Field manual 3-24 and the heritage of counterinsurgency theory

The Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24 has been accused of being over-dependent on the counterinsurgency 'classics' Galula and Thompson. But comparison reveals that it is different in spirit. Galula and Thompson seek practical control; the Manual seeks to build 'legitimacy'. Its concept of legitimacy is superficially Weberian, but owes more to the writings of the American Max Manwaring. The Manual presupposes that a rights-based legal order can (other things being equal) be made to be cross-culturally attractive; 'effective governance' by itself can build legitimacy. The fusion of its methods with an ideology creates unrealistic criteria for success. Its weaknesses suggest a level of incapacity to think politically that will, in time, result in further failures.

Insurgencies and counterinsurgency strategies: patterns and dilemmas

The roots of insurgencies and counterinsurgency go back to Antiquity, and consistent patterns can be traced. These include the state's use of its own armed forces against insurgents who tend to be inferior in terms of armaments, and states' attempts to delegitimize violent aimed to overthrow it, and the need for insurgents to recur to illegal means to challenge the state's power. Very often insurgents have to team up with criminal networks in order to do so, undermining their ability to claim legitimacy.

Terrorism, guerrilla warfare/counterinsurgency/low-intensity conflict, and revolutions : 1986-June 1988 /

"June 1988."

Shades of CORDS in the Kush : the false hope of "unity of effort" in American counterinsurgency /

"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.

The iatrogenic reflex and belief that repression can coercively suppress asymmetric coercive violence : does very robust action by the government decrease functional support for insurgents?

Non-state insurgent actors are too weak to compel powerful adversaries to their will, so they use violence to coerce. A principal objective is to grow and sustain violent resistance to the point that it either militarily challenges the state, or more commonly, generates unacceptable political costs. To survive, insurgents must shift popular support away from the state and to grow they must secure it. State actor policies and actions perceived as illegitimate and oppressive by the insurgent constituency can generate these shifts. A promising insurgent strategy is to attack states in ways that lead angry publics and leaders to discount the historically established risks and take flawed but popular decisions to use repressive measures. Such decisions may be enabled by a visceral belief in the power of coercion and selective use of examples of where robust measures have indeed suppressed resistance. To avoid such counterproductive behaviours the cases of apparent 'successful repression' must be understood. This thesis tests whether robust state action is correlated with reduced support for insurgents, analyses the causal mechanisms of such shifts and examines whether such reduction is because of compulsion or coercion? The approach is founded on prior research by the RAND Corporation which analysed the 30 insurgencies most recently resolved worldwide to determine factors of counterinsurgent success. This new study first re-analyses their data at a finer resolution with new queries that investigate the relationship between repression and insurgent active support. Having determined that, in general, repression does not correlate with decreased insurgent support, this study then analyses two cases in which the data suggests repression seems likely to be reducing insurgent support: the PKK in Turkey and the insurgency against the Vietnamese-sponsored regime after their ousting of the Khmer Rouge. It applies 'structured-focused' case analysis with questions partly built from the insurgency model of Leites and Wolf, who are associated with the advocacy of US robust means in Vietnam. This is thus a test of 'most difficult' cases using a 'least likely' test model. Nevertheless, the findings refute the deterrence argument of 'iron fist' advocates. Robust approaches may physically prevent effective support of insurgents but they do not coercively deter people from being willing to actively support the insurgency.

Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: pacificação, território e militarização

Pretende-se uma análise crítica do projeto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs), procurando entender como ele aparece como uma resposta possível para os problemas urbanos e de segurança na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Em primeiro lugar, volta-se à importação do ideal civilizatório pelo Brasil no início do século XIX e o surgimento da polícia e de uma questão urbana na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. O resgate histórico permite entender o surgimento das favelas e de uma cidade partida. Em seguida, trata-se do aspecto da pacificação das UPPs, retomando o sentido que essa ideia teve ao longo da história do Brasil, em especial como subjugação dos povos indígenas e como repressão às insurreições da primeira metade do século XIX. Em um segundo momento, volta-se à configuração da governamentalidade policial no Rio de Janeiro e no Brasil, do surgimento das polícias à racionalidade governamental do neoliberalismo. Demonstra-se como a polícia surge como um agente civilizador e como uma racionalidade autoritária da militarização e da criminologia do outro marca as polícias brasileiras, o que explica sua histórica atuação violenta voltada às classes subalternas. Em seguida, partindo da concepção de território pressuposta pelas UPPs, elabora-se sua crítica, observando que constituem uma política de ocupação militarizada do território que reforça uma geografia das desigualdades e promove uma nova forma de territorialização. Por fim, trata-se dos mecanismos que a governamentalidade neoliberal assume na gestão da questão urbana no Rio de Janeiro, a partir das ideias de urbanismo militar e empresarialismo urbano.O urbanismo militar é entendido como a extensão de ideias militares para os espaços e circulações cotidianos, o que leva a uma tendência internacional de militarização da segurança pública e proliferação de territórios de exceção. Nesse contexto, a política das UPPs guarda proximidades com as ocupações das favelas em Porto Príncipe pela MINUSTAH, os territórios palestinos ocupados por Israel, acontrainsurgência estadunidense no Iraque e Afeganistão e os Proyectos Urbanos Integrales em Medellín, nos quais se inspirou. Mas condizem também com o ideal do empresarialismo urbano, modelo baseado na competitividade das cidades orientada para o mercado. Trata-se, portanto, de um projeto de controle militarizado das favelas, necessário para os megaeventos e para a construção de uma imagem de cidade maravilhosa.

Modele strategii w konfliktach asymetrycznych na przykładzie działań zbrojnych w Iraku w latach 2003-2011

Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa

From Empire to Iraq and the "War on Terror": The Transplanation and Commodification of the (Northern) Irish Policing Experience

Charting the enduring export appeal of policing models from (Northern) Ireland, this article sheds some light on the processes by which policing models are communicated and actively promoted to the global policing environment. The authors demonstrate how the transplantation of the Irish colonial model (ICM) represents an early example of the globalization of policing. The legacy of counterinsurgency expertise embedded within the ICM remains a historical constant and is a key factor in relation to the increasing commodification of the contemporary Northern Irish policing model, a model that successfully blends counterterrorism experience with a template for democratic policing reform. By juxtaposing these models, the authors provide a conceptual framework through which to assess the contemporary substance of policing transfer. The authors conclude by suggesting that the seductiveness of these policing models is largely attributable to lessons in counterinsurgency and notions of "Ireland as the solution" to a host of complex security scenarios.