The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

Answering the Call of the European Court of Justice in Eurofoods a Proposed Package of Due Process Rights with a View Toward the 2012 Revision of the European Insolvency Regulation. IES WORKING PAPER 3/2011

This paper anticipates the 2012 revision of the European Insolvency Regulation, which is the sole Union legislation on the subject of cross border insolvency proceedings. The paper first describes the historical background of the Regulation. The salient point of the historical discussion is that the Regulation is the product of forty years of negotiation and arises from a historical context that is no longer applicable to current economic realities, i.e. it provides for liquidation, not reorganization, it doesn’t deal with cross border groups of companies, and it lacks an effective mechanism for transparency and creditor participation. The paper then reviews the unique hybrid jurisdictional system of concurrent universal and territorial proceedings that the Regulation imposes. It looks at this scheme from a practical viewpoint, i.e. what issues arise with concurrent proceedings in two states, involving the same assets, the same creditors, and the same company. The paper then focuses on a significant issue raised by the European Court of Justice in the Eurofoods case, i.e. the need to comply with fundamental due process principles that, while not articulated in the Regulation, lie at the core of Union law. Specifically, the paper considers the ramifications of the Court’s holding that “a Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State where the decision to open the proceedings was taken in flagrant breach of the fundamental right to be heard.” In response to the Court’s direction, this paper proposes a package of due process rights, consisting principally of an accessible, efficient and useful insolvency database, the infrastructure of which already exists, but the content and use of which has not yet been developed. As part of a cohesive three part due process package, the paper also proposes the formation of cross border creditors' committees and the establishment of a European Insolvency Administrator. Finally, on the institutional level, this paper proposes that the revision of the Regulation and the development of the insolvency database not only need to be coordinated, but need to be conceptualized, managed and undertaken, not as the separate efforts of diverse institutions, but as a single, unified endeavor.

The house that the Court built. The retained powers case law of the European Court of Justice and the constitutional structure of the Union

Euroopan unionin perustamissopimusten katsotaan muodostavan EU:n valtiosäännön, jonka rajat ovat kuitenkin perustamissopimusten määräysten väljän muotoilun sekä Euroopan unionin tuomioistuimen tulkintakäytännön valossa epätarkat. Etenkin kysymys unionin ja sen jäsenvaltioiden välisestä toimivallanjaosta on EU-oikeudellisen tutkimuksen klassikoita. Tarkastelen pro gradu -tutkielmassani unionin valtiosääntörakennetta ja unionioikeuden kokonaisvaikutusta jäsenvaltioiden toimivaltojen käyttöön erityisesti EU-tuomioistuimen ratkaisukäytännössään kehittämän niin kutsutun retained powers -doktriinin valossa. Kyseisen opin mukaan EU-oikeus asettaa vaatimuksia jäsenvaltioiden toimivaltojen käytölle myös niillä aloilla, joilla sääntelytoimivalta on jäänyt jäsenvaltioille eikä sitä ole jaettu unionin kanssa. Aiheen teoreettisen tarkastelun pohjalta analysoin Euroopaun unionin tuomioistuimen ratkaisukäytäntöä erityisesti yhtä säilytetyn toimivallan alaa, koulutusta, koskevissa tapauksissa pyrkien havaitsemaan typologioita tuomioistuimen ratkaisutoiminnassa. Tutkimus noudattaa EU-valtiosääntöoikeuden metodologiaa. Keskeisenä lähdemateriaalina on siten käytetty unionituomioistuimen ratkaisukäytäntöä, joka heijastaa perustamissopimuksia tarkemmin unionin valtiosääntörakennetta. Oikeuskäytännön analyysi ja tulkinta on suoritettu peilaten sitä vasten unionin kehitystä markkinaorientoituneesta organisaatiosta yleismaailmalliseksi poliittiseksi unioniksi. Tutkielmani loppupäätelmä on, että jäsenvaltiot ovat tietyissä rajoissa hyväksyneet unionituomioistuimen kehittämän doktriinin, ja unionituomioistuin on siten saanut aikaan tosiasiallisen muutoksen EU:n valtiosääntörakenteessa. Retained powers -doktriini on omiaan syventämään eurooppalaista integraatiota ja nostaa kysymyksiä toimivallanjaon merkityksestä unionioikeudessa, perustamissopimusten kyvystä heijastaa unionin valtiosääntörakennetta sekä unionituomioistuimen toiminnan poliittisesta luonteesta.

"Judicial Activism in the ""Eye of the Beholder"" : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Human Rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories"

Il est mondialement reconnu que les institutions judiciaires jouent un rôle central dans le processus de prise de décisions politiques, à la fois au niveau national et international. C’est d’ailleurs le cas à la Haute Cour de justice d’Israël. L’étendue de son succès (ou de son échec) dans la tentative de trouver une solution aux violations des droits humains dans les territoires occupés est un problème qui continue de faire l’objet de bien des débats et de recherches académiques. À cet égard, il a été suggéré que, malgré l’absence de constitution écrite et l’existence d’un état d’urgence prolongé en Israël, la Haute Cour de justice a réussi à adopter une approche « judiciairement active » quant à la protection et la promotion des droits de l’homme de manière générale, y compris ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. Dans cette perspective, le débat sur le processus d’examen judiciaire de la Haute Cour de Justice tient pour acquise la notion qu’Israël est une démocratie. Ainsi, cet article cherche à examiner cette hypothèse. Premièrement, en adoptant la position que le processus de révision judiciaire est compatible avec la démocratie et la règle de loi. Deuxièmement, il examine l’approche « judiciairement active » de la Cour et soumet un bref aperçu du processus, des outils et des principes légaux que la Cour adopte pour examiner les actions des autorités israéliennes, y compris l’armée, et imposer une loi commune de protection des droits de la personne, donc ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. L’article argumente également que le contrôle prolongé des territoires occupés par Israël a eu des conséquences significatives, car tout effort fourni par la Cour pour garantir le respect des droits humains de la population civile palestinienne doit se faire sans compromettre la sécurité du pouvoir israélien. La conclusion à laquelle on arrive ici dépend de la façon dont on qualifie ce contrôle: une occupation à long terme ou une annexion (ce qui n’est pas réglementaire par rapport à loi internationale), ce qui n’est pas sans conséquence sur le rôle que la Haute Cour de justice peut effectivement jouer pour faire respecter les droits de la personne dans les territoires occupés.

Translation of the Decision of the International Court of Justice related to the Case concerning the dispute regarding navigational and related rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) Judgment

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The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.