Att tala om det osägbara : Nicolaus Cusanus cirkulära filosofi i verket De coniecturis med särskild hänsyn till Nelson Pikes tankar om unio mystica

In my dissertation called Speaking of the unsayable: The circular philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa in his work De coniecturis, I presuppose an internal (conceptual) relation between the personal experience of God of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) in 1438 and, on the other hand, his philosophy. I hence try to describe the precise character of this relation. Referring to the Norwegian scholars Egil Wyller and Viggo Rossvær, I assume that there is a circularity in Cusanus’ philosophy which appears as self-references (= a sentence refers to itself: A is explained by B and B is explained by A). Wyller finds three phases in the thought of Cusanus (1. De docta ignorantia I-III, 2. De coniecturis I-II, 3. all subsequent works). Rossvær finds it impossible to presuppose certain phases, as the philosophy of Cusanus continuously proceeds and remains open to new ideas. As Cusanus however treats his experience of God far more consciously in his second work De coniecturis than in De docta ignorantia, I find it possible to distinguish between the earlier Cusanus (De docta ignorantia including his earlier works) and the later Cusanus (De coniecturis, about 1444, as well as the following works). Cusanus creates a philosophy of language in outline expressed in De coniecturis, in which he presents two concepts of necessity, i.e. absolute necessity and logical, or reasonable, necessity. These are interrelated in the sense that the mind, or the self, logically affirms the absolute, or unsayable, necessity, which shows itself in the mind and which the mind affirms conjecturally. The endeavour conceptually to understand absolute necessity implies intuitive (or intellectual) contemplation, or vision (investigatio symbolica), in which the four mental unities (the absolute, the intellectual, the rational and the sensuous) work together according to the rules described in De coniecturis. In De coniecturis Cusanus obviously turns from a negative concept of the unsayable to a paradigmatic, which implies that he looks for principles of speaking of the unsayable and presents the idea of a divine language (divinaliter). However, he leaves this idea behind after De coniecturis, although he continues to create new concepts of the unsayable and incomprehensible. The intellectual language of absolute seeing is expressed in the subjunctive, i.e. conditionally. In order to describe the unsayable, Cusanus uses tautologies, the primary one of which is a concept of God, i.e. non aliud est non aliud quam non aliud (the non-other is non-other than the nonother). Wyller considers this the crucial point of the philosophy of Cusanus (De non aliud), described by the latter as the definition of definitions, i.e. the absolute definition. However, this definition is empty regarding its content. It demonstrates that God surpasses the coincidence of opposites (coincidentia oppositorum) and that he is “superunsayable” (superineffabilis), i.e. he is beyond what can be conceived or said. Nothing hence prevents us from speaking of him, provided that he is described as unsayable (= the paradigmatic concept of the unsayable). Here the mode of seeing is decisive. Cusanus in this context (and especially in his later literary production) uses modalities which concern possibility and necessity. His aim is to conduct any willing reader ahead on the way of life (philosophia mentalis). In De coniecturis II he describes the notion of human self-consciousness as the basis of spiritual mutuality in accordance with the humanistic tradition of his time. I mainly oppose the negatively determined concept of Christian mysticism presented by the German philosopher Kurt Flasch and prefer the presentation of Burkhard Mojsisch of the translogical and conjectural use of language in De coniecturis. In particular, I take account of the Scandinavian research, basically that of Johannes Sløk, Birgit H. Helander, Egil Wyller and Viggo Rossvær, who all consider the personal experience of God described by Cusanus a tacit precondition of his philosophy.

Deus, mente e mundo: sobre os conceitos de complicatio, imago e explicatio a partir do diálogo de mente de nicolau de cusa

This work deals with the way how the three themes of traditional metaphysics, namely, God, man, and the world, are rethought through the philosophical speculation of German cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). Due to the comprehensiveness of this subject, our dissertation had as a starting point and constant reference the book that the philosopher wrote in 1450, Idiota. De mente, the second written work that makes up the series of the Idiota (Idiotae libri), whose discussion is developed around the theme of the human mind. From the dialogue of the mind we have built our reflection on some issues and theoretical foundations presented in Idiota. De sapientia and De docta ignorantia, extending it to little more than that. According to Nicholas of Cusa, the human mind, in its creative character in the image of the divine mind, transcends the purely functional considerations commonly assigned to it, that is, those that regard its cognitive nature and epistemological role. In addition to these aspects, Cusanus understands the humana mens as a point of articulation of two other main themes of his metaphysics: God and the world. In this context, through the concepts of complicatioexplicatio and imago, as well as with the intercession between the themes of man as imago Dei and the reason of the microcosm, we present here an introduction to Cusan metaphysics

Visio intellectualis : Nicolás de Cusa y Schelling

Este trabajo pretende descubrir una proximidad sistemática entre el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa y el idealismo alemán, en particular, en torno a la noción de "visio intellectualis" entendida en el plano teórico del conocimiento. Pretende demostrar que lo que el Cusano piensa como "visión intelectual" acaba por no ser otra cosa que el "Yo que se contempla a sí mismo" ("selbst anschauende Ich") en el que piensa Schelling y, así, que aquello que está en la base del pensamiento cusano y que se ha sido pensado a su manera en su tiempo, es lo mismo que fue mostrado en el tiempo de Schelling y a la manera de Schelling.

Visio intellectualis : Nicolás de Cusa y Schelling

Este trabajo pretende descubrir una proximidad sistemática entre el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa y el idealismo alemán, en particular, en torno a la noción de "visio intellectualis" entendida en el plano teórico del conocimiento. Pretende demostrar que lo que el Cusano piensa como "visión intelectual" acaba por no ser otra cosa que el "Yo que se contempla a sí mismo" ("selbst anschauende Ich") en el que piensa Schelling y, así, que aquello que está en la base del pensamiento cusano y que se ha sido pensado a su manera en su tiempo, es lo mismo que fue mostrado en el tiempo de Schelling y a la manera de Schelling.

Visio intellectualis : Nicolás de Cusa y Schelling

Este trabajo pretende descubrir una proximidad sistemática entre el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa y el idealismo alemán, en particular, en torno a la noción de "visio intellectualis" entendida en el plano teórico del conocimiento. Pretende demostrar que lo que el Cusano piensa como "visión intelectual" acaba por no ser otra cosa que el "Yo que se contempla a sí mismo" ("selbst anschauende Ich") en el que piensa Schelling y, así, que aquello que está en la base del pensamiento cusano y que se ha sido pensado a su manera en su tiempo, es lo mismo que fue mostrado en el tiempo de Schelling y a la manera de Schelling.