Breakfast at Tiffany's': eBay Inc., trade mark law, and counterfeiting

In an exploration of intellectual property and fashion, this article examines the question of the intermediary liability of online auction-houses for counterfeiting. In the United States, the illustrious jewellery store, Tiffany & Co, brought a legal action against eBay Inc, alleging direct trademark infringement, contributory trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition and trademark dilution. The luxury store depicted the online auction-house as a pirate bazaar, a flea-market and a haven for counterfeiting. During epic litigation, eBay Inc successfully defended itself against these allegations in a United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Tiffany & Co made a desperate, unsuccessful effort to appeal the matter to the Supreme Court of the United States. The matter featured a number of interventions from amicus curiae — Tiffany was supported by Coty, the Fashion Designer's Guild, and the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition, while eBay was defended by publicly-spirited civil society groups such as Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Citizen, and Public Knowledge as well as Yahoo!, Google Inc, Amazon.com, and associations representing telecommunications carriers and internet service providers. The litigation in the United States can be counterpointed with the fusillade of legal action against eBay in the European Union. In contrast to Tiffany & Co, Louis Vuitton triumphed over eBay in the French courts — claiming its victory as vindication of the need to protect the commercial interests and cultural heritage of France. However, eBay has fared somewhat better in a dispute with L’Oréal in Great Britain and the European Court of Justice. It is argued that, in a time of flux and uncertainty, Australia should follow the position of the United States courts in Tiffany & Co v eBay Inc. The final part examines the ramifications of this litigation over online auction-houses for trade mark law reform and consumer rights; parallel disputes over intermediary liability and safe harbours in the field of copyright law and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2010. The conclusion calls for a revision of trade mark law, animated by a respect for consumers’ rights and interests in the electronic marketplace.

Notes on cases in Lennox and Worcester, 1789

Contains notes on cases before the Supreme Court in Lennox and Worcester, Massachusetts relating to counterfeiting, libel, and fraud.

Know your money.

Mode of access: Internet.

Know your money.

Mode of access: Internet.

Comments on S. 214--a bill to enhance the integrity of the Social Security card /

"April 18,1990."

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

Vergonha e comportamento de consumo de produtos falsificados

A vergonha é uma emoção autoconsciente e avaliadora que depende de uma série de cognições relacionadas ao self para ser experimentada. Apesar de amplamente estudada na psicologia, no marketing pouco se sabe sobre os antecedentes da vergonha e seu efeito no comportamento do consumidor, em especial no consumo de produtos falsificados. O objetivo geral desse estudo é entender a relação entre vergonha e comportamentos de consumo de produtos falsificados. Dois procedimentos experimentais, numa amostra de 129 pessoas com idade entre 18 e 50 anos, foram realizados para analisar seis hipóteses apresentadas. O primeiro experimento verificou (a) se o risco social percebido alto aumenta a vergonha, (b) se a qualidade da falsificação (alta/baixa) modera a relação entre risco social percebido e vergonha, caso esta relação exista. Os resultados confirmaram o efeito esperado do risco social percebido na vergonha, mas não confirmaram a moderação da qualidade da falsificação nessa relação. Mostraram ainda um efeito inesperado do gênero na vergonha: homens sentem mais vergonha que mulheres no contexto de consumo de falsificados. O segundo experimento verificou (a) se a antecipação da vergonha reduz a intenção de compra de produtos falsificados, (b) se a antecipação de vergonha influencia a atitude (favorável/desfavorável) em relação a produtos falsificados, e (c) se estas duas últimas relações, caso existam, são moderadas pelo custo-benefício do produto. Os resultados não confirmaram a influência da antecipação da vergonha na atitude em relação a falsificados e na intenção de compra de falsificados, mas mostraram que quanto menor o custo-benefício, maior o efeito da antecipação da vergonha na redução da intenção de produtos falsificados. Os resultados mostraram ainda um efeito moderador inesperado da renda na relação entre antecipação da vergonha e intenção de compra de falsificados. A antecipação da vergonha reduz a intenção de compras em consumidores com renda mais alta.

The Garden, or, Familiar instructions for the laying out and management of a flower garden /

Publisher's catalog, [4] p. following t.p.

Evaluación de la efectividad de la marca LG en el ámbito de la percepción de marca usando una herramienta de simulación computacional

Cuando las empresas evalúan los resultados de su planeación estratégica y de mercadeo se enfrentan en numerosas ocasiones al escepticismo sobre cómo dicha planeación favoreció o afectó la percepción hacia la empresa y sus productos. Este proyecto propone por medio del uso de una herramienta de simulación computacional reducir el factor de incertidumbre de LG Electronics en el valor percibido de marca por la población de Bogotá D.C. en cada una de sus líneas de producto; el grado de inversión en mercadeo, publicidad, distribución y servicio. Para ello los consumidores son modelados como agentes inteligentes con poder de recomendación, quienes se basan principalmente en la experiencia generada por el producto y en el grado de influencia de las estrategias de mercadeo que afectan su decisión de compra, de preferencia y de permanencia. Adicionalmente se mide la retribución en utilidades y en recordación de marca de las inversiones en mercadeo que la compañía realiza.