The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

The Informational Value of Corporate Credit Ratings

This thesis examines the quality of credit ratings issued by the three major credit rating agencies - Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. If credit ratings are informative, then prices of underlying credit instruments such as fixed-income securities and credit default insurance should change to reflect the new credit risk information. Using data on 246 different major fixed income securities issuers and spanning January 2000 to December 2011, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) spreads do not react to changes in credit ratings. Hence credit ratings for all three agencies are not price informative. CDS prices are mostly determined by historical CDS prices while ratings are mostly determined by historical ratings. We find that credit ratings are marginally more sensitive to CDS than CDS are sensitive to ratings.

The effects of corporate social performance on the cost of corporate debt and credit ratings

This study investigates the differential impact that various dimensions of corporate social performance have on the pricing of corporate debt as well as the assessment of the credit quality of specific bond issues. The empirical analysis, based on an extensive longitudinal data set, suggests that overall, good performance is rewarded and corporate social transgressions are penalized through lower and higher corporate bond yield spreads, respectively. Similar conclusions can be drawn when focusing on either the bond rating assigned to a specific debt issue or the probability of it being considered to be an asset of speculative grade.

Credit ratings and government bonds evidence before, during and after the european debt crisis

Neste projeto, investigamos se as agências de rating e as taxas de juro de longo prazo da dívida soberana tiveram uma influência recíproca antes, durante e após a crise da dívida soberana Europeia. Esta análise é realizada, estimando a relação existente entre os ratings da dívida soberana ou taxas de juro e factores macroeconomicos e estruturais, através de uma diferente aplicação de metodologias utilizadas para este efeito. Os resultados obtidos demonstram que, no período da crise soberana, os ratings e as taxas de juros tiveram um mútuo impacto, sugerindo que as descidas dos ratings podem ter conduzido a profecias auto-realizáveis, levando países relativamente estáveis a um eventual incumprimento

The effect of timeliness and credit ratings on the information content of earnings announcements

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of timeliness and credit ratings on the information content of the earnings announcements of Greek listed firms from 2001 to 2008. Using the classical event study methodology and regression analysis, we find that firms tend to release good news on time and are inclined to delay the release of bad news. We also provide evidence that the level of corporate risk differentiates the information content of earnings according to the credit rating category. Specifically, firms displaying high creditworthiness enjoy positive excess returns on earnings announcement dates. In contrast, firms with low creditworthiness undergo significant share price erosions on earnings announcement days. We also observe a substitution effect between timeliness and credit ratings in relation to the information content of earnings announcements. Specifically, we find that as the credit category of earnings-announcing firms improves, the informational role of timeliness is mitigated.

Comparative analysis of Spanish Banks’ Standalone credit profile

The paper studies the relationship between four differently rated bank’s financial profile and their standalone credit rating issued by Moody’s. The comparative analysis shows an example that despite their pricing power and geographical coverage, larger banks do not necessarily have better credit ratings. Instead, business model and risk appetite seem to be the defining factors of banks’ vulnerability to shocks, such as the Spanish real estate crisis. The risk-return relationship is also identified in the banks’ fundamentals meaning that while expansionary strategy in riskier asset classes enhances margins, it also potentially distorts the credit risk profile.

Forecasting US bond default ratings allowing for previous and initial state dependence in an ordered probit model

In this paper we investigate the ability of a number of different ordered probit models to predict ratings based on firm-specific data on business and financial risks. We investigate models based on momentum, drift and ageing and compare them against alternatives that take into account the initial rating of the firm and its previous actual rating. Using data on US bond issuing firms rated by Fitch over the years 2000 to 2007 we compare the performance of these models in predicting the rating in-sample and out-of-sample using root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano tests of forecast performance and contingency tables. We conclude that initial and previous states have a substantial influence on rating prediction.

Sovereign Credit Rating Announcements and Equity Market Response: Evidence from the European Markets

This thesis examines the equity market reactions on credit rating announcements. The study covers 12 European countries during the period of 2000-2012. By using an event study methodology and daily collected stock market returns, the impact of the sovereign credit rating announcements to national stock indices is examined. The thesis finds evidence for the rating downgrades having a statistically significant negative effect on the stock markets. This finding is in line with earlier literature (see Brooks, 2004). The paper also discusses whether the changes in the sovereign credit ratings are contagious, anticipated by the market, and persistent. There is some evidence found for the contagion effects in case of downgrades, but not for upgrades. Markets seem to anticipate rating upgrades, but not downgrades. In addition, market´s reaction towards rating announcements seems not to be persistent.

How Is Credit Risk Estimated? Discussion and Evidence based on Cross-Industry Sample Utilizing the KMV Model

The purpose of this thesis is to focus on credit risk estimation. Different credit risk estimation methods and characteristics of credit risk are discussed. The study is twofold, including an interview of a credit risk specialist and a quantitative section. Quantitative section applies the KMV model to estimate credit risk of 12 sample companies from three different industries: automobile, banking and financial sector and technology. Timeframe of the estimation is one year. On the basis of the KMV model and the interview, implications for analysis of credit risk are discussed. The KMV model yields consistent results with the existing credit ratings. However, banking and financial sector requires calibration of the model due to high leverage of the industry. Credit risk is considerably driven by leverage, value and volatility of assets. Credit risk models produce useful information on credit worthiness of a business. Yet, quantitative models often require qualitative support in the decision-making situation.

Effects of credit rating change on risk-taking

This thesis investigates whether there are changes in risk-taking behavior following an upgrade or downgrade in credit ratings. Research on effects of rating changes on capital markets is well-documented but the literature on how rating changes may affect firm behavior is sparse. Following, a downgrade in credit rating, managers may increase risk-taking to improve their overall performance or reduce risk-taking following upgrades to ensure that their performance is assessed more on the basis of what they may deem success in the form of an upgrade. Using a sample of firms trading in the U.S from 1994-2013, we find evidence of change in risk-taking behavior. We use cross-sectional regressions and matching using propensity scores and Barber and Lyon (1997) methodology to measure changes in risk-taking and we do find evidence of changes in managerial risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, we find that the direction of change (increase or decrease) in some cases is dependent on the type of measure rather than the type of rating change.