to help resolve the Cyprus problem is to aim to broker a deal between the two Cypriot communities which will permit the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) or at least the ‘Taiwanisation’ of Northern Cyprus. Albeit, there are many studies that address the impact of the EU on the conflict or the RoC, which represents the government that has monopolised EU accession, the argument advanced in this thesis is that despite the alleged Europeanisation of the Turkish Cypriot community, they are habitually disregarded because of the EU’s current legal framework and the Union’s lack of conflict transformation strategy vis-à-vis the island. Since the self-declared TRNC is not recognised and EU law is suspended in northern Cyprus in accordance with Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003, the Turkish-Cypriots represent an idiomatic partner of Brussels but the relations between the two resemble the experience of EU enlargement: the EU’s relevance to the community has been based on the prospects for EU accession (via reunification) and assistance towards preparation for potential EU integration through financial and technical aid. Undeniably, the pre-accession and postaccession strategy of Brussels in Cyprus has worsened the Cyprus problem and hindered the peace process. The time has come for the international community to formally acknowledge the existence of the TRNC.