Shareholder participation in the corporation

Given that recent empirical happiness findings demonstrate that psychological needs are more important to individuals than the generation of wealth, the coporation should be considered as a mechanism utilised by individuals, through the acquisition of shares, to satisfy psychological needs, rather thean simply a means to generate and maximise wealth.

Corporate governance, accounting and finance: a review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.

The new governance approach to the devolution of corporate governance

The moral arguments associated with justice, fairness and communitarianism have rejected the exclusivity of cost‐benefit analysis in corporate governance. Particularly, the percepts of new governance (NG) have included distributive aspects in efficiency models focused on maximizing profits. While corporate directors were only assigned to look after the return of investment within the traditional framework of corporate governance (CG), NG has created the scope for them to look beyond the set of contractual liabilities. This article explores how and how far NG notions have contributed to the devolution of CG to create internal strategies focusing on actors, ethics and accountability in corporate self-regulation.

The corporate governance effects of audit committees

Arguments associated with the promotion of audit committees in many countries are premised on their potential for alleviating weaknesses in corporate governance. This paper provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is argued that there is only limited and mixed evidence of effects to support claims and perceptions about the value of audit committees for these elements of governance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behaviour. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (i) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (ii) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (iii) complementing extant research methods with field studie, and; (iv) investigation of unintended (behavioural) as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

The Corporate Governance Effects of Audit Committee

This chapter provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics, and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behavior. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (1) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (2) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (3) complementing extant research methods with field studies; and (4) investigation of unintended as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

Applying metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism to (shareholder and stakeholder) models of corporate governance

There has, in recent decades, been considerable scholarship regarding the moral aspects of corporate governance,and differences in corporate governance practices around the world have been widely documented and investigated. In such a context, the claims associated with moral relativism are relevant. The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed consideration of how the metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism in particular can be applied to corporate governance. This objective is achieved, firstly, by reviewing what is meant by metaethical moral relativism and identifying two ways in which the metaethical claim can be assessed. The possibility of a single, morally superior model of corporate governance is subsequently considered through an analysis of prominent works justifying the shareholder and stakeholder approaches, together with a consideration of academic agreement in this area. The paper then draws on the work of Wong (Moral relativity, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1984, A companion to ethics, Blackwell, Malden, 1993, Natural moralities: A defense of pluralistic relativism,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), firstly in providing an argument supporting metaethical moral relativism and secondly regarding values of tolerance and/or accommodation that can contribute to the normative claim. The paper concludes by proposing an argument that it is morally wrong to impose a model of corporate governance where there are differences in moral judgements relevant to corporate governance, or to interfere with a model in similar circumstances, and closes with consideration of the argument’s implications.

Corporate governance convergence and moral relativism

Research question / issue This paper frames the debate on corporate governance convergence in terms of the morality underlying corporate governance models. The claims and arguments of moral relativism are presented to provide theoretical structure to the moral aspects of corporate governance convergence, and ultimately the normative question of whether convergence should occur. Research findings / insights: The morality underlying different models of corporate governance has largely been ignored in the corporate governance convergence literature. A range of moral philosophies and principles that underlie the dominant corporate governance models are identified. This leads to a consideration of the claims and arguments of moral relativism relating to corporate governance. A research agenda around the claims of Descriptive and Metaethical moral relativism, and which ultimately informs the associated normative argument, is then suggested. Theoretical / Academic implications The application of moral relativism to the debate on corporate governance convergence presents a theoretical structure to the analysis and consideration of its moral aspects. This structure lends itself to further research, both empirical and conceptual. Practitioner / Policy implications The claims and arguments of moral relativism provide a means of analysing calls that are made for a culturally or nationally ‘appropriate’ model of corporate governance. This can assist in providing direction for corporate governance reforms and is of particular relevance for developing countries which have inherited Western corporate governance models through colonialism.

The ethics of corporate governance: A (South)African perspective

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to review the developments in South African corporate governance since the end of apartheid, with a view to identifying themes and points of convergence and/or divergence with other models. Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a critical review of South African corporate governance in the context of political and economic developments. Where relevant, aspects of corporate governance theory (in particular the stakeholder and shareholder debate) are considered in the South African context. Findings – South African corporate governance can be seen to broadly follow Anglo‐American examples with the notable exception of the stakeholder approach of the two King reports. This approach emphasises the responsibilities of companies to various stakeholders and encourages stakeholder engagement as an integral element of company strategy. There has not, however, been any substantial incorporation of stakeholder interests into formal corporate governance structures such as board structure and financial reporting. Practical implications – The ongoing consideration of corporate governance developments in South Africa is important for its continued development in the country and the region. Originality/value – A review of South African corporate governance is timely given the probable release of the third King report in 2009, together with new company legislation.

Corporate Governance in European Banks: Essays on Bank Ownership

Banks are important as they have a central role in the financial system, where funds are channelled either through financial intermediaries, such as banks, or through financial markets, hence promoting growth in any economy. Recently, we have been reminded of the drawbacks of the central role of banks. The current financial crisis, which started out as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, has become a global financial crisis with substantial impact on the real economy in many countries. Some of the roots to the current financial crisis can be sought in the changing role of banks and in bank corporate governance. Moreover, the substantial revitalising measures taken have been justified by the central role of banks. Not only are banks important, they are also very special. The fact that banks are regulated in conjunction with greater opacity, make bank corporate governance different from corporate governance in non-bank companies. Surprisingly little is, however, known about bank corporate governance, in particularly, in a European setting. Hence, the objective of this doctoral thesis is to provide new insights in this research area by examining banks from 37 different European countries. Each of the three essays included in the doctoral thesis examines a particular aspect of bank corporate governance. In the first essay the interaction between the regulatory environment a bank operates in and its ownership structure is explored. Indicators of the severity of the moral hazard problem induced by the deposit insurance system and implicit too-big-to-fail government guarantee, particular features of deposit insurance systems as well as legal protection of shareholders, legal origin of a country and level of integration to the European community are used in the analysis. The empirical findings confirm previous findings on the link between legal protection of shareholders and ownership structure. Moreover, they show that differences in deposit insurance system features can explain some of the differences in ownership structure across European banks. In the second essay the impact of management and board ownership on the profitability of banks with different strategy is examined. The empirical findings suggest that the efficiency of these two particular corporate governance mechanisms varies with the characteristics of the agency problem faced by the bank. More specifically, management ownership is important in opaque non-traditional banks, whereas board ownership is important in traditional banks, where deposit insurance reduces the monitoring incentives of outsiders. The higher profitability does, however, go together with higher risk. In the third essay the profitability and risk of commercial, savings and cooperative banks are compared. The empirical findings suggest that distinct operational and ownership characteristics rather than only the mere fact that a bank is a commercial, savings or cooperative bank explain the profitability and risk differences. The main insight from the three essays is that a number of different aspects should be addressed simultaneously in order to give the complexity of bank corporate governance justice.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Independent Directors and Corporate Governance

The paper examines the reliance placed in the United Kingdom and Australia on the concept of ‘independent directors’ as a mechanism to ensure better (less crisis prone) corporate governance. The article suggests that there is an over emphasis placed on some rather limited psychological evidence that independence in the boardroom produces more critical thinking and informed discussion thus leading to higher quality decision-making. The article offers others evidence, drawn from the material on the psychology of group formation and group discussion, which suggests that this confidence in ‘independence’ is misplaced. The article exposes a misunderstanding between independence as a character trait and independence as a structural concern which goes to the heart of the corporate governance discourse around the benefits of independence.

Corporate Governance in Canadian and US Credit Unions

This report, a collaborative effort between the Filene Research Institute and the Credit Union Central of Canada, with participation from the Desjardins Group, follows on two recent governance projects: Tracking the Relationship Between Credit Union Governance and Performance and a three-part series by Professor Robert Hoel about how boards can add more value. Beyond these, the academic literature of corporate governance is well developed, so this study includes an in-depth review of financial institution governance research and calls out the differences between credit unions and other firms. Also, because surveys can only go so far in teasing out insights, the authors followed up with a dozen interviews with credit unions of all sizes across all three major North American credit union systems.

Because the report is survey-based, large swaths of the findings compare major and minor details of different (and often not-so-different) approaches to governance in the three systems and among differently sized credit unions. From those comparisons, some interesting differences emerge. For example, as a federated system, Desjardins excels at some aspects of board development and system governance in ways that the more atomized US and Canadian credit union systems do not.

Does the existing Corporate Governance structure and strict Legal Framework, affect the strategic decisionmaking of CEOs?

This thesis is a case study on Corporate Governance and Business Ethics, using the Portuguese Corporate Law as a general setting. The thesis was conducted in Portugal with illustrations on past cases under the Business Judgment Rule of the State of Delaware, U.SA along with illustrations on current cases in Portugal under the Portuguese Judicial setting, along with a comparative analysis between both. A debate is being considered among scholars and executives; a debate on best practices within corporate governance and corporate law, associated with recent discoveries of unlawful investments that lead to the bankruptcy of leading institutions and an aggravation of the crisis in Portugal. The study aimed at learning possible reasons and causes for the current situation of the country’s corporations along with attempts to discover the best way to move forward. From the interviews and analysis conducted, this paper concluded that the corporate governance structure and legal frameworks in Portugal were not the sole influencers behind the actions and decisions of Corporate Executives, nor were they the main triggers for the recent corporate mishaps. But it is rather a combination of different factors that played a significant role, such as cultural and ethical aspects, individual personalities, and others all of which created gray areas beyond the legal structure, which in turn accelerated and aggravated the corporate governance crisis in the country.

The carbon disclosure project, an evolution in international environmental corporate governance : motivations and determinants of market response to voluntary disclosures

This paper examines the factors associated with Canadian firms voluntarily disclosing climate change information through the Carbon Disclosure Project. Five hypotheses are presented to explain the factors influencing management's decision to disclose this information. These hypotheses include a response to shareholder activism, domestic institutional investor shareholder activism, signalling, litigation risk, and low cost publicity. Both binary logistic regressions as well as a cross-sectional analysis of the equity market's response to the environmental disclosures being made were used to test these hypotheses. Support was found for shareholder activism, low cost publicity, and litigation risk. However, the equity market's response was not found to be statistically significant.

Convergence of corporate governance : comparative study in Canada and in China

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M.)"